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I. INTRODUCTION
Contemporary democracies are undergoing a radical transformation: public
authority is migrating from the national realm to the global arena.1 The institutions
through which we seek to protect ourselves from physical violence, promote
economic prosperity, keep the environment clean, and further the other attributes of
the good life are now as much global as national. Domestic legislatures, executive
branches, courts, and administrative agencies do not decide alone. They are
constrained by the decisions of international bureaucrats, they abide by the rules
adopted by transnational networks of regulators, and they comply with the decisions
of international tribunals. By establishing, participating in, and adhering to global
regimes, domestic polities today share power with government officials and citizens
elsewhere in the world and with international organizations to an extent that is
unprecedented in recent memory.
What shape will global authority take? What configuration of public power and
rights against government will emerge? This Article takes a first step towards
developing a positive theory of rights in institutions of global governance through a
study of the European Commission, one of the oldest and most powerful
international organizations in existence today. Rights, it turns out, are creatures of
historical challenges to international organizations, based on national constitutional
traditions, and the calculated, rights-innovative responses of those organizations.
The Commission began in 1952 as a specialized international secretariat
responsible for the administration of European coal and steel production in six
member countries.2 In 1957, the same countries signed the Treaty of Rome, in which
they made ambitious commitments to a common market in goods, services, capital,
and labor. The state parties entrusted the Commission with the far-reaching powers
of a classic executive branch.3 Yet the Commission was conceived as an
1

See Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence 258 (3d ed. 2001).
The founding treaties of the European Union are the Treaty of Paris Establishing the European
Coal and Steel Community (1951) [“ECSC Treaty”]; the Treaty of Rome Establishing the European
Economic Community (1957), in 1992 renamed the European Community [“Treaty of Rome”, “EC
Treaty” or “TEC”]; the Treaty of Rome Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (1957);
and the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (1992) [“Maastricht Treaty”]. The articles of the EC Treaty
and the Maastricht Treaty were renumbered in the Amsterdam Treaty (1997). On June 18, 2004, the
Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (“Constitutional Treaty” or “TCE”) was approved by
European Heads of State. It was signed in Rome on October 29, 2004 and then submitted to each of the
Member States for ratification. The Constitutional Treaty would replace the EC Treaty and the Maastricht
Treaty. The ECSC Treaty expired in 2002. Under the ECSC Treaty, the Commission was known as the
“High Authority.” A protocol to the Constitutional Treaty modifies, but does not replace, the Treaty of
Rome Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community.
3
Aside from the treaties, there are three important types of legal acts in the European Union
(“EU”): European laws (which include what are known as Directives and Regulations), European
implementing regulations (which include what are known as implementing Directives and implementing
Regulations), and European decisions. See TCE, arts. I-33-39. There are six important government bodies:
the European Council, which is composed of Heads of States and meets every six months to agree on
treaty amendments and other types of major political change; the Council of Ministers (“Council”), on
which government representatives of the Member States sit and vote; the European Commission
(“Commission”), staffed by civil servants and headed by a President and College of Commissioners
appointed by the Member States with the consent of the European Parliament; the European Parliament,
directly elected since 1979 through national elections; the Court of Justice, the highest court of the EU;
and the Court of First Instance, established in 1988 to hear cases brought by individuals against European
2

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=648541
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organization responsible for administering an international regime, in which the
participants were states, not citizens. Hence individual rights were largely absent
from the Treaty of Rome.
The transformation, a half century later, is remarkable. The Commission must
engage in a full, adversarial hearing when enforcing European law against
individuals and firms. It maintains a public, electronic register of all legislative and
administrative documents and makes those documents accessible to European
citizens. Before the Commission submits a legislative proposal to the Council and
the Parliament for a decision, it must invite public comment on an early draft and
incorporate the comments in the final proposal. In sum, European citizens are
guaranteed a number of procedural rights common to national systems of democratic
government: the right to a hearing, the right to transparency, and the right to civil
society participation.
Administration through adversarial hearings, extensive disclosure of
government documents, and consultations open to all groups and citizens is
common, but not universal. Another, equally liberal democratic outcome could have
been imagined just as easily. Rather than require a full adversarial hearing before the
Commission, the Court of Justice might have used its extensive fact-finding powers
to scrutinize the facts, law, and policy choices underpinning the Commission
decision.4 (The Court of Justice is the highest court of the European Union and has
jurisdiction over European legislative and administrative acts.) There might have
been no right to official documents.5 And public comment on draft legislation might
have been staged at the very end of the legislative process, when the Commission
proposal was under consideration in the European Parliament.6 The alternative,
imagined Commission would have been a very different government body, yet it still
would have met comfortably the standards of today's set of liberal democracies.
Why do Europeans today enjoy this particular constellation of rights when the
Commission exercises authority? How do we explain the legal rules that constrain
and shape the Commission's powers? In this Article, I argue that in the early days of
the European Community, rights before the Commission were patterned on the laws
and legal traditions of the dominant Member States. Changing political
circumstances largely outside the control of the Commission and other European
institutions gave rise to a number of discrete, historical challenges to their authority.
Most of these challenges came from citizens with allegiances to minority, national
constitutional symbols and practices who were determined to retain them in the face
of European integration. To preserve and extend their authority, European
institutions, with a right of appeal to the Court of Justice. The European legislative and administrative
processes can be described, in very general terms, as follows. Before 1993, European laws were passed by
the Council on a proposal from the Commission. Since 1993, European laws are passed by the European
Parliament and Council acting on a proposal from the Commission. Implementing regulations and
decisions are issued by the Commission. See generally Paul Craig & Gráinne de Búrca, EU Law: Text,
Cases, and Materials 3-109 (3d ed. 2003) [hereinafter Craig & Búrca, EU law].
4
See infra text accompanying notes 50-52, 72-109 (discussing French droit administratif and
German traditions).
5
See infra text accompanying notes 223-26 (reviewing access to information legislation in Italy,
the UK, and Germany).
6
See infra text accompanying notes 325-35 (reviewing the legislative and rulemaking processes in
all Member States).
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institutions adopted these constitutional ideals and hence altered the nature of
European rights.
The evidence for this explanation comes from the historical record. Part III
demonstrates that European citizens enjoy three major, historically distinct sets of
rights in their relations with Europe's executive branch: the right to a hearing, the
right to transparency, and the right to civil society participation. The basic
parameters of Commission procedure were set down in the founding Treaty of Rome
and a number of legislative instruments adopted in the 1960s. Then, in 1973, the
United Kingdom acceded. 7 The common law system of administrative law contained
a number of anomalies compared to the continental systems that were already part of
the European Community.8 In 1973, the risk was that English courts would not
enforce Commission decisions that failed to abide by the common law's guarantees
of fair and lawful public power. I show that the Court of Justice and the Commission
responded by adopting the common law right to a hearing in European competition
proceedings, a right which then migrated to other areas in which particularized
Commission decisions adversely affect the interests of firms or individuals.
The second historical moment was the Danish rejection of the Maastricht Treaty
in 1992. I demonstrate that, to guarantee Danish ratification of the Maastricht Treaty
the second time around, the twelve Heads of State made a series of commitments to
transparency patterned on the Danish, and more generally, northern model of open
government. The European Parliament then combined its long-standing institutional
interest in more information on Commission policymaking—critical for the exercise
of the Parliament's legislative powers—with the northern transparency ideal to push
for extensive access-to-documents legislation. The third and final historical juncture
was the resignation of the Santer Commission in 1999, after vitriolic criticism from a
European Parliament intent on asserting its new treaty power to hold the executive to
account. I show that the new Commission's response was to adopt legal measures
guaranteeing that civil society—citizens and organized interests—would be
consulted in the lawmaking process, hence improving its democratic credentials in
the eyes of the European public and creating allies among the civil society groups
that were to be consulted. This innovation was patterned on both the trend towards
civil society participation in other international organizations and the European
tradition of corporatist interest representation.
This Article contributes to a number of different strands in the literature on
European integration. Legal scholarship often depicts European rights as a conscious
attempt by legislators, judges, and scholars to bring the realities of the new European
polity in line with universal norms of fair and democratic government. By exposing
national constitutional variation and the politics through which particular
constitutional ideals are adopted over others, this Article serves as a corrective to the
legal perspective. An empirically grounded understanding of European rights can
7
The European Union was formed initially of six Member States (France, Germany, Italy,
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg). The UK, Ireland, and Denmark acceded in 1973, followed
by Greece in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986, Sweden, Finland, and Austria in 1995, and the Czech
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Cyprus, and Malta in 2004. It
now has 25 Member States.
8
In the interest of historical accuracy, I use "European Community" when specifically referring to
the period before the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. Otherwise I use "European Union" or "EU."
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contribute to a more rigorous evaluation of the desirability of the emerging European
constitutional order.
In political science, one of the longest-running debates over European
integration is the balance between sovereign states and supranational institutions in
setting the pace of European integration.9 While some scholars argue that traditional
state interests and the balance of power among states are critical, others take
supranational institutions—and their interest in expanding their powers and pushing
forward integration—as the decisive force behind integration. My review of the
origins of rights before the Commission shows that both sets of actors, at different
points in time, were agents of rights. More importantly, the empirical analysis brings
to light two important constraints on the ability of states and supranational
institutions to design European rights to their advantage, often overlooked in the
political science literature. The first is history writ large: understandings of fair and
democratic government developed within the nation-state and representing the
accumulation of experiences, beliefs, and norms over generations. The second is
history writ small: episodic, external challenges to the authority of European
institutions that serve as the context in which such institutions further their interests.
These factors should be taken into account in explaining the rights that define, today,
what it is to be a European citizen.
The European experience can also inform the literature on international relations
and international law. Theories of international systems have sought to answer two
related questions: Why do states create international institutions and, once created,
do international institutions behave autonomously and hence act as an independent
causal force in international politics? The field is divided between the realist and
liberal institutionalist camps. Realists take the view that international organizations
are established to facilitate relations among states by handling minor tasks;
international organizations do not have the power to shift outcomes away from the
bargains that the states would reach in their absence.10 Liberal institutionalists
attribute far more significance to international organizations. They argue that
international organizations are conferred considerable powers by states and that such
organizations can shape international relations, independent of their founding
states.11 Yet both schools treat the international organization itself as a black box.
9
There are two major types of European institutions, intergovernmental and supranational. The
European Council and Council of Ministers are intergovernmental institutions on which representatives of
national governments sit and which operate similarly to international bodies like the U.N. Security
Council and the WTO Conference of the Parties. The Commission, Parliament, and European Courts are
supranational institutions. They are considered supranational because decisions are made by public
officials with five or six-year tenures of office who, under the treaties, are to serve not their national
governments but the collective, European mission enshrined in the treaties. They bear similarities to
institutions like international tribunals and international secretariats. This characterization is useful
heuristically but the reader should beware that it vastly simplifies the degrees of intergovernmentalism
and supranationalism in the European system of government. The classic scholarship defines only the
European Council and other meetings of European Heads of State as intergovernmental because they are
the only institutions that decide, always, by a unanimity rule and that decide matters not governed by the
treaties.
10
See Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest
Liberal Institutionalism, 42 Int’l Org. 485 (1988).
11
Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy
85-109 (1984) (stating the original liberal institutionalist position).
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Courts and administrations in international regimes are presumed to operate
according to certain functional imperatives that are common to courts and
bureaucracies everywhere, regardless of whether they are national or international.
The European experience can serve as a springboard for thinking about why
international courts and bureaucracies take the form they do, guaranteeing
individuals certain rights and not others.
Understanding European rights is crucial for the American legal profession for
several reasons. First, as this Article amply demonstrates, rights before Europe’s
executive branch are very different from the rights guaranteed under American
administrative law. Yet this point is missed by American scholars and lawyers alike,
to the detriment of their students and clients. The similarities that Americans tend to
discern between European and American administrative procedure have the quality
of bad puns rather than true resemblances. Only a sustained examination of the roots
and evolution of European rights can do away with the misinformation caused by
those superficial semblances and uncover the real nature of European rights. Second,
the dynamic of competing national rights traditions and strategic institutional interest
that informs European rights is one that we can expect to animate a variety of
international bureaucracies and tribunals. Therefore, the European experience
contains useful lessons for Americans as they navigate today’s emerging system of
global governance.
The argument is organized as follows. Part II presents three major sets of
explanatory theories with implications for European rights—legal constitutionalism,
realism, and neo-functionalism. Part III, which constitutes the bulk of the Article,
presents my argument through a detailed examination of the historical record. For
each major set of rights, this consists of an examination of procedural rights before
and after the historical event; a description of the event and the nature of the
challenge it posed to European authority; specific evidence of the salience of
national rights traditions following the event and the strategic use of the right by
certain European institutions to consolidate their powers; an analysis of the evolution
of the right after the historical moment; and a comparison of the new, invariably
more expansive, European right with the right in the place of origin. Because
understandings of good government developed within the nation-state were critical,
the account of rights before the turning point includes a review of the constitutions
and administrative procedure laws of the Member States. Part IV returns to the
theories of European constitutional design, explores how their predictions fare when
faced with the historical record, and proposes revisions and new hypotheses based on
my analysis of the evidence. In the Conclusion, I take stock of rights before the
Commission and speculate as to why, once certain rights are adopted by European
institutions, they tend to become more extensive than in their place of origin.
II. EXPLAINING RIGHTS
Theories that seek to develop positive explanations for rights have focused
generally on national constitutions as opposed to international regimes.12 Until
12
By rights, I mean both classic liberal rights such as those contained in the American Bill of
Rights and rights to participate in democratic decisionmaking through, for instance, the right to vote and
have one's representatives influence public affairs. By constitution, I mean all the rules that serve to
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recently, citizenship was conceived exclusively as a matter of belonging to historical,
territorially defined communities and hence the duties and entitlements of citizenship
were developed within the framework of the political institutions that governed those
communities. Beyond the confines of the nation-state were international
organizations, but they were believed to order relations among sovereign states, not
individuals. Hence their operations did not give rise to duties and rights inhering in
individuals, nor could those same individuals make direct claims on international
organizations for protection and other collective goods.13 A thorough exploration of
national constitutionalism is beyond the scope of this Article, but an overview of the
principal schools of thought is worthwhile because their insights have animated the
nascent debates on individual rights in the European Union.
A. Theories of National Constitutional Design
In the contemporary American legal academy, two types of theories prevail in
explaining the emergence and evolution of constitutional orders. One treats rights as
value choices by voters, legislators, public officials, and judges; the other treats them
as the product of strategic behavior designed to maximize the individual preferences
of those same individuals, who are generally assumed to be self-interested. I label
the first "legal constitutionalism," to reflect the privileged place that such theories
enjoy in the legal academy, and the second "rational choice constitutionalism," to
signal the borrowing of the approach from the rational choice study of politics. Both
make distinctive assumptions about two central elements of any explanation for the
emergence and survival of constitutional rules: human preferences and the way in
which individuals collectively create and change the rules.
1. Legal constitutionalism
Legal constitutionalists assume that individuals have preferences for
constitutions, rules, and other modes of ordering collective life that do not turn on a
calculation of how to maximize self-interest—what I call values.14 When individuals
come together to design or reform government, they give expression to their
commonly held values or, if their values turn out to be different, some persuade
constitute and define public authority in a political community. These can be set down in a written
founding document called a "constitution" but also in parliamentary laws, court judgments, and
administrative rules and practices. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, The New Constitutional Order 1 (2003)
(defining "constitutional order" as a "reasonably stable set of institutions through which a nation's
fundamental decisions are made over a sustained period, and the principles that guide those decisions").
13
See Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with
International Regulatory Agreements 271-85 (1995) (describing classic and modified views of
international organizations as “creatures of their Member States”).
14
In the political science literature that seeks to explain the rise of institutions and their effects, such
preferences are sometimes identified as "ideologies" or "norms." See, e.g., Paul Pierson, Politics in Time:
History, Institutions, and Social Analysis 39 (2004); Kathleen Thelen, Historical Institutionalism in
Comparative Politics, 1999 Ann. Rev. Pol. Sci. 369, 375 n. 4 (1999); Martha Finnemore & Kathryn
Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 Int'l Org. 887, 891 (1998). The term
"value" is more appropriate for present purposes because it avoids the suggestion that this form of
motivation is necessarily collective; preferences other than self-interested ones can be held by individuals
and particular groups, as well as broader communities.
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others that their position is the better one.15 Constitutional rules are designed to
promote the moral choices of members of the political community. The rules of
government, in turn, guide human action because they are internalized by
individuals; in other words, they become norms of behavior. Thus, a legal
constitutionalist explains constitutions, parliamentary laws that set down basic
government procedures and rights, and judgments of constitutional courts as a
function of the substantive value choices made by national leaders at a constitutional
convention, representatives in a legislative assembly, or judges on a deciding court.
Citizens act in accordance with the constitution, law, or judgment because they are
automatically recognized as legally and morally correct and hence deserving of
obedience.
For instance, in American constitutional law, the decision of the Constitutional
Convention to divide legislative power between the Senate, the House of
Representatives, and the President is explained as a function of Madison's desire to
avoid the rise of factions.16 The institutional design that Americans live with today
ensures balance—or, put differently, stalemate—over action because Madison
preferred the "enlarged and permanent" interest that would emerge over time to the
"irregular passion" of majority action.17 Likewise, the right to property and contract
contained in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is explained as an endorsement
by the Founders of Locke's view of limited government.18 To move to a more recent
statement of rights, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), passed in 1946 to
structure the relations between federal administration and citizens, was taken by
James Landis as a codification of what was fair and just.19 George Shepherd and
Martin Shapiro independently explain the APA as a compromise between what
Republicans in Congress thought was good government—an administration limited
by the common law's protection of property rights—and what Democrats believed
was good government—an administration free to alter the status quo and to use its
expertise to create prosperity for all citizens.20
2. Rational choice constitutionalism
Rational choice constitutionalism dates to the early 1980s and is informed by the
methods of economics and political science.21 The behavioral assumptions of
15
Most legal and rational choice constitutionalists avoid considering the influence of differential
endowments of resources on the choice of rules. Power, however, informs other strands of scholarship in
both the law and political science.
16
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 29, 59-64
(1985).
17
See generally Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation 195-96 (1972) (discussing
Madison's political philosophy).
18
See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain
(1985).
19
See James M. Landis, The Administrative Process—The Third Decade, 13 Admin. L. Rev. 17
(1960).
20
See George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from
New Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1557 (1996); Martin Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 Va. L.
Rev. 447 (1986).
21
See generally Barry R. Weingast, Rational-Choice Institutionalism, in Political Science: State of
the Discipline 660 (Ira Katznelson & Helen V. Milner eds., 2002).
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rational choice scholars depart significantly from the ones employed by legal
scholars. Those assumptions are:
purposive action, consistent preferences, and utility maximization.
Purposive action posits that most social outcomes can be explained by
goal-oriented action on the part of the actors in the theory, as opposed to
being motivated by habit, tradition, or social appropriateness. Consistent
preferences refers to preferences that are ranked, are transitive, and do not
depend on the presence or absence of essentially independent alternatives.
Utility maximization posits that actors will select the behavior that
provides them with the most subjective expected utility from a set of
22
possible behaviors.

At first glance, these assumptions might seem consistent with legal
constitutionalism. Because rational choice theory does not impute any particular set
of preferences, it can accommodate the values that drive individuals to establish
constitutional rules and, once such rules are established, the norms that induce
individuals to adhere to them. Or can it? Part of the attraction of the rational choice
approach is the ability to derive hypotheses about social and political outcomes with
a small number of assumptions and a limited knowledge of the particular
environment faced by purposive actors. If rational choice analyses did allow any
type of preference to be attributed, they would lose their explanatory power. As one
advocate of the approach explains:
The theoretical bite of rational choice arguments depends both on the
plausibility of the goals attributed to actors and on the ability of analysts
to identify the goals a priori, that is, without reference to the specific
behavior to be explained. . . . Because the approach sets no limits on what
the goals may be, it is possible to construct rational choice explanations
for apparently irrational (in the everyday sense of the word) behavior by
claiming that actors were rationally pursuing their own (peculiar) goals. . .
. But when goals are directly inferred from observed behavior, rational
choice arguments slide from "creative tautology" . . . into mere
tautology.23

Thus rational choice theories of constitution-building generally assume selfinterested preferences for physical safety, material wealth, and political power.
When citizens collectively decide how to govern their joint affairs, they do so by
adopting rules that maximize their individual preferences in a Pareto-efficient
manner. Once the rules are adopted, they are obeyed because they promote those
same selfish preferences. In this school of thought, constitutions and rights are
explained as the self-interested decisions of citizens and legislators rather than as the
expression of the type of public life they believe to be morally right.
Some of the most influential work by rational choice scholars makes the case
that constitutions can be explained as solutions to collective action dilemmas. Jon
22
Paul K. MacDonald, Useful Fiction or Miracle Maker: The Competing Epistemological
Foundations of Rational Choice Theory, 97 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 551, 552 (2003).
23
Barbara Geddes, Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and Research Design in
Comparative Politics 180-81(2003).
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Elster argues that today’s legislators establish rights and independent courts to
enforce rights to protect themselves against the arbitrary actions of tomorrow's
legislators.24 Those with political power today tie their hands through constitutional
rules such as majority voting and the right to a fair trial only because they fear that,
tomorrow, their opponents will hold the reins of government. Likewise, political
scientist Adam Przeworksi argues that constitutions are obeyed only when all
politicians have a material interest in doing so.25 According to Przeworksi, the most
basic rule of any democracy, the rule that the individual or party that wins the
majority of votes takes political office and allows the losers to keep their property, is
viable only when property is distributed so widely that the losers have an incentive
to respect the rule. Election losers without property have nothing to fear from staging
a rebellion and attempting to establish a dictatorship. Election losers with property
have a lot to fear because they know that if they fail, the winners might decide to
ignore the rule themselves and establish a dictatorship in which they expropriate all
property. Majority rule and property rights, therefore, are obeyed only when election
losers have a material interest in doing so.
To turn to the rational choice approach to public administration, Mathew
McCubbins, Roger Noll and Barry Weingast (McNollgast) argue that legislators
enact procedural rights in order to protect the deal that is struck among competing
interests in the legislature when it is sent to the administration to be implemented.26
With administration, the analytical tool is the principal-agent relationship. Unless the
principal (legislator) has control instruments, the agent (the administration) will do
its own bidding. According to McNollgast, administrative procedures and individual
rights prevent policy drift when government agencies are charged with implementing
statutes. First, procedure empowers organized interests and hence ensures that the
interests that lobbied successfully in the legislature can protect their gains in the
administration. Additionally, formal procedure facilitates oversight by legislators.27
It bears mentioning that, given the behavioral premises of rational choice theory, the
policy choices contained in the original enabling act being implemented by the
administration are themselves the product of the self-interest of voters, organized
interests, and legislators.28
An example will serve to synthesize the differences between legal and rational
choice approaches. Take a constitutional rule prohibiting torture. For a legal
constitutionalist, the rule exists because citizens do not want themselves—or their
neighbors—to be subjected to arbitrary physical violence, because they all agree that
freedom from arbitrary physical violence is the only moral way of organizing their
24
See Jon Elster, Introduction, in Constitutionalism and Democracy 1, 8 (Jon Elster & Rune
Slagstad eds., 1997).
25
See Adam Przeworksi, Why Do Political Parties Obey Results of Elections, in Democracy and
the Rule of Law 114, 131 (Jose Maria Maravall & Adam Przeworksi eds., 2003); see also Weingast, supra
note 21, at 679-80 (arguing that constitutional rules must be "self-enforcing in the sense that all actors
have incentives to adhere to the rules" if democracy is to be consolidated).
26
See McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J.L. Econ. & Org.
180, 183-89 (1999).
27
See Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative
Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 Va. L. Rev. 431 (1989).
28
See Robert D. Cooter, The Strategic Constitution 20-73 (2000) (discussing interest of legislators
in obtaining and preserving power by winning elections and interest of citizens and organized interests in
improving material well-being through voting and campaign contributions).
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joint affairs, and because the rule against torture is so deeply engrained that they
adhere to it without further reflection. A rational choice constitutionalist would
explain the same rule based on an individual preference for personal safety, a
historical community in which resources are so widely distributed that individuals
can guarantee their own personal safety only by agreeing with other individuals to a
rule against torture applicable to all, and the persistence of historical conditions
under which individuals suffer threats to their own physical well-being if they harm
others. The legal scholar would criticize the rational choice scholar for the simplistic
understanding of human motivation and the failure to account for norm-driven
behavior, in which strategy plays no role. The rational choice scholar would reply
that the legal scholar ignores the historical record, which is full of examples in which
rules that would appear to be morally superior, such as a rule against torture, fail to
materialize or are routinely flouted. The relationship between individual values,
collective outcomes, and rule-abiding behavior is natural for the legal
constitutionalist, problematic for the rational choice constitutionalist.
B. Theories of European Constitutional Design
As in the domestic context, students of European governance have developed
radically different accounts of rights depending on their disciplinary origins. Each
generates predictions for three aspects of rights against the European Commission:
the type of rights, the European institution responsible for promoting rights, and the
timing of the emergence of rights.29 Part IV returns to these theories of rights to
explore how their predictions fare when put to the test of the historical record
presented in Part III.
1. Legal constitutionalism
European legal scholars are principally concerned with describing and
normatively assessing individual rights based on higher principles which are
themselves derived from constitutional law or universal theories of justice.
Sometimes, however, European legal constitutionalists examine the origins of
individual rights and, when they do so, they work with the same assumptions about
human motivation and the interaction of individuals in collective life as do their
domestic counterparts. The citizens, legislators, and judges who decide rights and
obey them are motivated by the values and higher principles that serve as the basis
for the normative evaluation.30 The focus of legal scholars is generally the Court of
Justice's jurisprudence, but that focus logically can, and does, extend to Europe's
legislators, especially when engaged in acts of high constitutional politics such as
drafting the European Charter of Fundamental Rights or the Constitutional Treaty.
Among European legal constitutionalists who focus on rights before the
Commission, the work of Hanns Peter Nehl is exemplary, both for its breadth and its
incisive analysis.31 Nehl concentrates on the jurisprudence of the Court. He argues
29
See generally Gary King et al., Designing Social Inquiry 99-114 (1994) (identifying falsifiability
and specificity of hypotheses as one rule for constructing causal theories).
30
See, e.g., The EU and Human Rights (Philip Alston et al. eds., 1999).
31
See Hanns P. Nehl, Principles of Administrative Procedure in E.C. Law (1999).
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that the Court was driven by concerns for fairness, rationality, and administrative
efficiency in developing the principles that, today, guide Commission
decisionmaking. Nehl is influenced by the neo-functionalist approach, explored in
detail below, in which rights serve the institutional interest of the Court in expanding
its powers. Ultimately, however, he is wed to the normative understanding of the
Court's past and future case law. In Nehl's account, the Court was motivated by the
imperative of protecting the dignity of European citizens against the arbitrary
exercise of government powers, promoting administrative rationality, and preserving
a workable administrative process. The Court will continue to grapple with this set
of concerns in deciding future cases. Nehl's legal constitutionalist approach is
manifest in the following passage from the concluding chapter of his book:
[I]t is useful to refer once again to the basic rationales determining the
existence of process standards. The Community Courts have forcefully
stressed the dignitary purpose of those rules and thereby considerably
improved individual protection in administrative procedures. Surely, also
from the perspective of the instrumental rationale, the high degree of
procedural protection and participation is paralleled by an increased
standard of rationality, accuracy, as well as transparency of the
decisionmaking process. . . . Both the dignitary rationale and the
instrumental rationale of process rules as essential components of this
notion are to be combined in a reasonable manner. The task of the
Community Courts is delicate in this regard. They bear the responsibility
for maintaining the workability of the administration and the institutional
balance provided for in the Treaty.32

Given the normative objective of analyses such as Nehl's, it is difficult to derive
robust, forward-looking predictions for the nature of rights. Commission procedure
has guaranteed and will continue to guarantee the basic values of dignity, rationality,
and workability. Should Commission procedure fall short of these guiding
principles, it must be corrected. The question of what type of procedures and rights
comport with dignity, rationality, and workability is addressed on a case-by-case
basis, when and if litigants claim that the Commission's procedure is deficient. A
legal constitutionalist analysis, however, does generate predictions as to which
institutions will press for rights in the administrative process: judges sitting on
courts. In Nehl's account, the Court of Justice is the institution that seeks to protect
fairness, while the Commission, as a typical bureaucracy, is mainly interested in
efficiently and expeditiously exercising its powers. Finally, according to a legal
constitutionalist, the timing of rights should follow, or slightly lag behind, the
attribution of powers to the Commission. As the Commission acquires and exercises
enforcement and rulemaking powers, litigants should go to the Court of Justice
demanding fair treatment, and the Court should require the Commission to respect
procedural rights to the extent warranted by dignity, rationality, and efficiency.

32

Id. at 167-68.
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2. Realism and neo-functionalism
In political science, two theoretical approaches offer promise for explaining the
constitutional rules that shape European institutions: realism and neofunctionalism.33 Both proceed from the same assumptions as domestic rational
choice constitutionalists: preferences are self-interested and political actors behave
strategically to maximize their preferences when designing institutions and rules.
However, they differ in their appreciation of which political actors have been
responsible for moving forward European integration and in their understanding of
the nature and power of supranational institutions.
A realist or "power politics" approach takes sovereign states, intent on
protecting themselves from other states in the anarchic international system, as the
drivers of international cooperation.34 In classic realism, state interests are primarily
geopolitical and security-related but a more nuanced version can also incorporate
preferences for economic well-being and national prosperity. The balance of power
among sovereign states determines their relations, including the treaties and other
33
A third type of explanation, which I do not consider in this Article, is one that draws on the
rational choice study of American administration. As explained earlier, some scholars argue that
procedure is an institutional device through which legislators control bureaucrats. Mark Pollack has
advanced such a principal-agent explanation of European administrative procedure, but with a focus on
the rights and procedures that are available to Member States, not individuals. See Mark A. Pollack, The
Engines of European Integration (2003). To predict rights using this approach it is necessary to know
whether legislators perceive their preferences as diverging in the present, or in the future, from those of
administrators. See, e.g., Rui J.P. de Figueiredo, Jr. & Richard G. Vanden Bergh, The Political Economy
of State-level Administrative Procedure Acts, 47 J. L. & Econ. 569 (2004). Rational choice theory
predicts administrative procedure only if this condition is present. To gauge whether Member States (the
main legislators in the Community system) believed that their preferences diverged, or would diverge,
from those of the Commission, three elements of the historical context are relevant: the political
affiliations of national governments as compared to those of Commissioners; the views of national
governments on specific policy areas in which power was delegated to the Commission and procedural
rights were—or were not—established; and national attitudes on federalism and supranationalism.
Difference between a national governing party and the party affiliations of Commissioners, hostility of a
national executive towards a particular Community policy area, or anti-federalist national attitudes should
be associated with Member State support for administrative procedure before the Commission. I do not
have the fine-grained data necessary to generate and to confirm or reject a set of rational choice
hypotheses. However, it is worthwhile pointing out that the historical background of the earliest form of
procedural rights—rights in competition proceedings—does not appear to bear out the principal-agent
hypothesis. In the 1950s and 1960s, France was nationalist—not federalist—and resisted competition
policy (adopted at the insistence of the Germans). Therefore France should have promoted a
comprehensive set of rights before the Commission. Yet such rights had to wait for accession of the UK,
no more hostile towards competition policy and no more nationalist than France. Moreover, the rational
choice understanding of rights as instruments designed to advance certain self-interested preferences of
legislators, rather than being intrinsically valuable, is difficult to square with the institutional context of
the European Community. Why would a Member State with an entire state administration available to
monitor and control the Commission empower citizens, through rights, to engage in such monitoring and
control? At least certain citizens and lobbies will have interests opposed to those of the Member State and
therefore will likely be the source of policy drift, not control.
34
See Rainer Baumann et al., Neorealist Foreign Policy Theory, in German Foreign Policy since
Unification: Theories and Case Studies 37 (Volker Rittberger ed., 2001) (describing variants of realist
theory); Kathleen R. McNamara, Where do Rules Come From? The Creation of the European Central
Bank, in The Institutionalization of Europe 155, 156, 158-60 (Alec Stone Sweet et al. eds., 2001)
[hereinafter Sweet, Institutionalization] (describing power politics approach and applying approach to
institutional design of European Central Bank).
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legal instruments they sign. Realists anticipate that the institutions that emerge in the
international realm will have minimal powers or will simply reflect, in their
decisionmaking activities, the balance of power among states. In either case,
institutions will not matter for developments in international relations because their
decisions will not depart from the bargains that sovereign states would reach in their
absence.
The existence of powerful, supranational institutions like the European
Commission and the European Court of Justice creates a puzzle for the realist
perspective, a puzzle which has fueled the alternative neo-functionalist approach
considered below. But setting aside this initial hurdle, what type of Commission,
with which individual rights, would we expect to emerge from power politics? One
interest sometimes attributed to states is the protection of the well-being of citizens
when they leave the sovereign territory of the state.35 The same might expected when
governments cede sovereignty over certain policy matters to an international tribunal
or an international bureaucracy. What type of procedure and rights would a state
promote as best protecting its citizens? Although international relations theories are
largely unhelpful on this question, especially once they are asked to incorporate
variation among democratic states, a good working assumption is the bundle of
rights and procedures available within the state. And according to the balance of
power logic, the most powerful Member States should be the ones that are able to
upload their systems of rights onto the Commission.
Thus the realist framework generates a number of predictions for individual
rights before the Commission. The types of rights should be those that exist in the
most powerful Member States. The actors promoting rights should be Member
States, when they negotiate treaties or bargain on the Council of Ministers, not
supranational institutions such as the Court of Justice, the Commission, and the
Parliament.36 Finally, on the question of timing, rights should be established as soon
as Member States confer autonomous powers upon the Commission that could be
exercised to undermine directly the well-being of Member State nationals.
Neo-functionalism is a theory specific to European integration.37 It seeks to
explain the rise of European governance, namely the attribution of extensive
government powers to European institutions notwithstanding the conventional
reluctance of states to cede national sovereignty. According to one of the most
prominent versions of the theory, once national governments made broad
commitments to free trade in the Treaty of Rome, exporters that benefited from trade
liberalization acted in combination with the Commission and the Court of Justice to
35
See Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 521-55 (5th ed. 1998) (describing
protections under international law for citizens of one state whose persons or property is stationed in the
territory of another state).
36
Supranational institutions might anticipate the preferences of Member States and therefore, even
in a power politics approach, the Court of Justice or the Commission could operate as the formal agents of
rights. See, e.g., Geoffrey Garrett, The Politics of Legal Integration in the European Union, 49 Int’l Org.
171 (1995) (arguing that Court of Justice decisions reflect preferences of Member States). However, given
the importance of states as the architects of international organizations in this line of analysis, we would
expect at least some of the instruments setting down rights to be negotiated directly by states.
37
Alec Stone Sweet & Thomas L. Brunell, Constructing a Supranational Constitution: Dispute
Resolution and Governance in the European Community, 92 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 63 (1998) (explaining
neo-functional theory).
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develop an extensive set of supranational policies and rules.38 Those policies and
rules went far beyond the original intentions of the Member States. The contrast with
the realist framework is stark: supranational institutions allied with economic and
other types of civil society actors can bypass states to promote international
cooperation in ways that transcend sovereign interests and power politics.
The critical assumption in the neo-functionalist line of analysis is that
supranational bodies have a twin preference for more power and greater European
integration. As Mark Pollack puts it, Europe's supranational institutions are
"competence maximizing," meaning that they "seek to increase both their own
competences and more generally the competences of the European Community."39
Rights, in the neo-functionalist line of analysis, are instrumental to the competencemaximizing agenda of the Court of Justice because they enable litigants to go
directly to the courts and challenge government action as incompatible with higher,
European law, thus bringing most public decisionmaking within the power of the
Court of Justice.40
Neo-functionalists have largely focused on the Court's role in establishing
European rights that individuals can invoke in their dealings with their national
administrations, rather than with the Commission. Martin Shapiro, however, has
argued that similar judicial politics are responsible for the development of rights in
Commission proceedings.41 According to Shapiro, a mix of wealthy corporate
litigants and receptive judges—moved by their activist propensities, the expansive
logic of even the barest of procedural checks on administrative action, and a general
distrust of technocracy—has led to an extensive set of procedural rights similar to
those in American administrative law.42 Shapiro contends that the structural and
legal conditions that resulted in the proceduralization of American rulemaking in the
1970s are today present in Europe.
The historical process as recounted by Shapiro can be broken down into a
number of parts. Wealthy corporate litigants using every possible argument to avoid
administrative action and espousing a larger anti-technocracy culture, challenge
decisions before the Court on the grounds that the Commission failed to respect
procedural requirements in the administrative process. They do so using a variety of
38
See Neil Fligstein & Alec Stone Sweet, Institutionalization of the Treaty of Rome, in Sweet,
Institutionalization, supra note 34, at 29.
39
See Mark A. Pollack, Supranational Autonomy, in European Integration and Supranational
Governance 217, 219 (Wayne Sandholtz & Alec Stone Sweet eds., 1998) [hereinafter Sandholtz,
European Integration]; see also Karen Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of European Law 45 (2001)
(“Judges are primarily interested in promoting their independence, influence, and authority.”).
40
See generally Alter, supra note 39 (advancing a modified neo-functionalist explanation of the
Court of Justice’s major constitutional doctrines); Anne-Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, Europe Before the
Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration, 47 Int’l Org. 41 (1993) (recounting the
constitutionalization of the EC Treaty through the neo-functionalist lens); Alec Stone Sweet & James A.
Caporaso, From Free Trade to Supranational Polity: The European Court and Integration, in Sandholtz,
European Integration, supra note 39, at 92, 105 (elaborating on neo-functional theory of the
constitutionalization of the EC Treaty); J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of European Law, 100 Yale
L.J. 2403 (1991) [hereinafter Weiler, Transformation] (recognizing and synthesizing the
constitutionalization of the EC Treaty).
41
See Martin Shapiro, The Giving Reasons Requirement, 1992 U. Chi. Legal F. 179 (1992); Martin
Shapiro, The Institutionalization of European Administrative Space, in Sweet, Institutionalization, supra
note 34, at 94 [hereinafter Shapiro, Institutionalization].
42
Shapiro, Institutionalization, supra note 41, at 98-99.
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textual and doctrinal hooks, most notably Article 253 of the EC Treaty, which
provides that all European measures "shall state the reasons on which they are
based."43 This duty would appear to be minimal, but the provision is used by the
Court to develop a jurisprudence of extensive procedural rights for the parties and,
covertly, to engage in judicial review of the substance of the Commission's
administrative determinations.44 The Court does so out of a penchant for judicial
activism common to constitutional courts. The Court is also compelled by the legal
logic of procedure and democratic, anti-technocracy ideals. Once the Court requires
the Commission to give reasons, it cannot accept just any set of reasons; the Court
demands reasons that respond to the objections of the parties and justify, in the eyes
of the judges, the measure.45 In this account, the political imperatives of rights at the
European level are slightly different from those that inform the relationship between
the Court of Justice and national courts and administrations: the Court is driven less
by the desire to maximize competences and more by a reaction, typical in most
advanced democracies, to the vesting of extensive discretion in the hands of
technocrats. Nonetheless, the self-interest of private plaintiffs and the activist,
competence-maximizing tendencies of the Court are critical forces for rights in both
settings.
The neo-functionalist account suggests a number of specific hypotheses
concerning rights before the Commission. They should be similar to the rights that
exist in American administrative law. The Court of Justice should be the actor
promoting the rights, in the interest of law, democracy, and judicial power, and the
Commission should resist, in an attempt to retain discretion and technocratic
expertise. Lastly, procedural rights should develop gradually, as litigants test the
waters, the Court of Justice considers and initially rejects novel theories, but then is
moved by virtue of the logic of judicial politics to accept the litigants' arguments.
The table below summarizes the theories and the predictions.

43

Treaty Establishing the European Community [TEC], art. 253.
For those familiar with the procedural demands made on American administrative agencies in the
1970s, the American and European trajectories contain some interesting parallels as well as differences.
As Shapiro points out, the requirements of notice, comment, and statement of basis and purpose contained
in the U.S. Administrative Procedure Act served as the textual basis for imposing extensive procedural
duties on federal administrative agencies, much as the duty to give reasons has influenced procedural
rights before the Commission. See Shapiro, supra note 41, at 101. In addition, in the U.S., tougher judicial
review of the substance of administrative decisions induced agencies to adopt greater procedural
safeguards—to build the factual record necessary to survive judicial review. See Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). This second logic of administrative procedure has been
absent from European law. The reason might be that the Court has yet to impose demanding standards of
substantive rationality on the Commission; or that the Commission is not confined to the administrative
record in responding to objections raised in judicial proceedings, as in the American case, and therefore, it
is not compelled to develop an exhaustive administrative record in anticipation of tough judicial review.
45
Shapiro, Institutionalization, supra note 41, at 100.
44
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Table 1—Creating rights before the European Commission: Theories and
predictions
Legal
constitutionalism

Realism

Neo-functionalism

Causal
mechanism

Courts promote
values of dignity,
rationality, and
workability.

States bargain to
protect their citizens
in Commission
proceedings.

Wealthy litigants go
to courts to avoid
adverse Commission
determinations and
courts seek to expand
their powers and
further antitechnocracy values.

Agents

European Courts

European Courts

Timing

Gradual, tracking
the attribution of
powers to
Commission.
_____

Member States
(treaties and laws
passed by Council
of Ministers)
Sudden, at the time
that Commission
conferred powers.
Rights existing in
most powerful
Member States.

Rights similar to
those in U.S.
administrative law.

Rights

Gradual, tracking the
attribution of powers
to Commission.

III. THREE GENERATIONS OF RIGHTS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
Part II canvassed the most prominent causal theories of European constitutional
design and generated predictions for the path of rights before the Commission. This
Part turns to the actual development of such rights over time.
Three different sets of rights govern dealings between European citizens and the
Commission: the right to a hearing, the right to transparency, and the right to civil
society participation. These categories are analytically distinct because they apply to
different types of Commission action—individual or general—and because they
encompass different sets of entitlements and procedures that citizens may vindicate
and that the Commission must respect. The categories are also historically distinct:
since Europe’s executive branch was first established in 1952, each has undergone
transformation, but at different points in time. Below, the same organizing scheme
is used to explore each set of rights. First, the original and contemporary law of
rights is reviewed. Second, in each case, historical challenge to the Commission’s
authority triggered transformation. Thus, the current constellation of rights can be
explained by analyzing that historical event, the subsequent salience of certain
national—in the case of civil society participation, international_rights in European
law, and the strategic interest of European institutions in adopting such rights.
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Third, examining the right as it has evolved after that historical juncture enables a
comparison of the new, invariably more expansive, European right with the right as
it first appeared in its place of origin.
The explanation of rights that follows in Part IV both incorporates some of the
insights of the theories reviewed earlier and suggests revisions of those theories.
Consistent with a realist approach, when the Commission was first established,
rights were patterned on the shared public law principles of the Member States, and,
in those areas in which the laws of the Member States differed, they were patterned
on the public law of the most powerful Member States. Consistent with a neofunctionalist approach, the transformation of rights subsequent to the founding of the
Commission was undertaken by European institutions to further their distinct
supranational preference for greater authority. Thus, in the case of creating
European rights, both realism and neo-functionalism illuminate; the two theories are
complementary, not mutually exclusive. However, the historical record of rights
before the Commission also requires that some of the premises of the theories
presented earlier be rejected or significantly modified. The comparative law of
rights and the diversity of national traditions requires that we discard the legal
constitutionalist assumption of a single, widely shared set of values that inspires
constitutional design. Furthermore, neo-functionalist theory generally overlooks the
vertical and horizontal dimensions of Commission authority that shape supranational
interests and that lead to rights transformation. Only if we grasp the unconventional
nature of supranational governance can we understand why certain historical events
constituted challenges to the Commission’s authority and why certain national or
international rights traditions emerged as salient in the effort to preserve and extend
supranational authority.
A. The First Generation: The Right to a Hearing
Compared to an ordinary executive branch, the Commission has few direct
enforcement powers.46 Fines, injunctions, orders, and permits under European laws
passed in Brussels are generally decided and issued by national administrations in
each of the twenty-five Member States. Nonetheless, the fact that, sometimes, the
Commission exercises direct powers over citizens of the Member States, bypassing
national governments, is extraordinary in light of the international origins of the
organization. The Commission directly enforces European law in three areas:
competition law (anti-trust), anti-dumping law, and customs law. In 1957, the
Commission was given the power to impose fines and issue orders against firms that
engaged in anti-competitive behavior.47 In 1969, it was authorized to impose duties
on foreign goods and, by extension, the firms selling the goods, if they were being
46

See Francesca Bignami, Transgovernmental Networks vs. Democracy: The Case of the European
Information Privacy Network, 26 Mich. J. Int’l L. (forthcoming 2005).
47
See TEC arts. 81 and 82 (ex 85 and 86); Council Regulation 17/62, 1962 O.J. (L 13) 204 (First
Regulation implementing arts. 81 and 82 (ex 85 and 86) of the Treaty). This has been repealed and
replaced by Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1 (on the implementation of the rules on
competition laid down in arts. 81 and 82 of the Treaty). The Commission has since come to exercise
powers in the related areas of merger control and state aids. See infra text accompanying note 71, 192,
422.
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sold at an unfair price ("dumped") on the European market or were being subsidized
by a foreign government.48 In 1979, in a narrow class of cases, the Commission was
given the power to decide whether the customs duties that had been paid or were due
on imported products under the European Customs Code had to be returned to the
importer.49 What were the rights of French, German, Italian, Belgian, Dutch, and
Luxembourger citizens when they first came face-to-face with international
authority? What are their rights today? And how can we explain the difference in the
rights that a European citizen yesterday could invoke when she learned that she was
at risk of paying a hefty fine or duty and those same rights today?
1. The right to oppose adverse Commission determinations then and now
a. National traditions of administrative procedure
In all Western legal systems, individuals have the right to contest vigorously
decisions of government administration that inflict hardship upon them. Nonetheless,
the stage at which the individual may contest the determination, the forum before
which she may vindicate her rights, the scope of the rights, and the range of
hardships believed to warrant such procedural rights, differ considerably from one
country to another. European systems of administrative law can be divided into the
droit administratif family and the common law family. 50 Of the original six Member
States, all were squarely droit administratif systems (France, Italy, Belgium,
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) or closely related to droit administratif systems
(Germany). 51 Administrative decisions in droit administratif countries are generally
48

See Council Regulation (EEC) 459/68, 1968 O.J. (L 93) 1 (on protection against dumping or the
granting of bounties or subsidies by countries which are not members of the European Economic
Community). The Regulation has been amended on numerous occasions. The law currently in force is
Council Regulation (EC) 384/96, 1996 O.J. (L 56) 1 (on protection against dumped imports from
countries not members of the European Communities).
49
See Council Regulation (EEC) 1430/79, 1979 O.J. (L 175) 1 (on the repayment or remission of
import or export duties). This law has been repealed and repayment and remissions are currently dealt
with under arts. 236-239 of Regulation (EEC) 2913/92, 1992 O.J. (L 302) 1 (establishing the Community
Customs Code).
50
The standard classification of countries into droit administratif and common law systems is based
on the nature of the court in which individuals can seek redress against administrative action. See John
Henry Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Western Europe and
Latin America (2d ed. 1985); L. Neville Brown & John S. Bell, French Administrative Law 1-8 (5th ed.
1998). In droit administratif countries, the courts have jurisdiction only over challenges to acts of the
administration and are staffed by specialized judges. In common law countries, the courts are courts of
general jurisdiction, with power over all types of disputes and whose judges are the same regardless of the
type of dispute. The characteristic of interest here—the extent and nature of procedural rights before
administration—is different from that used to create the standard typology. Nonetheless, the countries fall
into the same clusters.
51
German administrative law is generally characterized as related to, but different from, the droit
administratif family. See Mahendra P. Singh, German Administrative Law in Common Law Perspective
1-20 (2001). Administrative acts are reviewed in specialized courts but the judges on those courts are
recruited and promoted according to the rules governing the entire judiciary. Moreover, fines and other
forms of administrative sanctions are reviewed by ordinary criminal courts and lawsuits against the
government based on the Civil Code, i.e. sounding in contract, tort, or property, are brought in ordinary
civil courts. As for administrative procedure, German law also stands between the droit administratif and
common law families. The attention to individual rights in the Basic Law of 1948 has led to fairly
extensive procedural rights whenever an individualized administrative act (Verwaltungsakt) is
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made with few opportunities for individuals to express their views.52 When the
administrative process is completed, however, individuals have the right to apply to
the courts for full review of the legality of the determination. Thus, while individuals
have the right to contest adverse administrative determinations eventually, they do
not always have such a right before the administrative authority deciding on the act.
Fairness is guaranteed through access to strict "control" (contrôle) of the
administration's decision in an independent forum. By contrast, in the English
common law tradition, many of the same requirements of impartiality and procedure
that are imposed on courts are also imposed on government bureaucrats.
Government administration acts through trial-type procedures in which the citizen
has the right to challenge the factual and legal premises of the determination before
an unbiased decisionmaker. Once the determination becomes final, however, access
to the courts is restricted, the grounds of review are limited, and the types of
remedies available are strictly defined. The fairness of the administrative act in the
common law turns on the ability to engage in a quasi-judicial process at the time of
its adoption.
The difference in procedural rights can be traced to differences in experiences
with the administrative state. In France, government administration is highly
centralized and professionalized and, consequently, the mode through which it
exercises power and renders decisions is characteristic of a bureaucracy. By contrast,
in Great Britain, local government is largely autonomous of central government
departments in London and is not highly professionalized.53 In the early history of
the British administrative state, local government was mostly the task of justices of
the peace, responsible for administration of the poor laws, the highways, and liquor
licenses.54 Even now, local government administration in England is handled largely
by boards of elected local officials. Given these histories, it is no surprise that the
droit administratif and common law ideals of fair government administration differ.
In the droit administratif tradition, fair government administration consists of
professionalized decisionmaking, without extensive procedural rights for individual
citizens, but with intense scrutiny after-the-fact by judges. In the common law
tradition, the ideal consists of neutral third-party dispute resolution within the
administration, entailing extensive procedural rights for the parties seeking to avoid
the adverse government decision, and limited review afterwards, before judges.
b. Administrative procedure of the Commission
Procedural rights were first established in European competition proceedings,
one of the few areas in which the Commission, as opposed to the Member States, is
empowered to directly impose sanctions or other burdens upon individuals and

promulgated. Id. at 74-80. Nonetheless, the bureaucratic culture of German administration is strong and
therefore the quasi-judicial procedures that characterize British administration are less pervasive in the
German case.
52
See Marco D'Alberti, Diritto amministrativo comparato 35 (1992) (comparing Anglo-Saxon
proceduralism and French checking of administrative decisions by the Conseil d'Etat).
53
See generally David Foulkes, Administrative Law 35-40 (5th ed. 1982) (discussing structure and
powers of local government).
54
See William R. Wade & Christopher F. Forsyth, Administrative Law 448 (8th ed. 2000).

262

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN LAW

[Vol. 11

firms.55 These procedural rights were similar to those available in the droit
administratif tradition. In the Treaty of Rome, anti-competitive agreements and
abuses of monopoly power were prohibited and the Commission was entrusted with
enforcement powers.56 Five years later, in 1962, the Council passed Regulation
17/62, designed to implement Articles 85 and 86 (now 81 and 82) of the Treaty.57
The Regulation stipulated that:
Before taking decisions as provided for in Articles 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 15, 16 the
Commission shall give the undertakings or associations of undertakings
concerned the opportunity of being heard on the matters to which the
Commission has taken objection.58

In other words, the Commission was required to “hear” the parties whenever it took
any action to enforce competition law: decisions that an agreement or practice did
not violate Articles 85 and 86, so-called “negative clearance" (art. 2); findings of an
infringement of Article 85 or 86 and orders for termination of the infringement (art.
3); decisions under Article 85(3) that an agreement was exempt from the prohibition
on anti-competitive agreements (art. 6); decisions on the retroactive application of
European competition law to agreements existing before the passage of Regulation
17/62 (art. 7); the revocation or amendment of exemptions granted under Article
85(3) (art. 8); decisions to impose fines (art. 15); decisions to impose “periodic
penalty payment” to compel compliance with Commission decisions (art. 16).
The next year, the Commission set down the details of the procedure, which, as
shall be explained shortly, followed French and German law.59 The opportunity to be
heard comprised the following sequence:
o
o

The Commission would notify the parties, in writing, of the “objections
raised against them.” Art. 2.
The parties would have opportunity to “make known in writing their views
concerning the objections raised against them” and provide exculpatory
evidence. Art. 3.

55
In this Article, I do not cover the limits on the Commission’s investigative powers. These include
a privilege for attorney-client communications, Australian Mining and Smelting Europe Ltd. v.
Commission, Case 155/79, 1982 E.C.R. 1575, para. 23 (covering communications made between an
independent lawyer and a client for the sole purpose of defending the client in the competition proceeding
at issue), a privilege against self-incrimination, Orkem v. Commission, Case 374/87, 1989 E.C.R. 3283
(allowing firms to refuse to answer questions that directly go to the question of guilt or innocence), and a
duty to respect national search warrant requirements and only collect evidence related to the specific ends
of the investigation, Hoechst AG v. Commission, Cases 46/87 & 227/88, 1989 E.C.R. 2859. Rather, I
focus on the procedures the Commission must follow and the rights it must respect when it exercises its
decisionmaking powers under the Treaties. The Commission’s powers to collect information from
individuals and rights in that context are related but tangential to my inquiry.
56
TEC arts. 81 and 82 (ex arts. 85 and 86).
57
Council Regulation 17/62, supra note 47, at 204. This has been repealed and replaced by Council
Regulation 1/2003, supra note 47, at 1.
58
Id. at art. 19.
59
Commission Regulation 99/63/EEC, 1963 O.J. (L 127) 2268 (on the hearings provided for in art.
19(1) and (2) of Council Regulation No. 17).
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The Commission would hold an oral hearing at which the parties could
present their case, represented by counsel if they wished. Art. 7.
The Commission's final decision would be limited to the objections on
which the parties had had an opportunity to set forth their views. Art. 4.

Under Article 190 (now 253) of the EC Treaty, the Commission was also under a
duty to state the reasons for official acts, including competition enforcement
decisions.60 Lastly, under Article 173 (now 230) of the EC Treaty the parties could
go to the Court of Justice to challenge the decision on one of four grounds: lack of
competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of
the Treaty or any rule of law relating to its application, and misuse of powers.
The law left open many questions. How detailed did the statement of objections
need to be? Would the parties have to rely on the Commission’s characterization of
the facts, as set out in the statement of objections or would they have a right to
review independently the evidence collected by the Commission? If the parties had
the right to review the evidence, did this include all of the information collected by
the Commission or just the evidence supporting the Commission’s determination?
Could the same civil servants who investigated the case also decide it, or did the
decision have to be reached by a neutral third party? In its final decision, did the
Commission have to address all of the points raised by the parties, both those going
to their alleged anticompetitive behavior and those suggesting less burdensome
remedial measures, or could the Commission wait to respond, if and when the
decision was challenged in the Court of Justice?
In the following three decades, the Court of Justice, joined by the Court of First
Instance in 1988, answered most of these questions. In a line of cases on the right to
a hearing, the Court of Justice imposed an extensive set of procedural requirements
on the Commission.61 In the statement of objections, the Commission must notify the
parties of all aspects of the planned decision, to allow the parties a full opportunity to
answer the case against them and object to the proposed remedial measures.62 It must
allow the parties to examine all the information in its files.63 Summaries of the
evidence or the production of evidence limited to information that the Commission
60
TEC art. 253 (ex art. 190). Article 190 provided that "acts adopted by the Council or the
Commission shall state the reasons on which they are based . . . ."
61
In French, this line of cases comes under the doctrinal heading of “droits de la défense” and
sometimes is translated into English as “rights of the defense.” See, e.g., Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG
v. Commission, Case 85/76, 1979 E.C.R. 1139 (French version).
62
See Transocean Marine Paint Association v. Commission, Case 17/74, 1974 E.C.R. 1063; BAT
and Reynolds v. Commission, Joined Cases 142 & 156/84, 1986 E.C.R. 189, para. 13 (defining statement
of objections as "a procedural and preparatory document, intended solely for the undertakings against
which the procedure is initiated with a view to enabling them to exercise effectively their right to a fair
hearing"); A. Ahlstrom Osakeyhtio v. Commission (Woodpulp II), Joined Cases C-89/85, C-104/85, A114/86, C-116/85, C-117/85 & C-125 to 129/85 1993 E.C.R. I-1307, paras. 40-54, 148-154 (annulling
those parts of Commission decision that were not clearly raised in the statement of objections).
63
See Hoffmann-La Roche, 1979 E.C.R. at 1139; Hercules v. Commission, Case T-7/89, 1991
E.C.R. II-1711, para. 53; Soda Ash Cases, Cases T-30/91, T-31/91, T-32/91, T-36/91, T-37/91, 1995
E.C.R. II-1775, II-1821, II-1825, II-1847, II-1901 (setting down "general principle of equality of arms"
under which all parties are entitled to know contents of case file); ICI v Commission, Case T-36/91, 1995
E.C.R. II-1847. See generally Koen Lenaerts & Jan Vanhamme, Procedural Rights of Private Parties in
the Community Administrative Process, 1997 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 531, 545-49 (reviewing case law on
the right of access to the file).
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considers relevant to the case will not suffice. The Commission is not under a duty to
separate prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions and therefore the same civil
servants who investigate the case may also decide it.64 Under the separate but related
duty to give reasons, the Court requires that the Commission give a complete enough
statement of the facts and considerations underlying the final decision so that the
parties and the Court can discern whether the Commission has adhered to the
substantive requirements of European administrative law.65 However, the
Commission is not obliged to answer all of the objections of the parties in the final
decision. If the parties choose to challenge the administrative determination in the
European Courts, the Commission can advance more detailed reasons for the
decision there.66
The Commission has also contributed to the definition of the European right to a
hearing. Starting in the early 1980s, the Commission issued a series of policy
statements and binding rules, setting down procedures for exercising the right to
examine the evidence. Thus, in 1982, the Commission announced that it would
attach copies of the evidence to the statement of objections issued to the parties at
the beginning of a competition proceeding, or, if the evidence was unwieldy, allow
the parties to inspect the files on Commission premises.67 A Commission rule from
1997 defines the classes of documents that are available to the parties and those that
are protected from disclosure; the rule also sets down the procedure for enabling
parties to consult the documents.68
The Commission has also created the figure of the hearing officer.69 This is a
civil servant in the Commission department responsible for competition (DirectorateGeneral for Competition), who presides at the oral hearing. Her primary function is
to ensure that the hearing is fair by allowing the parties to present their statements,
by putting questions to the parties, by entering new evidence into the record, and by
64

See Cimenteries CBR and Others v Commission, Joined Cases T-25/95, T-26/95, T-30/95, T31/95, T-32/95, T-34/95, T-35/95, T-36/95, T-37/95, T-38/95, T-39/95, T-42/95, T-43/95, T-44/95, T45/95, T-46/95, T-48/95, T-50/95, T-51/95, T-52/95, T-53/95, T-54/95, T-55/95, T-56/95, T-57/95, T58/95, T-59/95, T-60/95, T-61/95, T-62/95, T-63/95, T-64/95, T-65/95, T-68/95, T-69/95, T-70/95, T71/95, T-87/95, T-88/95, T-103/95 and T-104/95, 2000 E.C.R. II-491, paras. 712-718.
65
See ACF Chemiefarma v Commission, Case 41/69, 1970 E.C.R. 661, 690; Michelin v.
Commission, Case 322/81, 1983 E.C.R. 3500.
66
See Cascades SA v. Commission, Case T-308/94, 1998 E.C.R. II-925, paras. 220-23.
67
Commission of the European Communities, 12th Report on Competition Policy (1982).
68
See Commission Notice 97/C 23/03, 1997 O.J. (C 23) 3 (on the internal rules of procedure for
processing requests for access to the file in cases pursuant to arts. 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty, arts. 65 and
66 of the ECSC Treaty and Council Regulation (EEC) 4064/89); see also Commission Regulation (EC)
773/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 123) 18, arts. 15-16 (codification of 1997 rules) (relating to the conduct of
proceedings by the Commission pursuant to arts. 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty).
69
See Commission Decision 2001/462/EC, ECSC, 2001 O.J. (L 162) 21 (on the terms of reference
of hearing officers in certain competition proceedings). The position was first created in 1982 and then
modified in 1990. See Notice on procedures for applying the competition articles of the EEC and ECSC
Treaties (arts. 85-86 of the EEC Treaty and arts. 65-66 of the ECSC Treaty), 1982 O.J. (C 251) 2;
Commission Decision of 8 September 1982, in Commission of the European Communities, 13th Report
on Competition Policy 273 (1983) (setting down “terms of reference” of Hearing Officer); Commission
Decision of 23 November 1990 on the implementation of hearings in connection with procedures for the
application of arts. 85-86 of the EEC Treaty and arts. 65-66 of the ECSC Treaty, in Commission of the
European Communities, XXth Report on Competition Policy 312 (1991) (modifying “terms of reference”
of Hearing Officer); Hartmut Johannes, The Role of the Hearing Officer, 1989 Fordham Corp. L. Inst. 347
(Barry Hawk ed., 1990).
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allowing witnesses to give testimony. At the conclusion of the oral hearing, the
Hearing Officer issues a report in which she summarizes the proceedings, draws
conclusions from the hearing, and makes recommendations for new evidencegathering if she believes it to be necessary.70
Lastly, when the Council enacted a European merger law, based on a proposal
from the Commission, all of the procedural guarantees developed in the context of
Article 85 and 86 (now 81 and 82) enforcement actions were extended to merger
proceedings.71 Firms that seek to obtain clearance for a merger, therefore, enjoy the
same procedural rights as firms under investigation for engaging in anti-competitive
practices or abusing a dominant position under Articles 85 and 86.
2. The historical juncture: Accession of the United Kingdom
What explains the choice that has been made in favor of a detailed statement of
objections, full disclosure of all the evidence, and a hearing presided by a civil
servant independent of Commission investigating officers? Accession of the United
Kingdom in 1973 tested the European system of legal authority because of the
different common law understanding of fair administrative action. European
institutions responded to the test by moving away from the droit administratif
model and adopting the common law right to a hearing.72
a. The common law challenge: The principle of natural justice compared to the
French droits de la défense and the German rechtlichen gehörs
The picture that was drawn earlier of the procedural differences between the
droit administratif systems of the founding Member States and the United Kingdom
was impressionistic. Especially in administrative law, generalization is perilous since
administrative procedures and the stringency of judicial review can differ
dramatically from one government department to the next, one field to another. To
show that the Commission's administrative procedure was first designed on the droit
administratif model of the six original Member States and then was transformed to
mimic the minority common law model, I enter into the details of national
administrative law. This discussion focuses on competition law, which would have

70
See Commission Decision 2001/462/EC,ECSC, supra note 69, at art. 8; see also Commission
Regulation (EC) 773/2004, supra note 68, at art. 14 (recent codification of oral hearing).
71
Council Regulation (EEC) 4064/89, 1990 O.J. (L 257) 13, at art. 8 (on the control of
concentrations between undertakings). This has been replaced from May 1, 2004 by Council Regulation
(EC) 139/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 24) 1 (on the control of concentrations between undertakings - the EC
Merger Regulation). See also the implementing regulation, Commission Regulation (EC) 802/2004, 2004
O.J. (L 133) 1 (implementing Council Regulation (EC) 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between
undertakings).
72
To refer to the country, I use the noun “UK.” The legal system of the UK is comprised of separate
courts for England and Wales, on the one hand, and Scotland, on the other hand. Since most of the cases
come from England, I use the adjective “English” to modify “law” when I refer exclusively to the judgemade principles of the common law. When I refer more broadly to the common law, statutes of
Parliament (generally applicable throughout the UK) and activities of government administration (also
generally applicable throughout the UK) I use the adjective “British” to modify “law.”
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been the natural reference point for the civil servants, lawyers, and judges designing
Commission procedure.73
In France, the right to make one's case before an administrative decision can be
issued is known as rights of the defense (droits de la défense). The right dates back
to 1944, when the French Conseil d'Etat (Council of State) recognized that
individuals have the right, above and beyond any of the rights contained in an
enabling statute, to refute the administration's version of the facts if the
administration’s decision constitutes a sanction.74 In Dame Veuve Trompier-Gravier,
the prefect (préfet) of the Seine region (département) had revoked a newspaper kiosk
permit based on the defendant's alleged misconduct, without giving the defendant the
opportunity to refute the charges against her.75 The Conseil d'Etat found in favor of
the defendant and annulled the prefect's decision based on a theory of general
principles of law (principes généraux du droit), among which figured rights of the
defense. In French administrative and constitutional law, this judgment constituted
an extraordinary turning point; it was the first in a long line of cases in which the
Conseil d'Etat created whole cloth, without a textual basis, general principles of law
that French administration had to obey.76 For the first time, the Conseil d'Etat
disregarded the fundamental tenet of French constitutional law under which the law
(la loi) enacted by the Parliament is the expression of the sovereign French people
and under which judges are to apply that law, never make it.
Notwithstanding the significance of rights of the defense for French public law,
it is critical to appreciate the limits of the right compared to the common law
tradition. The right only applies to administrative sanctions. And sanctions only
comprise a subset of administrative determinations that impose hardship on
individuals. The determination must involve personal facts (caractère personnel)
that go to the behavior of the individual concerned for it to be considered a
sanction.77 Sanctions are distinct from three broad classes of individualized
decisions: administrative acts that rest entirely within the discretion of the
administration and where a hearing of the parties would have no impact;78
administrative acts that are non-discretionary because they draw the necessary
consequences from a previous administrative or judicial determination and where,
again, a hearing of the parties would have no impact;79 and police measures (mésures
73
David Gerber’s masterful analysis of European competition laws distinguishes among “juridical”
competition regimes (the UK was, in part, such a regime), “administrative” regimes (France), and an
“administrative-juridical” regime (Germany). See David J. Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth
Century Europe: Protecting Prometheus 217-222, 180, 278 (1998). The contrast drawn here between
court-like British competition proceedings and bureaucratic continental proceedings overlaps with
Gerber’s typology. This analysis, however, seeks to situate competition law within the larger body of
administrative law, so as to understand the force of droit administratif and common law principles in
designing not simply European competition law but European administrative law broadly speaking.
74
The Conseil d’Etat (Council of State) is the highest French court responsible for reviewing
decisions of government administration.
75
Dame Veuve Trompier-Gravier, Recueil Conseil d'Etat 133 (May 5, 1944).
76
See Marceau Long et al., Les grands arrêts de la jurisprudence administrative 352-53 (14th ed.
2003).
77
Commissaire du gouvernement (Guy Braibant), Conclusions from Conseil d'Etat, Min. Intérieur
c. Rohmer, Recueil Conseil d’Etat 12 (Jan. 8, 1960).
78
Jean-Marie Auby & Roland Drago, Traité des recours en matière administrative 427 (1992).
79
Long et al., supra note 76, at 356, point 8b.
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de police), characterized as forward-looking decisions, adopted to protect public
safety or health, which concern the whole public and only incidentally affect the
interests of a specific individual.80 In sum, rights of the defense are far from
universally recognized in the French administration’s daily decisionmaking, even in
decisions that name particular individuals or that are clearly directed at certain
individuals or firms.81
In addition, the procedure required of administration is extremely abbreviated
compared to what would be expected in a judicial proceeding. The party must be
informed that the government is contemplating a sanction, she must be informed of
all the charges against her (griefs), and she must be able to present her case in such a
way as to be able to influence the administration's decision (présenter utilement sa
défense).82 With the exception of disciplinary proceedings involving state
employees, the duty to inform the party of the factual and legal basis of the
contemplated decision does not include the communication of all the administration's
evidence; rather it entails a summary description of the facts at issue in the case.
Furthermore, the manner in which an individual is entitled to present her case
depends on the circumstances of the particular decision and does not entail, as a rule,
an oral hearing.83
At the time that the European Commission was given powers in the competition
area, France also had legislation prohibiting certain types of inter-firm agreements
and abuses of dominant position.84 The legislation’s enforcement mechanism
comported with the bureaucratic rationality ideal and the limited nature of rights of
the defense in French law. The Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs was
required to refer a suspected competition infringement to a special commission
appointed by the government, and known as the Technical Commission on Cartels
and Dominant Positions (Commission Technique des Ententes et des Positions
Dominantes).85 The Commission appointed a rapporteur to investigate the matter and
80

Auby & Drago, supra note 78, at 427.
My analysis is based on the jurisprudence of the Conseil d'Etat. A number of legislative texts
provide greater protection for rights of the defense. The most significant are the Presidential Decree of 28
November 1983 and the Law of 12 April 2000. Decree No. 83-1025 of Nov. 28, 1983, 1983 J.O. 3492;
Law No. 2000-321 of Apr. 12, 2000, 2000 J.O. 5646. Under Article 8 of the Decree and Article 24 of the
Law, all administrative acts that must be accompanied by a statement of reasons under an earlier law (Law
of 11 July 1979) must also allow for an adversary proceeding (une procédure contradictoire), which in
French legal terminology is the equivalent of respect for rights of the defense. See Long et al., supra note
76, at 355, point 7. The acts covered are all those that are unfavorable (défavorable) to the interested party
or that derogate from a standard legal rule (une décision dérogatoire). Jean-Bernard Auby, Juris-Classeur
Administratif, Fascicule 107-20, at 14, point 110 (1998). The Decree and the Law have extended rights of
the defense in a number of ways, for instance, by requiring a hearing even in the case of police measures.
However, this legislation post-dates the developments in the Court of Justice and the Commission
analyzed below and therefore cannot serve to explain rights in Commission proceedings.
82
Auby & Drago, supra note 78, at 429.
83
This is another element of administrative procedure that was altered by the Decree of 1983. In the
administrative proceedings covered by the Decree, individuals have the right to submit written
observations and to give an oral presentation of their case. See Auby, supra note 81, at 15, point 113.
84
See Decree 53-704 of Aug. 9, 1953, 1953 J.O. 7045 (anti-competitive agreements); Law 63-628
of July 2, 1963, 1963 J.O. 5915 (abuse of dominant position). See Eric E. Bergsten, The Law of
Restrictive Trade Practices in France, II Business Regulation in the Common Market Nations 1, 109-12
(Harlan Morse Blake ed., 1969).
85
Bergsten, supra note 84, at 122-26; V.G. Venturini, Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices
in France 88-97 (1971).
81
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to draft a report and a separate advisory opinion that would then circulate to the
members of the Commission, the parties, and any government ministries that might
be concerned.86 The firms accused of the anti-competitive behavior had the right to
submit written observations on the report, but were not permitted to see the evidence
in the file. Moreover, when the Commission met to consider and vote on the case,
the parties did not have the right to appear in person. Even when they were
permitted to appear, the parties generally were not allowed representation by a
lawyer. Why? Because as one contemporary commentator put it, "the Commission
has apparently found that lawyers are too technical and want to argue the law, which
the Commission feels is not helpful before an economic advisory body."87 Then, the
Commission's opinion would be issued to the parties and would be sent to the
Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs for a final decision on the infringement
and any remedial action. The Commission's recommendation, although technically
non-binding, was considered an administrative act, subject to outside scrutiny by the
Conseil d'Etat.88 Hence, in France, the specifics of the administration of competition
policy fell into line with the basic features of the droit administratif tradition: before
the deciding authorities, few procedural rights existed, but access to the Conseil
d'Etat for scrutiny of the merits was guaranteed.
The only national understanding of rights and legitimate administration that
departed significantly from the droit administratif model in the first decades of the
European Commission was German law. Although, broadly speaking, Germany
resembles other droit administratif countries, the German system possessed, and
continues to possess, certain unique features. In the realm of administrative
procedure, it afforded more extensive rights. The Federal Administrative Procedure
Act of 1976, which codifies long-standing principles of administrative law, requires
that before an administrative authority issues an individual act (Verwaltungsakt) that
interferes with rights, the parties have a right to be heard (rechtlichen gehörs).
Interfering with rights captures a wider class of administrative action than the French
concept of sanction.89 The administration is under a duty to inform the interested
party (Beteiligten) of all the facts and evidence relevant to the decision and to give
the interested party an opportunity to controvert such facts and evidence.90
Individuals have the right to a written decision containing the decision’s essential
factual and legal grounds. 91 Unlike French law, individuals have a right of appeal
against the act within the administration (Vorverfahren), as well as a right of appeal
to the courts.92 As a rule, however, and contrary to the English common law,
administrative authorities are not under a duty to allow the interested party to
examine all the evidence, independent of the relevance to the party's case, or to make
oral representations. Moreover, administrative authorities are not required to afford
86
The provisions of the government regulation setting down the procedure of the Commission and
the Ministry (Decree No. 54-97 of 27 Jan. 1954) are reproduced in Venturini, supra note 85, at 98 n. 41.
87
See Bergsten, supra note 84, at 124.
88
Societé La Langouste, cited in Bergsten, supra note 84, at 125.
89
See Georg Ress, Due Process in the Administrative Procedure, in 3 Federation Internationale
Pour Le Droit Europeen (FIDE), Due process in the administrative procedure, Rapports du 8ème Congres,
22-24 Juin 1978, 4.1, 4.10 (1978).
90
Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz [Federal Administrative Procedures Act or “VwVfG”], §§ 28, 29.
91
VwVfG § 39.
92
VwVfG §§ 71-73.
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an independent, neutral adjudicator to take evidence and consider the government’s
case against the individual, as in the common law tradition.
German administrative procedure in competition proceedings also differed from
French procedure. The parties before the German Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt)
had the standard right to notice of the charges and the evidence, the right to respond
with a written statement, and the right to receive a reasoned decision.93 However, in
contrast to ordinary German administrative procedure and proceedings before the
French Technical Commission, the parties also had a right to an oral hearing.94 But
they did not have a right of access to all the evidence in the government's file95 nor
were the administrative officials responsible for the final decision independent from
those responsible for the investigation.
Procedural duties in English administrative law, known as the principles of
natural justice, are more extensive. Natural justice is one of a number of
requirements that English courts impose, as a matter of judge-made common law, on
government administration. The courts interpret parliamentary statutes delegating
powers to administration as containing certain conditions for the lawful exercise of
power. The administration may not commit errors of fact and law, exercise
discretion so that its decisions are unreasonable or based upon irrelevant
considerations, or make decisions without respecting the procedures of natural
justice. Should the administration breach any one of these principles, English courts
will hold administrative action to be ultra vires.96 These common law principles are
so engrained that it is hard to envisage a parliamentary statute that the courts would
interpret as instructing the administration to act in breach. Notwithstanding the
British constitutional doctrine of parliamentary supremacy, it would be extremely
difficult for the Parliament to write a statute that an English court would interpret as
permitting errors of fact or law, as authorizing unreasonable acts, as allowing
decisions based on irrelevant considerations, or as permitting disrespect for natural
justice.
Natural justice comprises two elements: officials are forbidden from deciding
cases in which they may be biased (nemo judex in re sua or "no man a judge in his
own cause") and every person has a right to be fairly heard (audi alteram partem or
"hear the other side").97 Both can be traced back to cases decided in the second half
of the 1800s, in which decisions of local administrative authorities were quashed
because the authorities had disregarded the rules of natural justice.98 The rule against
bias has no equivalent in French or German administrative law. Bias can stem from a
number of sources, including a pecuniary interest in the matter, a personal or family
relationship to the parties, prejudging the outcome before hearing all the evidence,

93
See Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen of 1958 [Act Against Restraints of Competition
or “GWB”], §§ 51, 53 (now §§ 54, 56);
94
See GWB, § 53 (now § 56).
95
See infra text accompanying note 128 (discussing limited access to administration's evidence in
German competition proceedings).
96
Wade & Forsyth, supra note 54, at 37.
97
Id. at 445, 469.
98
See, e.g., R. v. Rand (1866) L.R. 1 Q.B. 230 (rule against bias) (discussed in Wade & Forsyth,
supra note 54, at 448); Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works (1863) 14 CB (NS) 180 (right to a fair
hearing) (discussed in Wade & Forsyth, supra note 54, at 473).
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and commingling prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions.99 However, some of the
most common sources of bias in government administration are permitted by the
courts. For instance, a minister’s decision pursuant to a delegation from the
Parliament, will be considered lawful even if the civil servants under his direction
were responsible for investigating the case and even if the minister prejudged the
matter by announcing a departmental policy.100
The right to be fairly heard overlaps with the droits de la défense and the
rechtlichen gehörs but applies to a broader array of administrative action than the
French right and entails more extensive duties than both the French and German
rights. Under English case law, administration must respect the right to be heard
whenever it plans to make a decision that adversely affects the legal rights or
interests of an individual.101 Although the characterization of what is a legal right or
interest narrows the application of the right, it is nowhere as restrictive as the French
limiting principle of a sanction. Administrative decisions that are entirely forwardlooking, discretionary, or policy-driven must nonetheless respect the right to be
heard. As a result, administrative decisions such as land-use planning, awarding
funds to local administrative authorities, and awarding licenses to first-time
applicants can only be made after the affected parties have an opportunity to make
themselves heard.102
As for the content of the right, the courts have held that it includes the right to
know the government's case, including the evidence and reports in the government's
possession.103 The parties are also entitled, as a general matter, to present their case
directly before the deciding authority, although sometimes only written submissions
are required.104 Thus, English administrative procedure differs from its French and
German counterparts in both the extent to which the parties have the opportunity to
examine the government's evidence and the emphasis on oral hearings.
The principle of natural justice has not only been developed by common law
courts, but has also been given effect by parliamentary statutes establishing the
institutions of the British administrative state.105 In the early part of the 1900s, a
number of special tribunals were created to administer the social legislation of the
welfare state; they have since multiplied in virtually all policy domains. Tribunals
exist for awarding social security benefits, allocating fishing licenses, deciding on
child support, determining whether companies have infringed information privacy
laws, and myriad other policy areas.106 Tribunals are charged with making decisions
that in droit administratif systems would be made by government ministries.
Tribunals are analogous to courts in that they are independent of the ministry
responsible for the policy area in which they adjudicate.107 Furthermore, their
proceedings are adversarial: the government presents the case against the defendant
99

Wade & Forsyth, supra note 54, at 460-66.
Id. at 452, 464-66.
Id. at 484.
102
Id. at 525-31.
103
Id. at 506-11. There are exceptions to the duty to disclose the evidence, especially where there are
good reasons to preserve the confidentiality of the government's sources. Id. at 509-10.
104
Id. at 511-15.
105
Id. at 466.
106
Id. at 929-37 (table listing tribunals).
107
Id. at 890-98.
100
101

2005]

CREATING EUROPEAN RIGHTS

271

and the defendant has the opportunity to respond. Tribunals are different from
ordinary common law courts because they are specialized—their jurisdiction is
limited to one administrative scheme—and their procedure is abbreviated compared
to a civil or criminal trial. Appeals on questions of law decided by administrative
tribunals may be taken to the ordinary courts.
The other type of legislative scheme designed to give effect to the dictates of
natural justice is the statutory inquiry. Inquiries are established in areas in which,
ultimately, the decision is a discretionary one entrusted to a minister, but in which it
is believed that the minister should listen to the public’s opinion on the matter. A
civil servant is tasked with conducting a fair hearing of all the interested parties and
then making a recommendation to the minister.108 This is the procedure that is
followed before the government may acquire land, build roads or airports, and alter
certain types of health services. The parliamentary practice of establishing tribunals
in the place of bureaucracies and establishing statutory inquiries in the place of
exclusive ministerial power demonstrate the extent to which the principle of natural
justice permeates the fabric of British administration.
When the UK joined the European Community, enforcement of British
competition policy adhered to the principle of natural justice. The institutional
apparatus was split between the Restrictive Practices Court and the Monopolies and
Mergers Commission. The Restrictive Practices Court (RPC) was a full-fledged
administrative tribunal, with jurisdiction over cartels and certain forms of vertical
agreements in restriction of competition.109 The Monopolies and Mergers
Commission (MMC) was also organized as an administrative tribunal, with
jurisdiction over mergers and anti-competitive practices. But the MMC only had the
power to make recommendations;110 the Department of Trade and Industry—the
government ministry responsible for competition policy—was charged with making
the regulatory decision. In sum, cartel policy was the province of a classic
administrative tribunal and was fully in line with the principle of natural justice.
Monopolies and merger policy was administered by both a commission independent
of the government, before which individuals had a right to be heard, and a
government ministry, vested with discretionary power and unconstrained by the
principle of natural justice. However, in both areas of competition law, the contrast
with the French Commission Technique and the German Bundeskartellamt is
evident.
The European Commission procedure set down in 1962 and 1963 fell in line
with the procedural guarantees of French and German competition law. As in both
French and German law, the parties had the right to learn of the government's
essential facts and arguments, to respond in writing, and to receive a reasoned final
decision. As in German law, the parties also had the right to an oral hearing.
However, the Commission was not required to inform the parties of every aspect of
108
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See Rogers, supra note 109, at 14; Craig, supra note 109, at 205, 206, 221 (citing to Hoffmann-La
Roche & Co. v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [1975] A.C. 295).
109

272

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN LAW

[Vol. 11

the planned decision, to reveal all the evidence directly to the parties, or to provide
for a neutral third party to officiate the administrative proceeding. As in the French
and German systems, it was believed that any injustice that might arise from such
defects could be remedied when the administrative decision was appealed to the
Court of Justice. In 1973, this view was called into question.
b. National value: The influence of the English right to a hearing
The English principle of natural justice influenced both the jurisprudence of the
Court of Justice and the European Commission's self-imposed procedural reforms.
UK accession brought a marked shift in the Court's doctrine on procedural rights in
competition law.111 In 1966, in the very first challenge to a Commission competition
decision, the parties raised the question of the adequacy of their rights in the course
of the Commission’s proceedings. The parties claimed—and the Court dismissed—a
right to examine Commission evidence, the very same right that the Court declared
in 1979 to be part of a fundamental "right to be heard." Consten and Grundig, firms
that had been denied an exemption under Article 85(3) for their exclusive
distributorship contract, argued that the Commission had violated their rights of
defense.112 They argued that they should have had the right to receive and examine
all the evidence gathered in the Commission’s investigation. Consten and Grundig
were especially keen to examine memoranda from the French and German
authorities responding to questions posed by the Commission, which they believed
had influenced the Commission’s decision.
Advocate General Roemer rejected their claims based largely on the finding that
Commission procedure comported with the procedure followed by national
competition authorities, in particular the German authority.113 The Advocate General
recognized that there was a “right to be fully heard” (rechtlichen gehörs) but that, as
far as the right to examine the evidence was concerned, Consten and Grundig had the
right to only a summary of the facts relied upon by the Commission. The Advocate
General based his conclusion on the law governing the German Cartel Office
(Bundeskartellamt):
A clear summary of their contents [documents that served as the basis for
the decision], which allows those concerned to learn without difficulty of
the essential lines of the opinion of the third parties concerned, is enough.
These are also the principles which govern the procedure before the
Bundeskartellamt. (Cf. Müller-Henneberg and Schwartz, ‘Gesetz gegen
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Jürgen Schwarze has also argued that the Court of Justice came under the influence of English
administrative law in viewing fairness as turning on the procedural rights available to firms in competition
proceedings rather than on the relief they could obtain from the Court through judicial review. See Jürgen
Schwarze, Judicial Review in EC Law—Some Reflections on the Origins and the Actual Legal Situation,
51 Int’l Comp. L.Q. 17, 21 (2001).
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Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen und Europäisches Kartellrecht’, 2nd ed., p.
959.) 114

The Court followed the Advocate General.115
In 1970, when the Commission used its power to impose fines for the first time,
the parties challenged the decision on similar procedural grounds. Again, the claim
was rejected by the Advocate General and the Court, with one small exception. In
ACF Chemiefarma v. Commission, a number of quinine producers were found to
have participated in a price-fixing cartel. They argued that the Commission’s
statement of objections was not sufficiently precise; that the Commission should
have communicated all of the evidence in the file, or in the alternative, should have
communicated the documents that served as evidence for the Commission’s
allegations; and that the final decision was defective because it did not address
arguments made by the parties on the nature of the pharmaceuticals market.116 The
Commission, as it had in Consten and Grundig, relied on the absence of a duty to
disclose the file in the cartel laws of the Member States in defending its procedure.117
The Advocate General rejected all of the quinine producers’ procedural challenges
and, for the most part, the Court followed.118 The Court hedged only on the question
of whether the Commission had to disclose the records from staff visits to certain
firms or whether the Commission could simply summarize the results of those visits.
The Court said that the Commission should have communicated the records, but
when the Court went on to examine the prejudice to ACF Chemiefarma, it found that
prejudice to be minimal. The failure to communicate the documents and to allow for
critical examination of the proof led the Court to conclude that the Commission had
failed to prove its case in one limited respect: the life of the ten-year cartel, and
hence the amount of the fine, was reduced by seven months.119
The next competition case, decided in 1972, produced no surprises. In ICI v.
Commission, the member of a dyestuffs price-fixing cartel challenged the
Commission’s fine. The complainant alleged a similar litany of procedural defects
and, again, the Advocate General and the Court rejected them.120
By 1974, the tone of the Court had changed dramatically. Transocean Marine
Paint Association v. Commission was one of the first competition cases to be decided
after the accession of the UK.121 Transocean, an association of marine paint
manufacturers, operated a world-wide sales network for its members. It had
previously notified the Commission of the agreement and had obtained an Article
85(3) exemption. When Transocean applied for renewal of the exemption, the
Commission sent Transocean a notice of objections listing the conditions being
114
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contemplated by the Commission in order to ensure that the agreement would not
have anti-competitive effects. After giving Transocean the opportunity to make
written and oral submissions, the Commission issued the final decision. According
to Transocean, the decision depended on a condition of which the parties had not
been notified: Transocean’s members had to disclose cross-holding patterns between
their directors and other firms in the paint sector. Transocean challenged the decision
on the grounds that it could not have anticipated the condition from the proceedings
and hence had never had the opportunity to make its views known.
The Advocate General assigned to the case was one of the new British members
of the Court, Advocate General Warner. He agreed with the Commission that the
procedure was perfectly consistent with the letter of the applicable law. Nonetheless,
Advocate General Warner concluded that the “right to be heard” was part of
Community law. By imposing what amounted to an entirely new condition without
a hearing, the Commission had breached that right. Therefore, the Advocate General
recommended that the Court annul the new condition.122 The Advocate General
based his conclusion on a long excursion into the laws of the Member States. He first
gave what amounted to a textbook statement of the English rule:
There is a rule embedded in the law of some of our countries that an
administrative authority, before wielding a statutory power to the
detriment of a particular person, must in general hear what the person has
to say about the matter, even if the statute does not expressly require it.
Audi alteram partem or, as it is sometimes expressed, ‘audiatur et altera
pars’.123

He then launched into an extensive discussion of the English "rule of natural
justice," under which, “although there are not positive words in a statute requiring
that the party shall be heard, yet the justice of the common law will supply the
omission of the legislature.”124 The Advocate General then canvassed the traditions
of other Member States. In his tally, England, Scotland, Denmark, Germany, and
Ireland clearly embraced the principle, while France, Belgium, and Luxembourg
were arguably evolving in that direction, and Italy and the Netherlands clearly
rejected the principle. His results did not support a declaration that the right was
ubiquitous or even that it was a majority tradition. Nonetheless, he concluded:
My Lords, that review, which I have sought to keep short, of the laws of
the Member States, must, I think, on balance, lead to the conclusion that
the right to be heard forms part of those rights which the ‘law’ referred to
in Article 164 of the Treaty upholds, and of which, accordingly[,] it is the
duty of this Court to ensure the observance.125

The Court embraced the common law principle put forward by the Advocate
General. For the first time, it found that there was a “general rule” that “a person
whose interests are perceptibly affected by a decision taken by a public authority
122
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must be given the opportunity to make his point of view known.”126 In the past, the
Court had framed review of the Commission’s procedures as a matter of policing
respect for rights of the defense set down in European competition statutes. In
Transocean, by contrast, the Court announced a higher principle that could be used
to supplement competition statutes. The Court concluded by annulling the condition
and sending the case back to the Commission for further proceedings, so that the
parties would have the opportunity to make their views known.
By the time the Court decided the next major competition case involving
procedural questions, it was clear that the tide had turned towards a court-like
administrative process. Hoffman-La Roche, a manufacturer of vitamins, was found
by the Commission to have engaged in an abuse of a dominant position by forcing
buyer firms to purchase all their supplies from Hoffman-La Roche.127 Hoffman-La
Roche objected to the Commission’s procedure on the same grounds as the parties in
the pre-Transocean cases: Hoffman-La Roche had not been allowed to inspect
certain documents that supported the findings of fact in the Commission’s final
decision. Hoffman argued that the Commission had breached the right to be heard.
This time, the Court agreed.
The extent to which the new, English tradition had transformed Europe’s law of
rights is illustrated vividly by the difference between the opinion of the Advocate
General and the judgment of the Court. Advocate General Reischel recommended to
the Court that it find against Hoffman-La Roche. As his predecessor Advocate
General Roemer had done in Consten and Grundig, the Advocate General looked to
the procedural guarantees in German competition law for guidance. Like Advocate
General Roemer, he observed that, under German law, the parties to administrative
proceedings only had a right to a summary of the evidence, not to examine the
evidence for themselves:
According to [the German Law Against Restrictions on Competition] in
administrative proceedings the only applicable principle is that the persons
concerned must have the opportunity to give their views on the objections
laid against them and that a decision cannot be found on facts of which the
parties concerned were unaware. The way in which the Bundeskartellamt
(the Federal Cartel Office) applies this principle is evidently to
c[o]mmunicate only the essential content of the pleadings, and in
particular to notify them only of the essential purport of the views of the
other parties concerned. There is no right to carry out a thorough
inspection of documents . . . .128

The Advocate General found “no general legal principle” giving a right to inspect
documents. Therefore he recommended that the Court find against Hoffman LaRoche.
The Advocate General was behind the times. With British accession the nature
of Europe’s legal system had radically changed. The common law principle of
natural justice had replaced the German law of procedural rights as the yardstick
against which European authority had to be measured. Thus the Court declined to
126

Id. at 1080, para. 15.
Hoffman La-Roche, 1979 E.C.R. at 461, 472.
128
Id. at 600.
127

276

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN LAW

[Vol. 11

follow the Advocate General and departed from the cases decided before accession.
The Court declared, for the first time, that the right to be heard was a “fundamental
principle of Community law” and that the ability to examine the Commission’s
evidence was part and parcel of the right:
[I]n order to respect the principle of the right to be heard the
undertakings concerned must have been afforded the opportunity during
the administrative procedure to make known their views on the truth and
relevance of the facts and circumstances alleged and on the documents
used by the Commission to support its claim that there has been an
infringement of Article 86 of the Treaty.129

This rejection of earlier case law is striking. Both the timing of the change in the
Court’s doctrine, as well as the reasoning of the Hoffmann-La Roche judgment—the
Court categorized “the right to be heard” in much the same terms as Advocate
General Warner in the earlier Transocean case—support the conclusion that
European administrative law had come under the spell of the English common law.
In the twenty-five years of competition cases that have followed, the European
Courts have worked out the ramifications of the fundamental principle of the—now
European— “right to be heard.”
The background of how the Commission came to adopt a hearing officer at the
oral phase of Commission competition proceedings also demonstrates the common
law’s influence on individual rights. The historical record shows that the
Commission drew upon the common law's rule against bias, the second element of
natural justice. As mentioned earlier, in 1982, the Commission announced that a
civil servant, unconnected with the investigation, would preside at the oral hearing at
which parties accused of anti-competitive behavior give testimony and refute the
Commission’s evidence.130 According to a number of sources, this innovation
occurred in response to a damning report from the House of Lords European
Communities Select Committee.131 There, the House of Lords criticized the
European Commission for combining the functions of judge and prosecutor, in
breach of the second element of natural justice. The Select Committee said:
It is clearly essential that the rules and proceedings of the Commission
should be seen to be just and fair as well as effective. The evidence
129
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received by the Committee revealed that there exists widespread doubt
whether the Commission’s procedures are just and fair to undertakings
whose practices are under investigation . . . . For most witnesses,
including the Bar and Law Society, the grounds for believing that there
was “room for improvement” were derived from the fact that the
Commission combines the functions of investigator, prosecutor, and
judge. In general it was urged that the requirements of natural justice
should, as far as is possible, be observed in the adjudication by the
Commission of all contentious or disputed cases and that there should be
no departure from natural justice on grounds of administrative
convenience.132

Since the existing treaty framework would not allow for the appointment of an
independent figure, similar to a member of a British administrative tribunal, the
Committee suggested that a civil servant, removed from the Commission’s
investigation, be brought in at the hearing phase:
The Committee suggests that the creation of an additional post of Director
in Directorate-General IV [the Commission competition department]
should be considered. The Director so appointed would enter the case at
the stage of the preliminary meeting [the Committee also recommended
introducing a preliminary meeting at which the parties would be able to
clarify the factual basis and reasoning of the complaint] over which he
would preside. He would also preside over the oral hearing, and would
assume, within Directorate-General IV, responsibility for the subsequent
conduct of the case.133

The Commission very shortly afterwards adopted the crux of the House of Lord’s
recommendation by creating the post of hearing officer.
The House of Lords exercised a similar influence over the Commission’s
decision to disclose all the evidence to the parties, regardless of whether the
Commission considered the evidence relevant and hence relied on it to build its
case.134 The Committee’s report was published in February 1982, but its inquiry had
begun one year earlier. The Committee put a number of questions to the European
Commission on competition procedure, circulated the critical comments of British
lawyers to the European Commission, and called upon a high-ranking Commission
civil servant responsible for competition (Mr. Pappalardo, Director, DirectorateGeneral IV) to testify before the Committee. The British Lords on the Committee
had this to say to the Italian Director about the Commission’s practice of allowing
companies to examine only the evidence the Commission deemed relevant:
Lord Fraser of Tullybelton. Without wishing to be more offensive than I
can help, Mr. Pappalardo, the difficulty is that if the company concerned
knows that the judge has in his file under the table a whole lot more
132
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documents but does not quite know what those other documents are, it is
apt to leave the company in a dissatisfied position. That is the trouble, is it
not?
Chairman (Lord Scarman)
The Court said in the La Roche case that the Commission must produce
the documents on which they rely. What troubles the undertaking is that
there are other documents on which the Commission has not chosen to
rely and they want to know what they say?—I know [Mr. Pappalardo].
This is the problem. There are various answers to that, not simply the
dogmatic approach that since this is an administrative procedure we do not
need to go that far. . . . It is unthinkable for any official of DG IV
[Directorate-General IV] to have a document which would be favourable
to the company and to forget it in order to punish the company.
Chairman. You might not understand the document. You might not see
that it was helpful to the undertaking? . . . . I cannot exclude that. [Mr.
Pappalardo] However, it seems to me somewhat theoretical.135

The House of Lords final report recommended that the Commission give access to
the entire file and the Commission, shortly thereafter, did precisely that.
In making the recommendation, the House of Lords relied on a recent opinion of
Advocate General Warner. There the British Advocate General had criticized the
Commission for not disclosing all the evidence to the parties to a competition
proceeding. He had recited yet another classic common law maxim:
The Commission seems to me moreover to have overlooked that “justice
must not only be done but must manifestly be seen to be done.” Justice is
not seen to be done if there is concealed from an undertaking, for no
imperative reason, part of the text of a complaint made against it.136

This passage from the House of Lords’ report illustrates vividly how British lawyers,
statesmen, and judges throughout the European system, on both national and
supranational government bodies, joined together to challenge the droit administratif
way of governing. The critique from judges and lawyers socialized in the common
law tradition spurred yet another transformation in the direction of a quasi-judicial
administrative process.
c. Supranational interest: The interest of the Court of Justice and the Commission in
extending European legal authority
Why did the Court and the Commission alter the rights available in
administrative proceedings in accordance with the English principle of natural
justice? After all, the UK was a vastly outnumbered minority. In 1973, it was one of
only two common law Member States in a European Community of nine Member
States. The answer lies in the distinctive European system of legal authority.
Enforcement of European law relies upon national administrations, national police,
and, most importantly in the rights context, national courts. The Commission can
135
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issue decisions and the Court of Justice can hand down judgments, but unless
national courts are willing to enforce European law against individuals, the decisions
of European institutions exist on paper only. When the UK acceded and the British
legal community launched the natural justice attack, the Court and the Commission
came under immense pressure to accommodate the common law understanding of
fair administration. The consequence of failing to do so was English courts unwilling
to enforce Commission competition decisions because the time-honored rights of
their citizens had been breached. The Court and the Commission reformed
competition proceedings and adopted the right to be heard to bring the UK into the
European system of legal authority.
The dynamic of European legal authority can be rendered starkly or subtly and
more realistically. First, the stark account.137 To execute any decision against an
individual or firm, the Commission and the Court of Justice rely on national
administrations and national courts. A firm that does not comply with a Commission
competition decision and the Court of Justice judgment upholding that decision can
only be brought into line—and a bank account attached or an individual detained for
contempt of court—by a national government officer, upheld in national court. If the
government officer and the judge are unwilling to enforce the Commission’s
decision, it becomes an obligation in the international law sphere rather than an
authoritative command in the positivist sense.138 Especially at the beginnings of
European integration, the Commission and the Court were intensely aware of the
limits of their authority and this awareness contributed to the making of European
law.139 A Commission decision or Court judgment could not blatantly disregard
national cultural traditions of the lawful exercise of public power. The judges on the
Court of Justice were particularly attuned to the need to accommodate their English
brethren, given judicial sensibilities to rights and the imperative of protecting
individual freedoms in the face of oppressive government action.
The subtle version of the cooperation dynamic builds on the stark one. In
making decisions and rendering judgments, European administrators and judges take
seriously objections from their counterparts at the national level, schooled in
different traditions of public law.140 A national official’s claim that European
authority has been exercised unfairly must be examined with extreme care. To put it
slightly differently, one of the most important interpretive sources for determining
137
I draw upon Joseph Weiler's analysis of cooperation between the Court of Justice and national
courts in enforcing European law over national law. See Weiler, Transformation, supra note 40, at 2403.
According to Weiler, supremacy of European law was achieved not by judicial proclamation in
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the limits on the powers conferred upon the Commission are national legal
traditions. As the Court has repeatedly stated, “the Court draws inspiration from the
constitutional traditions common to the Member States.”141 But, despite what the
Court says, sometimes no common tradition exists. Hence, when it comes to
determining the limits of European public power in the absence of a common
tradition, the tradition that prevails is the one that will object most loudly. This
solicitude for national understandings of legitimate, rights-abiding public authority is
related to the absence of European enforcement powers and the corresponding
strategic need for cooperation from national courts and administrations. But today it
runs far deeper. It can be said to define Europe’s new constitutional tradition.142
My explanation for the powerful influence of a minority rights tradition is based
partly on speculation. However, it is a fact that the Commission and the Court of
Justice were policed by national courts: in the early years of the European
Community, individuals went to their national courts to protest Commission
decisions, and national courts reviewed Commission decisions to ensure that their
citizens were not subject to arbitrary and unlawful public power. The Commission
and the Court of Justice were well aware of this litigation and the consequences, for
their own authority, of disregarding national templates of fair government
administration. The case in point is a challenge brought in Italy by a number of
Italian steel producers to a fine issued by the High Authority—the predecessor to the
Commission and the executive branch for the Treaty Establishing the European Coal
and Steel Community Treaty (ECSC Treaty).
In 1965, the Italian Constitutional Court was asked by a trial court in Turin to
consider the constitutionality of a High Authority decision.143 The challenge was
based on exactly the same type of argument that, had the Court of Justice not
incorporated the right to a hearing eight years later, might have been made by British
litigants: the High Authority’s decision and the review available in the Court of
Justice did not satisfy national constitutional principles of lawful administrative
action. The facts are as follows: Under the ECSC Treaty, the High Authority had the
141
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[T]he deliberations of the court are and must remain secret. If differences of opinion occur,
they cannot be made public. So the ruling has to be given in one judgment. . . . The exclusion
of the possibility of giving separate or dissenting opinions protects the independence of judges.
Of course, by clothing the rulings in anonymity, it robs the action of the court of that vivacity,
which is so great an attraction in Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions. But on the other hand, it forces us
to work out an agreement, which is perhaps not approved by all, but which is considered clear
and adequate by lawyers from all six of the Member States. It demands much longer discussion
in camera and a very careful wording of the decision, but it ensures rulings that are
understandable throughout the Communities and contributes to the establishment of a common
fund of legal notions and principles.
See A.M. Donner, supra note 139, at 68 (emphasis added). Only an administrative process that respected
the right to a hearing would have been considered "adequate" by the British lawyer who joined the Court
in 1973.
143
Italian Constitutional Court, Decision No. 98/1965 of Dec. 27, 1965, reported and translated in
1966-67 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 81 (1966-67).
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power to regulate the production of steel in the Member States, including the power
to impose certain taxes related to the importation and use of scrap iron for steel
production.144 In 1961, the High Authority requested that producers forward original
invoices documenting their electricity consumption or certified copies of the
invoices, to monitor and verify the amounts of scrap iron being consumed by
individual steel plants. Ten Italian companies replied that they could not comply for
various reasons and that the request was unlawful. The High Authority then issued
an order pursuant to its information-gathering powers under the Treaty.145 The steel
companies brought a challenge in the European Court of Justice and the Court
upheld the order.146
Four days later, the High Authority issued new decisions to the parties,
imposing significant fines for their failure to comply with the first order (0.5% of the
companies’ annual turnover) and fining the companies additional amounts for each
day’s delay in failing to produce the documents, starting from the date of notification
of the second set of decisions (2.5% of the daily turnover for nine of the companies
and 5% for the tenth company).147 This time, the parties challenged the High
Authority’s order in both Italian court and the European Court of Justice. The Court
of Justice upheld the fine, with one exception. It found that since the applicants had
to obtain the invoices from third parties, i.e. the electricity company, there had been
good reasons for the delay in turning over the documents. Therefore the Court
suspended the daily penalties for a period of seven months.148
The High Authority's decision did not fare so well on the Italian front. Four
separate cases were filed in local courts: one in Milan, one in Naples, one in Rome,
and one in Turin. Exercising their rights under Italian law, the steel companies
challenged the decisions of the High Authority on the grounds that the order
breached a basic right (diritto soggettivo) by taking their property without respect for
the Italian Constitution's guarantees of lawful administrative action.149 According to
the litigants, the ECSC Treaty was unconstitutional. The Treaty and the European
Court of Justice did not afford the same guarantees against arbitrary and oppressive
government action as afforded under the Italian Constitution.
Only the Milan court held, without reservations, in favor of the High
Authority.150 The Naples court first examined whether the Court of Justice was
144

Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community [ECSC Treaty], Apr. 18, 1951, 261
U.N.T.S. 140 (1957).
145
ECSC Treaty, art. 47.
146
Società Industriale Acciaierie San Michele and others v. High Authority of the European Coal
and Steel Community, Joined Cases 5/62, 6/62, 7/62, 8/62, 9/62, 10/62, 11/62, 13/62, 14/62, 15/62, 1962
E.C.R. 859 (449 for the English special edition), 1963 C.M.L.R. 13.
147
Società Industriale Acciaierie San Michele and others v. The High Authority of the European
Coal and Steel Community, Joined Cases 2-10/63, 1964 C.M.L.R. 146, 148.
148
Id. at 165.
149
See Soc. Metallurgica di Napoli (SIMET) S.p.A v. High Authority, Tribunale di Napoli, Decision
of Feb. 28/Apr. 22, 1964; Meroni S.p.A. v. High Authority, Tribunale di Milano, Decision of June
24/Sept. 28, 1964; Soc. Acciaierie San Michele v. High Authority, Tribunale di Torino, Decision of Dec.
11/69, 1964; Soc. Acciaierie Ferriere di Roma (FERAM) v. High Authority, Tribunale di Roma, Decision
of Sept. 22, 1964, all reported and discussed in 2 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 449 (1964-65).
150
In finding that these lawsuits were admissible, all four Italian courts were acting in blatant
disregard of arts. 44 and 92 of the ECSC Treaty. Under the ECSC Treaty, arts. 44 and 92, decisions of the
High Authority imposing monetary sanctions and judgments of the Court of Justice upholding those
decisions must be enforced by the Member States in their territories. Officials of the Member States must
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structurally similar to an ordinary Italian court—as opposed to an Italian
administrative court, characterized by less independence from the executive
branch—because under the Italian Constitution, citizens were guaranteed an ordinary
judicial forum for challenges to administrative acts based on basic rights such as
property. The Court of Justice passed muster. Hence, the Naples court found that the
ECSC Treaty was constitutional; the court concluded that only the European Court
of Justice, not Italian courts, had jurisdiction over the decision of the High Authority.
The Rome court decided the case on slightly different grounds. It held that, in
the steel companies’ case, judicial review in the European Court of Justice met the
standards of the Italian Constitution. In so holding, however, the court found that it
could not rule out the possibility of future infringements of Italian constitutional
rights through inadequate European judicial review. The Rome court said:
[there are] more delicate questions resulting from the inability to impugn
before the European Court the decisions of the High Authority on the
grounds of conflict between Community norms . . . and norms of our
Constitution which assure inalienable guarantees for the rights of
individuals.151

The Turin court went even further. Unlike the Naples court, the Turin court
found that the Court of Justice was indeed a special administrative court, without the
full array of powers of an ordinary court of law, and hence judicial review in the
Court of Justice breached the Italian Constitution’s guarantee of access to an
ordinary court. Moreover, the Turin court found that the grounds of review set down
under the ECSC Treaty were limited, in violation of the Constitution’s requirement
that there be full legal protection of the rights and interests (diritti soggettivi and
interessi legittimi) affected by administrative decisions.152 Lastly, the Turin court
linked the case to the broader conflict between the Italian Constitutional Court and
the European Court of Justice on the question of whether European law was supreme
to Italian law. The Turin court repeated the Italian Constitutional Court’s earlier
holding that the Italian Constitution was supreme to the treaties and that a
constitutional amendment would be required to establish the supremacy of European
law. Therefore, the Turin court referred two questions to the Italian Constitutional
Court: were the Articles limiting the grounds of review before the European Court of
Justice (art. 33) and giving the Court of Justice exclusive jurisdiction to rule on the
validity of European acts (arts. 41 and 92) valid under the Italian Constitution?
The Constitutional Court decided the question in favor of the High Authority
and against the steel companies. But it did so by systematically comparing the
administrative law guarantees at the European level to those afforded under Italian
do so “with no other formality than the certification of the authenticity of such decisions.” ECSC Treaty,
art. 92. Moreover, “enforcement of such [High Authority] decisions can be suspended only by a decision
of [the European Court of Justice].” Id.
151
Soc. Acciaierie Ferriere di Roma (FERAM) v. High Authority, Tribunale di Roma, Decision of
Sept. 22, 1964, 2 Common Mkt L. Rev. 449, 451 (1964-65) (reporting and quoting from case).
152
Unlike the EC Treaty, the ECSC Treaty only allowed individuals to impugn administrative
decisions on the grounds of abuse of power (détournement de pouvoir). ECSC Treaty, art. 33. This
excluded a number of grounds available under Italian law, most notably excess of power (eccesso di
potere) and violation of law (violazione della legge).
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law and concluding that the two were roughly equivalent.153 It did not give the High
Authority and the European Court of Justice carte blanche. For students of European
law, it should be noted that this decision came down after the Court of Justice’s
judgment in Costa v. ENEL. In that case, the Court of Justice had held that, contrary
to an earlier pronouncement of the Italian Constitutional Court, European law was
supreme to Italian law.154 Obviously, the Italian Constitutional Court was still not
persuaded.
According to the Constitutional Court, the independence and impartiality of the
Court of Justice passed Italian constitutional muster:
That Court [Court of Justice] is established and functions according to
the rules corresponding to the basic principles of our own legal system . .
. . It is unanimously recognised that the Court of Justice is endowed with
a judicial character; and it may be observed that its members must
fulfil[l] their respective functions with independence and impartiality.155

Moreover, the Constitutional Court found that, under the ECSC Treaty, San Michele
would be allowed to impugn the High Authority’s decisions in the Court of Justice
on the same grounds as afforded under Italian law:
The [High Authority’s decision] is subject to attack before the Community
Court by virtue of Article 36, para. 2, by way of appeal with full
jurisdiction (recours de pleine jurisdiction); some maintain even that,
once formulated, such an appeal under Article 3, para. 3 [article
guaranteeing review of monetary sanctions issued by High Authority] may
be used to attack acts contemplated in Article 33, para. 2 [individual
decisions of Authority]. The latter, by their nature, could not be subjected
to any wider control under the internal order.

Therefore, the Constitutional Court concluded that European judicial review satisfied
the Italian right to judicial protection, guaranteed under Article 2 of the Constitution.
According to the Constitutional Court, the administrative law provisions of the
ECSC Treaty created a judicial order “[i]n accordance with the rules corresponding
to the fundamental features of our judicial system, even if they do not repeat literally
the whole of the rules.”156
What is the relevance of this old Italian case for the right to a hearing? At the
time that the UK acceded and Transocean was decided, the case was not so old.
Transocean was decided only nine years later and many of the same judges were still
sitting on the Court of Justice. The Italian case served as a warning that, after
accession, British lawyers and judges might challenge the authority of the
Commission and the Court of Justice if the Court failed to accommodate those
features of the British public law tradition that set it apart from continental systems.
153

Italian Constitutional Court, Decision No. 98/1965, supra note 143, at 82-84.
See Flaminio Costa v. Ente Nazionale per l’Energia Elettrica (ENEL), Case 6/64, 1964 E.C.R.
1141 (585 for the English special edition).
155
Italian Constitutional Court, Decision No. 98/1965, supra note 143, at 83.
156
Mario Berri, Annotation on Société Acciaierie San Michele v. European Coal and Steel
Community, Italian Constitutional Court, Decision No. 98/1965 of Dec. 27, 1965, 4 Common Mkt. L.
Rev. 238, 240 (1966-67) (quoting from Court).
154
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The procedural guarantees of the principle of natural justice were precisely such
features.
Some will object that because of the British constitutional doctrine of
parliamentary supremacy and because the British Parliament had incorporated the
treaties through the European Communities Act of 1972, an English court would not
assume jurisdiction over Commission decisions, as the Italian courts had done. But
would an English court have interpreted the Parliament’s exercise of sovereignty in
the European Communities Act as one in which it rejected centuries of common law
on the principle of natural justice? The answer, especially in the early years after
accession, was not clear. It is certainly not fanciful to argue that this was on the
minds of the members of the Court of Justice and that, to head off resistance from
English courts, they adopted the right to be heard and a highly proceduralized
blueprint of Commission decisionmaking.157
3. The evolution of the right to a hearing
Once the Court established the right to be heard in competition proceedings, the
right rapidly migrated to other areas of direct Commission enforcement of European
law. The common law understanding of fair administration colonized other areas of
Commission action through the logic of judicial decisionmaking. The Court of
Justice extended the right to a hearing to other policy fields based upon the
precedential value of earlier cases in deciding later ones and the similarities that
existed, as a matter of fact and logic, between individuals in competition proceedings
and other types of European proceedings. The first place where this occurred was
anti-dumping law.
As a policy related to the customs union, international trade is an area in which
the Commission has had direct enforcement powers since the early years of the
European Community. When importers of a product are alleged to have benefited
from government subsidies at home or to be selling the product on the European
market at a price below the “normal value” of the product (“dumping”), the
Commission is responsible for enforcement. The Commission, not national
administrative bodies, is charged with determining that there has been subsidization
or dumping and calculating the appropriate duty. The duty is intended to offset the
unfair price advantage of the imported good.
157

My explanation of the salience of the common law right to a hearing at the moment of accession
is also consistent with the explanation that has been advanced by Joseph Weiler, Pierre Pescatore,
Federico Mancini, and Imke Rissopp-Nickelson for the emergence of fundamental rights in the
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice. See Federico Mancini, The Making of a Constitution for Europe, in
The New European Community: Decisionmaking and Institutional Change (Stanley Hoffmann & Robert
O. Keohane eds., 1991); Pierre Pescatore, Die Menschenrechte und die Europäische Integration, 2
Integration 103-36 (1969); Imke Risopp-Nickelson, Interlocking Regimes and the Protection of Human
Rights in Europe 124-76 (Duke University, Ph.D Dissertation, 2002) (on file with author); J.H.H. Weiler,
Human Rights and the European Community: Methods of Protection, in The European Union—The
Human Rights Challenge II 580-81 (Antonio Casssese et al. eds., 1991). With fundamental rights, the
puzzle is what prompted the Court, in the 1960s, to shift away from categorically denying the power to
review European measures for respect of basic rights to the position that fundamental human rights were
"enshrined in the general principles of Community law and protected by the Court." See Erich Stauder v.
City of Ulm, Case 29/69, 1969 E.C.R. 419, 425, para. 7. The common wisdom today is that the Court of
Justice responded to pressure from the German and Italian constitutional courts.
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When the first European law was passed in 1968, it provided for a fairly
extensive procedure.158
o

o
o

The Commission would publish a notice of the investigation in the
Official Journal, as well as individually advise the representatives of the
exporting government and the exporters and importers known to be
concerned.
The parties would be allowed to examine “all information that is relevant
to the defence of their interests . . . and that is used by the Commission in
the anti-dumping investigation.”159
The parties would be allowed to refute the allegations of government
subsidies or sale at less than the normal value in writing. If they so
requested and if they “showed a sufficient interest,” the parties would be
allowed to present their views orally.160 Furthermore, on the request of the
parties, the Commission would organize a meeting of the foreign and
domestic interests, to enable them to exchange their views.

In 1979, however, the Court of Justice suggested that the procedure did not
adequately guarantee the right to a hearing because the parties did not have an
adequate opportunity to review the information collected by the Commission.161 The
case involved a challenge to an administrative decision imposing an anti-dumping
duty on ball bearings and tapered roller bearings from Japan.162 The Commission
recommended to the Council of Ministers (the European institution with the final
decisionmaking authority in dumping and subsidies proceedings) that a duty of 15%
be imposed, without disclosing to the ball-bearing producers the cost figures that had
served as the basis for calculating the duty. Advocate General Warner—ever-ready
to vindicate the principles of natural justice—relied on the competition law that he
had created to find a right to be heard in anti-dumping investigations:
It is a fundamental principle of Community law that, before any individual
measure or decision is taken of such a nature as directly to affect the
interests of a particular person, that person has a right to be heard by the
responsible authority; and it is part and parcel of that principle that, in
order to enable him effectively to exercise that right, the person concerned
is entitled to be informed of the facts and considerations on the basis of
which the authority is minded to act. That principle, which is enshrined in
158
Council Regulation (EEC) 459/68, 1968 O.J. (L 93) 1 (on protection against dumping or the
granting of bounties or subsidies by countries which are not members of the European Economic
Community). These provision gave effect to the procedural guarantees in the GATT Anti-Dumping Code.
See Clive Stanbrook & Philip Bentley, Dumping & Subsidies: The Law and Procedures Governing the
Imposition of Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duties in the European Community 15 (3d ed. 1996). The
GATT Anti-Dumping Code was laid down in the Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the
GATT, which was signed on June 30, 1967, and entered into force on July 1, 1968. European antidumping and subsidies law has been amended on numerous occasions. The law currently in force is
Council Regulation (EC) 384/96, 1996 O.J. (L 56) 1 (on protection against dumped imports from
countries not members of the European Communities).
159
Id. at art. 10(4).
160
Id. at art. 10(6).
161
See Nippon Seiko v. Council and Commission [Ball bearings], Case 119/77, 1979 E.C.R. 1303,
1262 (opinion of the Advocate General).
162
NTN Tokyo Bearing Company, Ltd. and Others v. Council of the European Communities, Case
113/77, 1979 E.C.R. 1185.
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many a Judgment of this Court, and which applies regardless of whether
there is a specific legislative text requiring its application, was re-asserted
by the Court only yesterday in Case 85/76 Hoffman-La Roche & Co. AG
v. Commission.163

He easily concluded that the anti-dumping duty was imposed in breach of the
producers’ right to be heard.
The Court never reached the procedural question, since it found for the
producers and against the Commission and Council on the alternative grounds that
they had acted contrary to powers conferred under the European anti-dumping
legislation.164 However, the Advocate General’s declaration attracted considerable
attention in academic commentary as well as in policymaking circles.165 A few
months after the judgment was handed down, European anti-dumping law was
amended in two fundamental respects.166 First, firms on both the foreign and
domestic sides of proceedings were allowed to inspect all the information gathered
in the investigation and contained in the Commission’s files. Second, firms that
exported and imported the product under investigation were given the right to
request that the Commission disclose its “essential facts and considerations.” The
common wisdom in international trade circles is that these revisions were made in
response to Advocate General Warner’s criticism.167
Then, in 1985 and again in 1991, the Court annulled two sets of anti-dumping
duties because they had been imposed in breach of the parties’ right to be heard. In
the first, Timex, the main European manufacturer of wrist-watches and the initiator
of the anti-dumping proceeding, had not been allowed to examine information
collected on watches from Hong Kong. The Commission reasoned that the action
was against watches from the Soviet Union, not Hong Kong, and European antidumping law only provided for the disclosure of evidence provided by the parties to
the investigation. The Court held against the Commission and the Council, reasoning
that to protect Timex’s procedural rights, the governing law had to be interpreted
broadly.168
In the second case, Al-Jubail Fertilizer v. Council & Commission, the influence
of competition principles was unmistakable.169 In Al-Jubail Fertilizer, a
manufacturer of fertilizer from Saudi Arabia opposed an anti-dumping duty on
procedural grounds: the manufacturer claimed that the Commission had failed to
communicate a number of facts relevant to the duty, including information on
European costs of production and prices that had led to the finding of injury to the
163

Id. at 1261.
Id. at 1208-10, paras. 20-27.
165
See Al-Jubail Fertilizer v. Council, Case C-49/88, 1991 E.C.R. I-3205, 3221 n.41, para. 72
(opinion of Advocate General discussing reaction of international trade community to earlier opinion of
Advocate General Warner).
166
Council Regulation (EEC) 1681/79, 1979 O.J. (L 196) 1, art. 3 (amending Regulation (EEC)
459/68 on protection against dumping or the granting of bounties or subsidies by countries which are not
members of the European Economic Community).
167
See Stanbrook & Bentley, supra note 158, at 15; J.F. Beseler & A.N. Williams, Anti-Dumping
and Anti-Subsidy Law: The European Communities 24 (1986).
168
See Timex Corp. v. Council & Commission, Case 264/82, 1985 E.C.R. 849, 868-69, paras. 2425.
169
Al-Jubail Fertilizer, 1991 ECR at I-3220.
164
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domestic industry.170 Advocate General Darmon first quoted at length from
Advocate General Warner in NTN Tokyo Bearing.171 He then noted the analogies
between the position of the parties in competition and anti-dumping proceedings:
From the viewpoint of an undertaking, the loss of the Community market
as a result of the imposition of a high anti-dumping duty— as in this
case— has financial consequences which are comparable to those which
follow the imposition of a fine for an infringement of Articles 85 or 86 of
the Treaty of Rome.172

The Advocate General concluded that the rights guaranteed in anti-dumping
proceedings should be similar to those guaranteed in the competition area, because
the right to be heard naturally applied to both types of determinations:
[A] principle as general as the one defined by the Court in its judgment
in Hoffman-La Roche v. Commission, namely that the Commission may
not base its decisions on facts, circumstances or documents on which the
party concerned has been unable to make its views known, would seem
to apply to dumping proceedings as well.173

The Court squarely followed the Advocate General’s opinion. It declared that
the right to a fair hearing was a “fundamental principle” of European law and that it
applied to anti-dumping proceedings because of the adverse impact that an antidumping duty could have on the interests of the parties:
[I]t is necessary . . . to take account in particular of the requirements
stemming from the right to a fair hearing, a principle whose fundamental
character has been stressed on numerous occasions in the case-law of the
Court (see in particular the judgement of 17 October 1989 in Case 85/87
Dow Benelux v. Commission [1989] ECR 3137 [competition case]).
Those requirements must be observed not only in the course of
proceedings which may result in the imposition of penalties, but also in
investigative proceedings prior to the adoption of anti-dumping
regulations which, despite their general scope, may directly and
individually affect the undertakings concerned and entail adverse
consequences for them.174

The Court of Justice, joined by the Court of First Instance in 1988, has since decided
a number of cases defining the scope of the right.175
170
Id. at I-3220, points 63-64, I-3227, point 99. There are two components to any anti-dumping
proceeding. First, the administrative agency must find that the foreign product was dumped on the
domestic market, that is, it was sold below “normal value” (or in the U.S., “fair value”). Second, the
agency must find that the domestic industry suffered “injury” by virtue of the dumping.
171
Id. at I-3221, para. 72.
172
Id. at I-3221, para. 73.
173
Id. at I-3222, para. 75.
174
Id. at I-3214, para. 15.
175
See, e.g., Kundan Industries Ltd and Tata International Ltd v. Council, Case T-88/98, 2002
E.C.R. II-4897, para. 132; EFMA v. Council, Case T-121/95, 1997 E.C.R. II-2391, para. 84; Ajinomoto
and Nutrasweet v. Council, Cases T-159/94 & T-160/94, 1997 E.C.R. II- 2461, para. 83; Champion
Stationery v. Council, Case T-147/97, 1998 E.C.R. II-4137, para. 55.
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Customs policy is the last field in which the Commission must abide routinely
by the right to a hearing. The same judicial logic is at work as in the anti-dumping
cases: precedent and reasoning by analogy. Since 1968, the European Community
has had a single set of tariff rates for goods imported into the Community from third
countries. The duties are calculated and collected, pursuant to an elaborate set of
European rules, by national customs services in each of the Member States.
Generally, national administrations, not the Commission, handle the collection of
custom duties. Since 1979, however, in a narrowly defined class of cases, the
Commission has had the power to make individualized determinations affecting
specific firms.176 These are cases in which the importer applies for the repayment
(the duty has already been paid) or the remission (the duty is owed but has not yet
been paid) of a customs duty due under the European Customs Code. The importer’s
claim can be based on any one of a number of circumstances set out in the Customs
Code, for instance, negligence on the part of the Commission in administering
customs policy.177 Remission or repayment may also be made under the general
fairness clause of the implementing regulation.178 The proceeding is initiated by the
importer by filing an application with the responsible national customs service.179
The customs service is responsible for determining whether to grant remission or
repayment, but, in the case of doubt, it may refer the question to the Commission,
which has the last word.
Until recently, individual importers did not enjoy the right to a hearing before
the Commission in remission or repayment proceedings. The procedure afforded
under national law before the customs service of the Member States was deemed
enough. Even when the national customs service sent the file to the Commission for
consideration, no provision was made for the trader to make her views known. Then,
in France-aviation v. Commission, the Court of First Instance held that that a trader
who requests repayment of customs duties has the right to be heard during the
proceeding.180 As a consequence of that judgment, the Commission amended its
customs rules in 1996. Under the new provision, when a national customs service
sends a file to the Commission, it is required to include a statement by the trader. In
the statement, the trader must certify that she has read the case file and the trader
must either list any additional information that she considers relevant or state that
she has nothing to add.181 But still no provision permitted individual importers to
have any direct contact with the Commission in the course of remissions
proceedings.

176
See Council Regulation (EEC) 1430/79, 1979 O.J. (L 175) 1 (on the repayment or remission of
import or export duties). This law has been repealed and remissions are currently dealt with under arts.
236-39 of Council Regulation (EEC) 2913/92, 1992 O.J. (L 302) 1 (establishing the Community Customs
Code).
177
See Council Regulation 2913/92, supra note 176, at arts. 236-39.
178
See Commission Regulation (EEC) 2454/93, 1993 O.J. (L 253) 1, art. 905 (laying down
provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) 2913/92 establishing the Community
Customs Code and implementing art. 239 of the Customs Code).
179
Id. at arts. 905-09.
180
See France-aviation v. Commission, Case T-346/94, 1995 E.C.R. II-2841, paras. 34-40.
181
Commission Regulation (EC) 12/97, 1997 O.J. (L 9) 1, art. 1(12) (amending Regulation (EEC)
2454/93 laying down provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) 2913/92
establishing the Community Customs Code).
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This changed in two subsequent cases involving remissions applications for
customs duties owed on high-quality beef imported from Argentina (known,
appropriately, as Hilton beef ). The Court of First Instance held that if the
Commission was contemplating reversing a favorable determination by the national
customs service, it was under a duty to give the importers access to the
Commission’s file and an opportunity to respond, in writing, to the Commission’s
allegations, including the right to submit evidence.182 Again, the Commission
amended its customs rules to reflect the Court’s holding.183 In two pending cases, the
Court has been asked by importer firms to extend the right to a hearing even further:
the issue under consideration is whether parties to remissions proceedings also have
the right to make oral representations to the Commission.184
The Court has sporadically recognized the right to a hearing in other types of
Commission proceedings. These are proceedings which, according to the Court’s
test, “are initiated against a person and are liable to culminate in a measure adversely
affecting that person.”185 In these policy areas enforcement is almost exclusively in
the hands of national authorities, and the Commission intervenes rarely, under
exceptional circumstances. In one case, the exclusion of a Swedish fishing company
from a Community fishery zone because of allegations of illegal fishing activities
was enough to trigger a hearing right.186 Another time the reduction of European
financial assistance to a Portuguese firm triggered the right.187 In these cases,
however, the scope of the hearing right is far less extensive than in the core areas of
competition, anti-dumping, and now, customs administration.188 The litigants have
the right to a brief description of the facts and reasoning supporting the decision, to
make their arguments and advance their evidence in a written submission, and to
receive a brief and by no means exhaustive reply in the Commission's statement of
reasons.
Notwithstanding the Court’s advocacy of adversarial, trial-type Commission
procedure, it recognizes a critical limit to the right to a hearing. The Commission
decision must “adversely affect” the party vindicating the right. This requirement has
led the Court to reject the right in two types of cases. When the Commission’s
decision is characterized as benefit-conferring, as opposed to burden-imposing, then
the right is not guaranteed. In Windpark Groothusen, the Commission denied an
application for Community aid under a programme promoting energy
technologies.189 The Commission based the decision exclusively on the information
182

See Eyckeler & Malt AG v. Commission, Case T-42/96, 1998 E.C.R. II-401; Primex Produkte v.
Commission, Case T-50/96, 1998 E.C.R. II-3773. See also Mehibas Dordtselaan BV v. Commission, Case
T-290/97, 2000 E.C.R. II-15, para. 44.
183
See Commission Regulation (EC) 1677/98, 1998 O.J. (L 212) 18 (amending Regulation (EEC)
2454/93 laying down provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) 2913/92
establishing the Community Customs Code) (Regulation 2454/93, art. 906A).
184
Common Market Fertilizers v. Commission, Cases T-134/03 & T-135/03, 2003 O.J. (C 158) 24,
25.
185
See, e.g., Fiskano v. Commission, Case C-135/92, 1994 E.C.R. I-2885, para. 39.
186
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188
See Koen Lenaerts & Jan Vanhamme, Procedural Rights of Private Parties in the Community
Administrative Process, 1997 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 531, 562-66 (1997).
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submitted in the initial application, without allowing the applicant to submit
observations before the final funding decision was made. The Court of First
Instance, upheld by the Court of Justice, found that there was no right to a hearing
because “the applicant . . . had merely been placed on a reserve list of possible
beneficiaries of Community financial support.”190
The other type of case in which the Court does not recognize that the parties are
“adversely affected” is when a third-party individual stands to benefit or lose from a
Commission enforcement action. In other words, the individual seeking the
procedure is a member of the wider public in whose interest the Commission acts
when it enforces European law, not the specific individual or firm against whom the
Commission is taking action. For instance, the Court denied that a consumer group
had the right to a fair hearing in an anti-dumping case brought against audiocassettes imported from Japan, Hong Kong, and Korea. The Commission, therefore,
was allowed to deny the consumer group access to the information in its files.191
The Court has employed a variation of this logic in state aid cases. In state aid
proceedings, the Commission takes action against Member States alleged to assist
unfairly their national firms through direct subsidies or favorable treatment in one
form or another. Competitors of national champions often bring state subsidies to the
Commission's attention. The Court has repeatedly held that the Member State under
investigation has a right to a hearing.192 By contrast, the procedural rights of national
champions and competitor firms are significantly more limited.193
The most recent chapter in this history is the European Charter of Fundamental
Rights of 2000, which would acquire binding legal force in the Constitutional Treaty
of 2004. Article II-101 codifies the extensive case law of the Court of Justice on
individual rights in European administration, including the right to a hearing
chronicled above. The relevant paragraphs read as follows:
Article II-101 Right to good administration
1. Every person has the right to have his or her affairs handled impartially,
fairly and within a reasonable time by the institutions, bodies, offices and
agencies of the Union.
2. This right includes:
(a) the right of every person to be heard, before any individual measure
which would affect him or her adversely is taken;
(b) the right of every person to have access to his or her file, while
respecting the legitimate interests of confidentiality and of professional
and business secrecy;
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Windpark Groothusen v. Commission, Case T-109/94, 1995 ECR II-3007, para. 50; Windpark
Groothusen, 1998 E.C.R. at 2873, para. 47 (affirming reasoning of Court of First Instance).
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See BEUC v. Commission, Case C-170/89, 1991 E.C.R. I-5709, para. 19.
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See, e.g., Netherlands and Others v. Commission, Case C-48/90, 1992 E.C.R. I-565, paras. 44, 49
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known for the Netherlands and the Netherlands alone).
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See British Airways plc and British Midland Airways Ltd. v. Commission, Cases T-371 &
394/94, 1998 ECR II-2405; Commission v. Chambre syndicale nationale des entreprises de transport de
fonds et valeurs (Sytraval), Case C-367/95, 1998 E.C.R. 1719, paras. 53, 58 (finding that Commission, in
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. . . . 194
Thus, Article II-101 enshrines the long and steady trajectory of the Court of Justice’s
jurisprudence that started with Transocean in 1974 and continues to this day.
4. European value: The European and British rights compared
How does the European right to a hearing today, after thirty years of Court of
Justice judgments and Commission policymaking, compare to the British tradition
from which it was drawn? Since generalization in administrative law is dangerous, it
is best to compare procedure in the same policy area. The one field in which such
one-to-one comparison is possible is competition. The results are startling: by the
early 1980s, the European right had overtaken the British one. The entitlements of
the right to a hearing—the duty to give notice of the government's case, disclose the
evidence, and allow the parties opportunity to refute the government’s case—were
more extensive before the European Commission than before the British authorities.
As the reader will recall, early in the history of British competition policy,
jurisdiction was split between two administrative authorities: the Restrictive
Practices Court, responsible for cartels and certain types of vertical restraints of
trade, and the Mergers and Monopolies Commission (MMC), responsible for
investigating monopolies and mergers and a variety of market practices considered
to be anti-competitive. By the mid-1970s, the MMC had become the most active of
the two authorities.195 Yet the procedure there fell short of the Commission’s
proceedings in certain respects. The parties did not have the right to examine all of
the evidence gathered by the MMC.196 Furthermore, the letter sent out to the parties
at the beginning of the MMC’s investigation, informing them of the factual and legal
grounds of the case, was not as comprehensive as the Commission’s statement of
objections.197
Although not strictly related to the principle of natural justice, one last, notable
difference separated British from European competition proceedings and
undermined the rights of the parties. The British system allowed for vastly more
discretion in the hands of the Secretary of State of Trade and Industry, i.e. the
Minister, than was vested in the European Commission.198 After conducting an
investigation, the MMC would issue a comprehensive report in which it made
findings on injury to the public interest and made recommendations on any
appropriate remedies. The Minister, however, was completely free to reject the
finding of injury or the proposed remedial measures. This ministerial discretion was
used often.199 The application of largely political considerations at the final stage
signified that even though, early on, the parties were heard in a quasi-judicial
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proceeding, the final outcome could well turn on factors of which they had had no
notice and to which they had had no opportunity to respond.200
In 1998 and again in 2002, British competition law was completely overhauled.
A number of the substantive rules and institutional elements of the British system
were believed to be out-of-date. The British legislation replicates the European
Community’s rules on anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominant position, and
mergers, as well as the related European enforcement model. While British
legislators were not legally required to adopt the European regulatory scheme, that is
what they chose to do.201 Some of the reforms remedied the procedural defects
mentioned earlier: complete disclosure of the evidence and a more exhaustive notice
of investigation. Other reforms were designed to de-politicize competition law,
removing the Minister’s authority to depart from the report of the MMC (now called
the Competition Commission) and replacing review by the Minister with a powerful
appeals tribunal separate from the Competition Commission.202
There lies the irony. In the 1970s and early 1980s, European rights were
transformed to respond to the common lawyer’s criticism of European Commission
competition proceedings as overly bureaucratic, without adequate opportunities for
individuals to test decisions and protect their rights. Since then, the British system
has been changed to render it more adversarial, expressly modeled on European
competition proceedings.203 To be sure, the procedural and institutional dimensions
of modernization were just one part of a complex reform of the entire system of
competition law. Moreover, the de-politicization of British competition policy does
not come under the doctrinal heading of natural justice. But, effectively, the right to
be heard and the rule against bias are more vigorously protected in a system with a
powerful appeals tribunal and with no ministerial discretion. Here we see the
influence of new European rights on old national traditions, the effect of which has
been to bring the British system closer to the ideal of natural justice.
B. The Second Generation: The Right to Transparency
The next wave of rights to transform the structure of Commission
decisionmaking and the relationship between the Commission and European citizens
came in 1993. The Commission has the far-reaching policymaking prerogatives of
200

See Graham, supra note 197, at 274.
See Imelda Maher, Juridification, Codification and Sanction in UK Competition Law, 63 Mod. L.
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an executive branch in a parliamentary system of government. The EC Treaty gives
the Commission the exclusive right to introduce laws into the assemblies with the
power to vote and enact laws, the Council of Ministers and the European
Parliament.204 The Commission is also responsible for implementing European laws
by promulgating implementing regulations, monitoring implementation by the
Member States (which, as mentioned earlier, are charged with day-to-day
enforcement normally), and suing Member States in the Court of Justice if their
implementation is inadequate.205 What rights did European citizens have in 1957
when the Commission exercised authority through broadly applicable policy
measures?206 What rights do they have today? And how do we explain the
transformation? This section of the Article gives the first part of the answer to this
set of questions by examining the rise of the right to transparency.
1. The right to examine Commission documents then and now
a. National traditions of open government and the right of access to documents
In Europe, the openness of government administration to the public varies
considerably.207 Most government administrations, regardless of whether they
operate in a common law or civil law tradition, fall on the closed side of the
spectrum. Over the centuries, government officials in countries like France, Italy,
Belgium, Germany, and the UK have been allowed to draft legislation, promulgate
administrative rules, and make administrative decisions in secrecy. They have not
faced widespread public scrutiny through reporting requirements, the right of access
to documents, and other transparency devices. The exception is government
administration in the smaller countries of northern Europe: Sweden, Norway,
Denmark, the Netherlands, and Finland. For example, Sweden's legal system
contains a number of features that separate it from the majority tradition and that
render it open: powerful parliamentary committees, an ombudsman elected by the
parliament with investigative and prosecutorial powers over government officials,
constitutionally guaranteed independence for the administration from the prime
minister and the cabinet, and the constitutional right of access to government
documents.208 Although the classic dichotomy between the North and the rest of
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Europe is not as stark as it used to be due to a number of contemporary, Europe-wide
trends in government administration, the difference remains.
Whether a country has access-to-documents legislation largely tracks the
categorization of a system as open or closed.209 In the Nordic systems and in the
Netherlands, individuals have the right to request documents related to a broad array
of government acts, without demonstrating any particular connection to the
government proceeding. Especially in Sweden and Finland, this right has deep,
historical roots and is part of the constitutional identity of the nation, or at least of
the public lawyers of the nation.210 The declaration on transparency in the Swedish
Treaty of Accession gives a flavor of the symbolic nature of the right:
Transparency in the management of public affairs and, in particular,
access of the public to administrative documents as well as the protection
that the Constitution guarantees for the media, are and remain
fundamental principles that are part of the constitutional, political, and
cultural heritage of Sweden.211

It is important not to exaggerate the scope of the right. The legislation in all of
these countries contains significant exceptions. Everywhere, public officials may
refuse disclosure to prevent harm to the public interest or to other individuals, albeit
according to different, national understandings of what constitutes harm. Moreover,
in all these systems, certain internal documents are exempted from public access
because of their preparatory or political quality. The rationale is that, in some cases,
members of the executive branch should be protected from public scrutiny to permit
them to engage in frank discussion before making final decisions.
Until 1999, Finnish law probably carved out the broadest exception for internal
documents: “non-public” documents were defined as all those that served to prepare
a final decision on a government matter.212 Excluded was material such as drafts of
legislative bills, memoranda, preparatory reports, and information-gathering
documents.213 In Sweden, material containing factual and policy information
209
See generally Institut International des Sciences Administratives, Le secret administratif dans les
pays développés (1977) (providing overview of early European access-to-documents legislation); David
Banisar, The Freedom.org Global Survey: Freedom of Information and Access to Government Laws
Around the World (2004), available at http://www.freedominfo.org/survey.htm [hereinafter Banisar,
Freedom.org Global Survey] (providing overview of contemporary legislation).
210
The Swedish right of access dates back to the Freedom of the Press Act of 1766, one of Sweden’s
basic constitutional laws. See Joakim Nergelius, Constitutional Law, in Michael Bogdan, Swedish Law in
the New Millenium 65, 83-84 (2000). Chapter Two of the Act gives citizens the free right of access to
official documents. In Finland, the right dates back to the same Freedom of Press Act of 1766, since
Finland was governed by Sweden at the time. It now is guaranteed under Section 12 of the Finnish
Constitution.
211
Act concerning the conditions of accession and the adjustments to the Treaties — Accession of
the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden, 1990 O.J. (C 241) 397.
212
Law No. 83 of Feb. 9, 1951, art. 6.
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A new law, replacing the original access to documents legislation, came into force on Dec. 1,
1999. See Olli Mäenpää, Right of Access to Documents: New Finnish Legislation, 11 Eur. Rev. Pub. L.
1621, 1623 (1999). It significantly improves access to preliminary documents. Id. at 1622, 1629. Now,
materials such as outlines, memoranda, and draft bills are available after the government’s decision
becomes final. Other materials such as studies and minutes of departmental meetings can become
available before, once finalized by the responsible agency. See Act on the Openness of Government
Activities §§ 5(2), 6 (1999) available at http://www.om.fi/1184.htm.
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relevant to final government decisions is made public.214 But the law exempts drafts
of government bills and minutes from meetings related to bills, working papers,
internal memoranda, and notes. The Danish restrictions on access to internal
documents appear similar to the Swedish ones.215 Preparatory material that contains
the government agency’s reflections—draft reports, draft plans, minutes, and
notes—and that is not circulated to other government agencies and thus is considered
“internal,” is protected from disclosure.216 Moreover, as in both Sweden and Finland,
documents that are highly political in nature, like correspondence between
government ministries on draft legislation, minutes of cabinet meetings, and
documents prepared for cabinet meetings are excluded.217
The Netherlands appears to have the most liberal system of all. Individuals may
request documents related to any general policy decision or individual determination,
including documents related to the initial preparation and drafting of decisions and
including material related to government bills.218 The Dutch statute expressly applies
to cabinet ministers, including the Prime Minister; unlike the Danish law, minutes
from cabinet meetings and documents prepared for cabinet meetings are subject to
disclosure.219 The principal exception to the disclosure of internal documents is the
one for documents containing personal opinions of public officials. Even on that
score, however, in the interests of “good administration" and democratic
government, the administration can choose to transmit the information. In such
cases, the information must be communicated in an anonymous form, so as to
prevent identification of the individual who gave the opinion.220
Another difference that separates northern systems is the requirement that
government agencies maintain official registers of documents. In Sweden and
Finland, government agencies must keep registers—containing titles and reference
numbers of documents but not their full text. In Denmark and the Netherlands,
government agencies are not required to keep registers.221 This difference is
primarily structural and organizational: the registers are used to facilitate the
processing of access-to-documents requests. In systems with registers, individuals
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(2002).
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filing requests must generally refer to the documents by name or number; in systems
without registers, individuals need only refer to the issue of interest.222
Among those Member States on the closed side of the spectrum, one group of
countries has recently adopted cross-cutting, access-to-documents legislation but is
still a newcomer to the habit and law of open government. The UK adopted a law in
2000, Ireland in 1997, Belgium in 1994, Portugal in 1993, and Spain in 1992.223 A
second set of Member States has adopted general legislation that restricts the right by
requiring individuals to show a special interest in the document because the
document is related to an administrative proceeding affecting their rights and duties.
Italy224 and Greece225 fall in this category. Lastly, Germany does not provide for a
general right of access; rather the right is contained in numerous, sector-specific laws
in areas such as the environment and municipal planning.226
b. The right of access to Commission documents
Until 1992, European citizens who wished to know how the Commission
exercised its powers enjoyed the same rights—or more accurately, lack of rights—as
their counterparts in Member States belonging to the closed government tradition.
Citizens had the right to know of official acts passed by European institutions
pursuant to their powers under the treaties, in the case of individual decisions
through the communication of the decision in writing to the concerned party, and in
the case of generally applicable measures, through publication in the Official
Journal.227 It is difficult to imagine how matters could have been otherwise: all of the
Member States were committed to the basic rule of law principle that, as
governments of law and not men, the law should be put down in writing and should
be known to citizens. But European citizens did not have the right to be informed of
what went on behind the closed doors of the Commission’s offices. As a matter of
practice, the Commission was more open than many national administrations.228
Nonetheless, as a matter of rights, European citizens could not demand to learn about
individual decisions that were not of specific concern to them, to review the expert
reports and technical data that served as the basis for administrative and legislative
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acts, or to view the correspondence among Commission departments and between
the Commission and outside parties on the administration of the law.
In 1993, a process of transformation of European law began. On December 6,
1993, the Commission and the Council entered into an agreement, called a Code of
Conduct, pledging to adopt access to document rights for their respective
organizations and agreeing to common conditions and principles. Thereafter, the
Council and Commission separately promulgated internal rules of procedure
implementing the terms of the Code of Conduct.229 The rules were worded extremely
broadly. The documents covered by the rules were defined as any written text held
by the Council or Commission and the exceptions to disclosure were sketched in the
briefest of terms, covering areas such as public security, privacy, business secrets,
and the Community’s financial interests.230 Four years later, the Amsterdam Treaty
created a right of access to documents:
Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or
having its registered office in a Member State, shall have a right of access
to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents . . . .231

In 1999, the Commission agreed to extend the right of access to the European
rulemaking process, including meeting agendas, drafts, and final decisions, and to
create a public register of all such documents.232 Finally, in 2001, the Council,
Commission, and European Parliament passed a law giving effect to the right of
access in the Amsterdam Treaty.233
The Public Access to Documents Law, which has been followed by more
precise provisions in each of the institution’s rules of procedures,234 elaborates
considerably on the terms under which Europeans can exercise their right of access.
The most significant innovation is the requirement that each institution establish a
register of documents and that, whenever possible, access be provided through direct
electronic access to the documents listed in the register.235 The law also creates a
new category of sensitive documents, designed to cover material generated in the
fields of foreign affairs, security, and police cooperation, which would enable the
229
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230
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institutional author of the document to veto disclosure.236 As for the exceptions to
disclosure of ordinary, non-sensitive documents, the Public Access to Documents
Law specifies them in far greater detail compared to the 1993 rules of procedure;
most of the exceptions require European institutions to balance the applicant’s public
interest in disclosure against the commercial or institutional interest in secrecy.237
2. The historical juncture: The Maastricht Treaty crisis
What explains the radical change in the right of European citizens to know how
the Commission exercises its powers? The crisis provoked by the Danish rejection
of the Maastricht Treaty rendered the northern model of open government salient in
the eyes of European Heads of State, who consequently made a number of hortatory
commitments to transparency. Once the crisis had subsided, momentum for
transparency continued because of the presence of government officials from the
North within the institutional system—reinforced considerably by the accession of
Sweden and Finland in 1995—and through the advocacy of the European
Parliament.
a. Danish rejection of the Maastricht Treaty: Northern values and the interest of
European Heads of State
The idea of a European right of access to government documents was not new.
In the 1980s, the European Parliament called for “legislation on openness of
government of Community affairs;”238 a “right to information;"239 and a "right of
access to information."240 In the run up to the signing of the Maastricht Treaty on
February 7, 1992, the Dutch government sought to insert a provision, modeled on the
Dutch Constitution, that would have required European institutions to pass
legislation on access to information.241 The idea fell flat among the other Member
States, and as a compromise measure, the Commission proposed that the text be
included as a toothless, non-binding protocol to the Treaty. Hence the following
Declaration of the Heads of State:
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The Conference considers that transparency of the decision-making
process strengthens the democratic nature of the institutions and the
public’s confidence in the administration. The Conference accordingly
recommends that the Commission submit to the Council no later than
1993 a report on measures designed to improve public access to the
information available to the institutions.242

Nowhere was there mention of an individual right and, aside from the usual
diplomatic language, the only concrete action envisaged was a Commission report,
which, given the text of the protocol, might very well have been limited to a call for
the publication of more official documents and better access to existing data bases.
The Danish rejection of the Maastricht Treaty in the national referendum of June
2, 1992 was the catalyst that set the right to transparency into motion.243 The Danish
referendum, along with the Euro-skepticism it triggered in a number of other
countries, was a tremendous blow to the twelve governments that had signed the
Treaty.244 More than a year had been consumed in the negotiations on the Treaty, and
the result was an ambitious project of monetary and political union that surpassed the
customs union and common market of the original Treaty of Rome.245 The
Maastricht Treaty was a step beyond the functional, market-oriented vision of Jean
Monnet’s European Community. It included European citizenship, a common
currency, and cooperation on foreign policy, immigration, and police matters. The
signatories had a great stake in ratification. The Danes and the gloomy mood that set
in after their referendum stood in the way of the transition to a monetary and political
union.
Transparency emerged as a powerful concept through which the governments
could reclaim legitimacy for the European project, largely because it was the open
government country of Denmark that had rejected the Treaty. After the “No” vote,
the Danish government submitted a memorandum outlining the changes that would
be necessary if the Maastricht Treaty was to survive a second referendum. At the top
of the list were openness and transparency.246 The response was a steady wave of
commitments to transparency by European Heads of State at European Council
meetings in the fall of 1992.247 The Commission dutifully produced a series of policy
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Maastricht Treaty, Declaration 17.
The close observer and freedom of information crusader, Tony Bunyan, is also of the opinion that
the Danish rejection of Maastricht, not the Maastricht protocol, was the critical moment. See Tony
Bunyan, Secrecy and Openness in the European Union: The Ongoing Struggle for Freedom of
Information, available at http://www.statewatch.org/secret/freeinfo.
244
Shortly thereafter, the French electorate approved the Maastricht Treaty in a referendum by just
over 50 percent, one of the narrowest margins ever. See Bermann et al., Cases and Materials on European
Union Law 18 (2002).
245
The Intergovernmental Conferences on Political Union, Economic and Monetary Union were
launched at the European Council meeting in Rome on December 15, 1990.
246
Prime Minster’s Office, Denmark in Europe, reprinted in European Institute of Public
Administration, The Ratification of the Maastricht Treaty: Issues, Debates and Future Implications 505,
505-06 (Finn Laursen & Sophie Vanhoonacker eds., 1994) [hereinafter Ratification of Maastricht] (calling
for “openness and transparency in [the EC’s] decision-making procedures” and “openness in
administration”).
247
See Conclusions of the Presidency, Birmingham European Council, Oct. 16 1992, Annex I,
reprinted in Ratification of Maastricht, supra note 246, at 407, 409; Conclusions of the Presidency,
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documents in spring of 1993.248 And in summer and fall of 1993 the last Member
States ratified the Treaty: the Danish electorate approved Maastricht in a second
referendum on May 18, 1993; the UK House of Commons voted in favor of the
Treaty on May 20, 1993, and the UK House of Lords approved it on July 20, 1993;
and the German Constitutional Court upheld the constitutionality of the Treaty,
thereby allowing Germany to ratify it, on October 12, 1993.
b. The aftermath of Maastricht
i. National value: The influence of the northern tradition of open government
After the Maastricht Treaty was ratified by all Member States in the fall of
1993, transparency could very well have faded from the political agenda and could
have become a hortatory duty without any real bite in the day-to-day operation of the
institutions. Instead, the advocacy of Europeans with cultural allegiances shaped by
their experiences as citizens of the Netherlands and Denmark, and later Sweden and
Finland, ensured that the impetus for transparency was sustained. The evidence of
the significance of the northern mental map of rights and democracy comes in the
form of surnames. Who were the advocates of transparency? The parliamentarians
who have chosen to make transparency their mission have mainly come from the
North: Jens-Peter Bonde (Denmark), Maj-Lis Loow (Sweden), Hanja Maij-Weggen
(Netherlands), Heidi Hautala (Finland), Cecilia Mamlström (Sweden), and Astrid
Thors (Finland).249 Certainly, there were exceptions. A few British parliamentarians
have also been active on the issue and, over the years, parliamentarians from a
couple of other Member States have shown sporadic interest.250 Nonetheless the
northern provenance of most of the transparency advocates is striking, especially
given that, in the Parliament’s system of weighted representation, relatively few
parliamentarians come from the small northern Member States.
Likewise, within the Council of Ministers, the representatives of northern
Member States have consistently come down on the side of transparency, against
representatives of Member States in the center and south of Europe. The voting
record of the Council working party on access to documents is illustrative on this
score. When an application filed with the Council possibly comes within one of the
exceptions to the right of access, it is sent to a working party of Member State
European Council in Edinburgh, Dec. 11-12, 1992, Annex 3 to Part A, reprinted in Ratification of
Maastricht, supra note 246, at 411, 429.
248
See Commission of the European Communities, Increased Transparency in the Work of the
Commission, 1993 O.J. (C 63) 8; Commission of the European Communities, Public Access to the
Institutions’ Documents: Communication to the Council, the Parliament and the Economic and Social
Committee, COM (93) 191 final, May 5, 1993; Commission of the European Communities, Openness in
the Community: Communication to the Council, the Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee,
COM (93) 258 final, June 2, 1993.
249
See Francis Jacobs, Institutional Dynamics after Nice: Views from the European Parliament, May
2001, at 5 (unpublished paper on file with author) [hereinafter Jacobs, Institutional Dynamics]. Francis
Jacobs is a long-time civil servant at the European Parliament who worked for the Institutional Affairs
Committee on transparency matters. See Interview with Francis Jacobs (June 17, 2004) (notes on file with
author).
250
Id. at 4-5. Jacobs names Michael Cashman and Nicholas Clegg, from the UK, Dirk Sterckx, from
Belgium, and Antonio Di Pietro, from Italy, as active on the issue.
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representatives. In 2000, the working party was divided on whether to grant access in
24 instances. Denmark voted to grant access in 88% of those cases, Sweden in 83%,
Finland in 53%, the Netherlands in 29%, the UK in 20%, Ireland in 17%, Greece and
Germany each voted to granted access in only one case (4%), and the remaining
Member States (Austria, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, France, and Sweden) voted to
deny access in all 24 cases.251
The citizens and Member States of northern Europe also made their mark in the
judicial branch (Court of Justice and Court of First Instance). Member States
intervened on the behalf of plaintiffs in seven out of the 28 cases brought between
1993, when the first rules of procedure entered into force, and summer 2002.252 They
were all northern Member States: Sweden in four cases,253 the Netherlands in
three,254 Denmark in two,255 and Finland in one.256 Member States also intervened in
support of the defendant institutions (the Council and Commission, alternatively).
They were countries with traditions of closed government: France in four cases257
and the UK in four.258
The Netherlands also sued the Council independently over the first Council
access-to-documents rules. The Netherlands, supported by the European Parliament
(which because of the rules of standing existing at that time could not bring suit
independently), sued the Council on the grounds that access to documents should be
set down in a legislative measure rather than in internal rules of procedure.259 The
consequence of adopting the access-to-documents measure as internal rules of
procedure had been to allow the Council to act by a simple majority, thereby
enabling the Member States in favor of continued secrecy to easily out-vote Member
States like the Netherlands in favor of transparency and to allow the Council to cut
out the Parliament entirely from the decisionmaking process. Both the Netherlands
251

Id. at 6.
In the United States, the functional equivalent is litigation under the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) by individuals who file a request with the government for documents, are denied the documents
on the basis of one of the many exceptions in FOIA, and then sue the government to contest the denial.
My count of European cases is based on a list developed by the activist Tony Bunyan and the academic
Steve Peers for the period 1993-August 5, 2002, and a v a i l a b l e
at
http://www.statewatch.org/caselawobs.htm. I counted as a different case any case that was assigned a
different number by the Court of First Instance. This led to the omission of one case from the Statewatch
list of Court of First Instance orders, item 10, British American Tobacco International (Investments) Ltd.
v. Commission, Case T-111/00, 2001 E.C.R. II-2997. I have independently done a search to check for the
accuracy of the count, as well as the categorization of intervenors and plaintiffs. For purposes of the
count, I included all of the lawsuits brought by individual plaintiffs and the one lawsuit brought by a
privileged, non-individual plaintiff, namely the Netherlands.
253
WWF UK (World Wildlife Fund for Nature) v. Commission, Case T-105/95, 1997 E.C.R. II-313;
Svenska Journalistforbundet v. Council, Case T-174/95, 1998 E.C.R. II-3269; Rothmans International v.
Commission, Case T-188/97, 1999 E.C.R. II-2463; Heidi Hautala v. Council, Case T-14/98, 1999 E.C.R.
II-2489.
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Carvel v. Council, Case T-194/94, 1995 E.C.R. II-2765; van der Wal v. Commission, Case T83/96, 1998 E.C.R. II-545; Svenska Journalistforbundet, 1998 E.C.R. at II-3269.
255
Carvel, 1995 E.C.R. at II-2765; Svenska Journalistforbundet, 1998 E.C.R. at II-3269.
256
Hautala, 1999 E.C.R. at II-2489.
257
WWF UK, 1997 E.C.R. at II-313; Svenska Journalistforbundet, 1998 E.C.R. at II-3269; Hautala,
1999 E.C.R. at II-2489; Netherlands v. Council, Case C-58/94, 1996 E.C.R. I-2169.
258
WWF UK, 1997 E.C.R. at II-313; Svenska Journalistforbundet, 1998 E.C.R. at II-3269; Hautala,
1999 E.C.R. at II-2489; The Bavarian Lager Co. v. Commission, Case T-309/97, 1999 E.C.R. II-3217.
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Netherlands, 1996 E.C.R. at I-2169.
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and the Parliament considered that the exceptions to the access-to-documents
principle were far too broad and hence vitiated the right to transparency.260 They
lost. This foreshadows the argument made later in this section: the Parliament, not
the Council or the Court of Justice, was the main institutional proponent of
transparency because it could act notwithstanding the majority, closed government
tradition and because it had a strategic, institutional interest in doing so.261
The nationalities of the plaintiffs are also revealing.262 Eight were from the UK,
eight from the Netherlands, four from Germany, two from Finland, one from each of
Denmark, Sweden, France, Greece, and Italy, and two were public interest groups
with diverse membership.263 Plaintiff nationalities roughly correspond with
expectations, albeit less strikingly than in the case of government intervenors. In
terms of their numbers relative to population, citizens of northern, open-tradition
countries are disproportionately represented. British citizens are an interesting
anomaly: they vindicate access to information rights even though they have never
had access-to-documents legislation at home, their national administration is widely
known for resisting open government measures, and their government was one out
of only two Member States that intervened in support of defendant European
institutions. Part, but certainly not all, of the high case count can be attributed to a
single dispute between the Commission and two British nationals over certain VAT
documents that generated three separate cases.264 A number of factors explain the
litigiousness of British nationals in the transparency domain: they are accustomed to
extensive discovery in judicial proceedings, unlike their civil law counterparts, and
use transparency as a functional substitute for discovery; in practice, citizens enjoy
260
See Curtin, supra note 241, at 103 (describing Dutch position); Netherlands, 1996 E.C.R. at I2193 (describing Parliament’s position).
261
See infra section II.B.2.b.ii.
262
I counted a firm as a national of a Member State if the Court of First Instance said that it had a
place of establishment in the Member State. I classified individuals based on where the Court of First
Instance said the person resided.
263
Carvel, 1995 E.C.R. at II-2765; JT’s Corp. v. Commission, Case T-123/99, 2000 E.C.R. II-3269;
BAT, 2001 E.C.R. at II-2997; BAT v. Commission, Case T-311/00, 2002 E.C.R. II-2781; Carvel and
Guardian v. Council, Case T-19/96, 1996 E.C.R. II-1519; Elder v. Commission, Case T-78/99, 2000
E.C.R. II-3717; Elder v. Commission, Case T-178/99, 1999 E.C.R. II-3509; Elder v. Commission, Case
T-36/00, 2001 E.C.R. II-607; Netherlands, 1996 E.C.R. at I-2169; Van der Wal, 1998 E.C.R. at II-545;
Rothmans, 1999 E.C.R. at II-2463; Kuijer v. Council, Case T-188/98, 2000 E.C.R. II-1959; Denkavit
Nederland v. Commission, Case T-20/99, 2000 E.C.R. II-3011; Kuijer v. Council, Case T-211/00, 2002
E.C.R. II-485; Le Canne v. Commission, Case T-41/00, 2002 E.C.R. II-1251 (Netherlands); Interporc Imund Export v. Commission, Case T-124/96, 1998 E.C.R. II-231; The Bavarian Lager, 1999 ECR at II3217; Interporc v. Commission, Case T-92/98, 1999 E.C.R. II-3521; Berge v. Commission, Case T156/97, 1997 E.C.R. II-2097 (Germany); Hautala, 1999 ECR at II-2489; Oliehandel Kuster v.
Commission, Case T-304/99 (removed from the registry on Oct. 6, 2004) (Finland); Carlsen and others v.
Council, Case T-610/97, 1998 E.C.R. II-485 (Denmark); Svenska Journalistforbundet, 1998 E.C.R. at II3269 (Sweden); Meyer v. Commission, Case T-106/99, 1999 E.C.R. II-3273 (France); Pitsiorlas v.
Council and BCE, Case T-3/00, 2001 E.C.R. II-717 (Greece); Associazione delle Cantine Sociali Venete
v. Médiateur européen and Parliament, Case T-103/99, 2000 E.C.R. II-4165 (Italy); WWF UK, 1997 ECR
at II-313 (World Wildlife Fund, which is a trust incorporated under English law and whose head office is
in the UK); Petrie and others v. Commission, Case T-191/99, 2001 E.C.R. II-3677 (Incorporating
Committee (Associazione) for the Defence of Foreign Lecturers, established in Italy). In the case of the
Incorporating Committee for the Defence of Foreign Lecturers, the place of establishment is deceptive for
purposes of identifying nationality: all the members were foreign and the most active one was English.
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See Elder & Elder, 2000 E.C.R. at II-3717; Elder, 1999 E.C.R. at II-3509; Elder, 2001 E.C.R. at
II-607. These are items 4, 5, and 8 on the Statewatch list of “Orders of the Court of First Instance.”
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fairly good access to government documents through the British ombudsman system;
and British litigants use the European right of access strategically to circumvent
official secrecy and to gain insight into British and European government
decisions.265
ii. Supranational interest: The interest of the European Parliament in information
on policymaking in the Commission and the Council
In the ordinary politics following the Maastricht ratification crisis, the European
Parliament proved to be the most significant institutional proponent of transparency.
A number of episodes in the development of transparency after the Maastricht
debacle demonstrate the centrality of the Parliament. In the aftermath of the highlevel European Council meetings of fall 1992 and the final national ratifications of
the Maastricht Treaty in summer and fall of 1993, the Parliament, Commission, and
Council negotiated an inter-institutional agreement on transparency. 266 It is widely
held among policymakers and scholars alike that the inter-institutional agreement of
October 1993 served as the basis for the Commission and the Council’s first rules on
access to documents. Yet the Council originally was determined to discuss
subsidiarity only, and it was intense pressure from the Parliament that put
transparency and democracy on the bargaining table as well.267 In the agreement, the
Council undertook to make some of its debates public, publish voting records, and
improve access to documents. The Commission and the Parliament also committed
themselves to a number of transparency measures.268
The Parliament also played a key role in the Intergovernmental Conference
(IGC) leading to the Amsterdam Treaty and Article 255 on access to documents.269
The Danish parliamentarian Jens-Peter Bonde issued a number of working
documents on behalf of the parliamentary Committee on Institutional Affairs
recommending the inclusion of transparency provisions in the Treaty.270 In all of the
European Parliament’s contributions to the 1996-1997 IGC, the Parliament insisted
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I am grateful to Carol Harlow for suggesting these possible explanations. For a discussion of the
British system of ombudsmen and their role in promoting access to documents, see Carol Harlow &
Richard Rawlings, Law and Administration 441, 448-52 (1997).
266
Interinstitutional Declaration on Democracy, Transparency and Subsidiarity, 1993 Bull. E.C.
10/93, at 18 (Oct. 25, 1993).
267
See Richard Corbett, The Treaty of Maastricht: From Conception to Ratification: A
Comprehensive Reference Guide 82 (1993); Richard Corbett, The European Parliament’s Role in Closer
EU Integration 344 (1998) [hereinafter Corbett, Closer EU Integration].
268
Parliament, not entirely happy with the result, entered a unilateral declaration pressing for greater
openness in Council meetings, stating that “the adoption of all legislative texts by a public vote is a sine
qua non of democracy and transparency.” Corbett, Closer EU Integration, supra note 267, at 344. In 1994,
the Institutional Affairs Committee of the Parliament sought to negotiate a more comprehensive interinstitutional agreement on transparency, appointing three parliamentarians as “explorers,” but with no
success. See Mr. Donnelly, Mr. St. Pierre & Mr. Tsatsos, Working Document on Transparency and
Democracy of November 1994, PE 210.692/A (on file with author).
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The Treaty of Maastricht foresaw an intergovernmental conference in 1996. The IGC was
officially launched on Mar. 29, 1996 and was preceded by a number of reflection documents prepared by
the institutions and an ad hoc committee. See The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference: Retrospective
Data Base, available at http://europa.eu.int/en/agenda/igc-home.
270
Committee on Institutional Affairs, Working documents PE 227.237; PE 222.239; PE 222.240.
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that commitments to transparency be made in specific treaty articles.271 A simple
comparison of the Parliament's three major demands—demands not made by the
other institutional actors—with the final outcome of the treaty negotiations
demonstrates the Parliament’s influence.272 The Parliament proposed that the
principle of openness be written into the Treaty, that a rule of access to documents
be included in the Treaty, and that the legislative meetings of the Council of
Ministers be opened to public scrutiny, both through open meetings and through
access to the minutes, votes, and reservations recorded at those meetings.273 While
the Parliament's requests were not incorporated word-for-word, the Amsterdam
Treaty included all three dimensions.274
After Amsterdam, the very first significant legislative innovation in the
transparency area was adopted at the behest of the Parliament. New legislation
setting down the structure and operation of European administration was adopted in
summer of 1999. The original proposal submitted by the Commission did not make
any mention of the public’s right of access to the documents generated in the
administrative process.275 Following an amendment proposed by the Parliament, the
law provided that a public register of documents would be created and that the
access-to-documents rules set down in the Commission’s rules of procedure would
also apply to the administrative process.276
The Public Access to Documents Law, adopted to give effect to the Amsterdam
Treaty’s commitment to transparency, was also strongly influenced by the
Parliament. In the aftermath of Amsterdam, the Parliament tasked its Committee on
Institutional Affairs with coming forward with recommendations for the
implementation of Article 255, which were adopted by the entire Parliament in its

271
See Resolution on the functioning of the Treaty on European Union with a view to the 1996
Intergovernmental Conference—Implementation and development of the Union, 1995 O.J. (C 151) 56,
59, 62; Resolution embodying (i) Parliament’s opinion on the convening of the Intergovernmental
Conference, and (ii) an evaluation of the work of the Reflection Group and a definition of the political
priorities of the European Parliament with a view to the Intergovernmental Conference, 1996 O.J. (C 96)
77, 86 [hereinafter “Parliament Resolution on Amsterdam IGC”].
272
See Reflection Group’s Report, Messina 2nd June 1995 and Brussels 5th December 1995, at “A
more transparent Union,” available at http://europa.eu.int/en/agenda/igc-home/eu-doc/reflect/final.
html#2.5; Commission Opinion, Reinforcing Political Union and Preparing for Enlargement, Feb. 28,
1996, at “Simplifying and democratizing Europe,” available at http://europa.eu.int/en/agenda/igchome/eu-doc/commissn/avis-en.html#onethree.
273
See Parliament Resolution on Amsterdam IGC, supra note 271, at 86 (section 20 called “[a]
positive response to popular demands for more openness and transparency”).
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See TEU art. 1 ("decisions are taken as openly as possible"); TEC art. 255 (right of access to
documents); TEC art. 207 (Council to make public the documents and votes related to its legislative
activities).
275
See Commission, Proposal for a Council Decision laying down the procedures for the exercise
implementing [sic] powers conferred on the Commission, 1998 O.J. (C 279) 5.
276
See Amendments by Parliament, 1999 O.J. (C 279) 404, 410 (“Except for reasons of
confidentiality, all documents shall be made public and accessible by electronic transmission.”);
Comitology Decision, supra note 232, at art. 7 (providing that “[t]he principles and conditions on public
access to documents applicable to the Commission shall apply to the committees” and that “[t]he
references of all documents sent to the European Parliament . . . shall be made public in a register to be set
up by the Commission in 2001”).
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plenary session of January 12, 1999.277 Nevertheless, when the Commission
eventually came forward with its proposal for legislation, parliamentarians found it
disappointing in a number of critical respects.278 The Commission proposal would
have excluded all internal documents that were not contained in official acts, in order
to protect the so-called “space to think" of the institutions.279 The list of exceptions
to the right of access was far more extensive than those in the earlier access-todocuments rules of the Council and the Commission. It contained some dangerously
broad categories such as the protection of “the effective functioning of the
institutions” and “the stability of the Community’s legal order.”280 Furthermore,
when the documents of third parties were involved, the proposal required that they
give their consent before the documents could be released.281 All communications
with the Member States and with non-Community institutions were at risk of falling
into this loophole.282 Another shortcoming of the Commission’s proposal was the
failure to use the device of the public register to make documents directly available
to the public, electronically, without the need to file a request.283 Lastly, the
Parliament was concerned that the Council would use the public interest exception to
exclude most documents related to common foreign and security policy and police
and judicial cooperation.284
In response, the responsible parliamentary committee produced a highly critical
report and proposed a number of amendments.285 The Parliament approved the
amendments to the Commission’s text, after which followed a series of trilogues
between the Parliament’s representatives, the Swedish Presidency of the Council,
and the Commission.286 (Trilogues are tripartite negotiations among the deciding
institutions on the final text and are functionally equivalent to conference
committees of members of the House of Representatives and the Senate in the
277
See Resolution on openness within the European Union, 1999 O.J. (C 104) 20; Committee on
Institutional Affairs, Report on Openness within the European Union of 8 December 1998 (A4/0476/98)
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278
See Jacobs, Institutional Dynamics, supra note 249, at 16-25.
279
See Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, 2000 O.J. (C 177)
70, art. 3(a).
280
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281
Id. at art. 4(d).
282
Id. at art. 4(a).
283
Id. at art. 9.
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In August 2000, the Council amended its rules to exclude documents relating to security and
defence and classified as “top secret,” “secret,” or “confidential.” See Council Decision 2000/527/EC,
2000 O.J. (L 212) 9 (amending Decision 93/731/EC on public access to Council documents and Council
Decision 2000/23/EC on the improvement of information on the Council's legislative activities and the
public register of Council documents). Parliament was up in arms and brought a case against the Council
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subsequently withdrawn, 2002 O.J. (C 144) 30. Parliament therefore viewed the public interest exception
with great suspicion.
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See Committee on Citizens’ Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs, Report on the
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European Parliament, Council, and Commission documents, Oct. 26, 2000 (A5-0318/2000). It was
approved by Parliament on Nov. 16, 2000. See Public Access to Documents of the European Parliament,
the Council, and the Commission (vote), 2001 O.J. (C 223) 194.
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United States.) In the final compromise version, the Commission lost its blanket
exclusion of “space to think” documents. The Parliament also succeeded in reducing
considerably the list of exceptions. Moreover, all European institutions were
required to establish electronic registers of documents.287 For legislative documents,
direct, electronic access to the document is mandatory and for other documents such
access should be provided where possible. In conclusion, had the Amsterdam Treaty
not required that the legislation be adopted by co-decision, the law would have
almost certainly represented a step backwards for transparency. (Co-decision gives
the Parliament decisionmaking powers equal to those of the Council and thus
requires the Commission to anticipate the Parliament's position in the original
proposal and to allow the Parliament to vote on the final text.) The Parliament
ensured that the Council and Commission did not back-pedal on their existing rules
of procedure and, in some respects, improved the access-to-documents scheme.288
Why did the Parliament campaign so hard for transparency, above and beyond
other principles associated with good European governance, and more assiduously
than other institutional actors? Since the European Parliament was first directly
elected in 1979, it has pushed for access to Commission and Council information for
itself. Without information, the meager powers the Parliament originally possessed
under the Treaty of Rome would have been virtually nonexistent. After Maastricht,
the growing currency of the northern value of transparency led the Parliament to
couple the strategic, institutional need for information with the campaign for open
government.
To demonstrate the logic of supranational institutional interest and national
value, it is again necessary to review the history. The Parliament’s campaign for
information can be divided into three categories: the budget, legislation, and
administration. In the past, the European Parliament’s most important, and some
would say, only, powers were in the area of the budget. In two treaties dating to the
1970s, the Parliament acquired the right to propose amendments to the European
Community’s annual budget and to reject the budget if dissatisfied with the outcome
after final voting in the Council.289 The Parliament also obtained the right to review
or “discharge” the European Community’s accounts, after the expiration of the fiscal
year, to ensure that the money appropriated under the budget had been spent
lawfully.290 Since the Parliament was first directly elected in 1979, it has consistently
called for more documents, reports, and statistics on the programs to be financed by
each of the line items in the budget. It has also called for more information on how
the monies appropriated were spent.
287
The register idea, first applied to regulatory documents with the Comitology Decision, and then
to all documents with the Public Access to Documents Law, originated with the European Ombudsman.
See Special Report to the European Ombudsman to the European Parliament following the own initiative
inquiry into public access to documents, 616/PUBAC/F/IJH, Dec. 15, 1997, at 7, available at
http://www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/special/pdf/en/970616.pdf.
288
See Bo Byurulf & Ole Elgström, Negotiating Transparency: The Role of Institutions, 42 J.
Common Mkt. Stud. 249, 264 (2004) (finding that the co-decision requirement was extremely significant
in shaping the Public Access to Documents Law).
289
Treaty Amending Certain Budgetary Provisions of the Treaties (1970); Treaty Amending Certain
Financial Provisions of the Treaties (1975). The provisions can be found at TEC art. 272. For an
overview, see Corbett, Closer EU Integration, supra note 267, at 93-97.
290
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Dissatisfaction with the scant information provided by the Commission has been
expressed repeatedly, in many forms. The comments accompanying the Parliament’s
annual discharge reports are one place where such dissatisfaction can be found.291
More information on the intended use of budget appropriations, as well as the
implementation of the different programs, is a staple of the recommendations and
criticisms put forward by the Parliament. Portions from the Parliament's report on
the discharge of the budget from the 1982 financial year give a flavor of this critique.
Explaining its decision to defer its discharge—at the time an extraordinary
expression of disapproval, equivalent to a parliamentary no-confidence vote—the
Parliament said that it "[r]equests the Commission to consider ways of providing
more and clearer statistical and explanatory information on the execution of the
budget."292 And the Parliament declared that it "[s]trongly deplores the fact that the
present Commission has taken a step backwards, as compared with the preceding
college, by refusing to make certain basic document available to the Parliament."293
The discharges of subsequent years are replete with comments in the same vein.294
In the 1980s and the 1990s, the Parliament also pushed the Commission for
more information in connection with its legislative powers. Until 1986, the
Parliament only had the power to give non-binding opinions on European legislation

291
Another place is Parliament’s contribution to the Intergovernmental Conference leading up to
Maastricht. Parliament’s Committee on Budget Control called for the strengthening of Parliament’s “right
to information” by requiring information to be transmitted by European institutions besides the
Commission and by establishing a right of parliamentary inquiry. See Final Report of the Committee on
Budgetary Control on strengthening Parliament’s powers of budgetary control in the context of its strategy
for European Union, Sept. 27, 1991 (A3-0253/91) at 6, 12.
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Commission of the reasons for the deferral of discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of
the EC for the 1982 financial year (May 14, 1984), 1984 O.J. (C 127) 36, 38, para. 14.
293
Decision refusing to grant a discharge to the Commission of the EC in respect of the
implementation of the EC budget for the 1982 financial year in accordance with the provisions of Article
5 of Annex IV to the Rules of Procedure (Dec. 17, 1984), 1984 O.J. (C 337) 23, 24, para. 4.
294
See Resolution embodying the comments which form an integral part of the decision granting a
discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Communities for the
financial year 1983, 1985 O.J. (C 122) 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, paras. 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 22, 23; Resolution
embodying the comments which form an integral part of the Decision granting a discharge in respect of
the implementation of the general budget of the European Communities for the financial year 1984, 1986
O.J. (L 120) 141, 142, 143, paras. 15, 19, 20, 32; Resolution on action taken by the Commission in
response to the comments made in the resolution accompanying the decision granting a discharge in
respect of the implementation of the 1984 budget, 1987 O.J. (C 318) 128, 128, para. 3(a); Resolution
embodying the comments which form an integral part of the decision granting a discharge in respect of
the implementation of the general budget of the European Communities for the financial year 1988, 1990
O.J. (L 174) 42, paras. 4, 20, 24, 30; Resolution embodying the comments which form an integral part of
the decision granting a discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European
Communities for the financial year 1989, 1991 O.J. (L 146) 24, paras. 6, 17, 64, 74, 75; Resolution
containing the comments which form an integral part of the decision granting a discharge in respect of the
implementation of the general budget of the European Communities for the financial year 1990, 1993 O.J.
(L 19) 26, paras. 3, 36, 70; Resolution on the Commission report on action taken in response to the
observations contained in the resolution accompanying the decision giving discharge in respect of the
general budget of the European Communities for the 1990 financial year, 1993 O.J. (C 315) 89, 89, 90,
paras. 3, 16; Resolution embodying the comments which form an integral part of the decision granting a
discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Communities for the
financial year 1991, 1993 O.J. (L 155) 72, paras. 18, 37, 53, 84.
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through what was known as the consultation procedure.295 The real decisionmaking
power rested with the Commission, which had the power to propose legislation, and
with the Council, which had the power to adopt legislation. In the Single European
Act of 1986, the co-operation procedure was introduced in certain policy areas. Cooperation required that the Parliament review proposals at two separate stages in the
legislative procedure, once after the Commission issued the initial proposal, and a
second time, after the Council had voted on the proposal. On the second reading, the
Parliament could propose amendments, which the Council could reject, but only by a
unanimous vote. The Parliament’s legislative powers were improved again in the
Maastricht Treaty of 1992. Maastricht introduced co-decision, which preserves the
two-readings structure of cooperation, but requires the Council to adopt the
Parliament’s amendments if the legislation is to pass. As the label suggests, in codecision, the Parliament and the Council are co-legislators: the approval of both is
necessary for a piece of legislation to be enacted. In the treaties negotiated
subsequent to Maastricht, co-decision has been extended to a wide number of areas,
so that today, outside the foreign policy and criminal law areas, it is the prevalent
mode of enacting European laws.
In all three procedures, information on the Commission’s policy agenda, the
Commission’s legislative proposals, and the trajectory of proposals once they enter
the Council—where more often than not they are heavily amended—is critical.
Without advance warning of the different proposals in the Commission pipeline, and
without access to the information supporting the Commission’s proposals,
parliamentary committees are handicapped in researching the issues and writing their
reports, and the Parliament as a whole cannot take informed votes. In the
consultation procedure, if the proceedings in the Council are secret, the
Commission’s proposal can be transformed by the Council and enacted into law
without any warning to the Parliament. The Parliament’s power of consultation is
rendered meaningless, since the Commission proposal on which the Parliament gives
its opinion may bear no relation to the law ultimately passed by the Council.
Information on Council proceedings is also important in co-operation and codecision; advance warning of the likely outcome of the Council vote is necessary for
the Parliament to react fully and to propose its own, well-considered amendments in
the second reading.
The failure to disclose declarations made by Member States when approving
European laws in the Council can also undermine the Parliament’s legislative
prerogatives. These declarations are similar to reservations in international treaties
and can modify the text of the agreement, either by allowing derogations for certain
Member States or by altering the interpretation of the legislation for certain Member
States.296 If declarations are not published, then, in effect, the Member States on the

295
See generally Craig & Búrca, EU Law, supra note 3, at 141-47 (describing consultation,
cooperation , and co-decision).
296
It should be noted, however, that if a legal challenge is brought to the law, such a declaration
would not be found binding and would not be used to assist in the judicial task of interpreting the law. The
Court of Justice has consistently denied that such declarations have legal effects. See The Queen v.
Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Antonissen, Case C-292/89, 1991 E.C.R. I-745, para. 18;
Commission v. Denmark, Case 143/83, 1985 E.C.R. 427, paras. 12-13.
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Council can alter legislation without the knowledge or input of the Parliament, even
on matters on which the Parliament has full co-decision powers.297
To safeguard its institutional prerogatives as legislator, the Parliament has
negotiated an inter-institutional agreement with each new Commission since 1990.298
(A new Commission takes office every five years.) In all, timely and complete
information on the Commission’s policy initiatives and the state of play of
negotiations in the Council have figured prominently. The Parliament has also
separately urged the Council to notify the Parliament of any planned changes to
proposals in the course of negotiations there.299 It has suggested an inter-institutional
agreement with the Council, patterned on the agreements with the Commission, but
without any success to date.300 As far back as 1981, in connection with the power to
approve the annual budget, which it shared with the Council, the Parliament voiced
frustration with the secrecy of the Council and requested information on the state of
play of negotiations among the Member States sitting on the Council:
[Parliament c]onsiders that the procedure of budgetary collaboration
between Council and Parliament during the annual budgetary process
should be improved by a series of practical measures: for example, the
Committee of Permanent Representatives and the Budgetary Committee
of Council should supply the rapporteur and the members of the
Committee on Budgets with the working documents and minutes of their
meetings.301

Information has also been at the heart of the Parliament’s attempt to establish
legislative oversight of European administration. The implementation of European
legislation by the Commission, through implementing regulations or individualized
decisions, very often requires the approval of committees of national regulators. Socalled comitology committees are designed to serve as surrogates for the Council
and to enable the Council to monitor, and sometimes veto or modify, the
Commission's implementing regulations and decisions.302 Because comitology

297
This occurred in the case of state aids to shipbuilding, where, thanks to a unpublished statement
made at the time of the Council vote, Germany was permitted a derogation for East German shipyards.
See Jacobs, Institutional Dynamics, supra note 249, at 9 n. 3.
298
See Commission, Bilan annuel 1991 d’application du “Code de conduite”: Communication de la
Commission au Parlement européen, Annex I, at 4.3, June 5, 1991 SEC (91) 1097 final; Resolution on the
obligation for the Council to await Parliament’s opinion, 1990 O.J. (C 324) 125, 128 (point 19, urging
Commission to fulfil the information-related undertakings in the Code of Conduct); Resolution on the
Commission’s annual work programme (approving annexed Code of Conduct negotiated with the
Commission), March 15, 1995, 1989 O.J. (C 89) 68, 69-70 (points 3.1, 3.2, 4); Framework Agreement on
relations between the European Parliament and the Commission, 2000 O.J. (C 121) 122, 124 (“Flow of
information”, points 12-17).
299
Resolution on the obligation for the Council to await Parliament’s opinion, 1990 O.J. (C 324)
125, 127, 128 (points 7, 17).
300
Id. at 128 (point 15).
301
Resolution on the inter-institutional dialogue on certain budgetary questions, 1981 O.J. (C 101)
107, 107 (point 2).
302
The term "comitology" derives from the French word for committee, "comité," and the suffix
indicating a science or branch of knowledge, "ology." See generally, Francesca Bignami, The
Administrative State in a Separation of Powers Constitution: Lessons for European Community
Rulemaking from the United States, Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 5/99, at 8-13, available at
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committees empower the Council, the Parliament views them with great suspicion.
In the Parliament’s eyes, comitology committees constitute a device through which
the Council can undermine legislative commitments, by obtaining results that would
otherwise be impossible because of opposition from the Parliament. The Parliament
has staged a long, but futile, battle to eliminate comitology committees in European
administration.303 In compensation, the Parliament has sought to establish
supervisory powers over European administration equal to those of the Council.
The Parliament has asserted control over administrative decisionmaking since
the mid-1980s through a series of resolutions, inter-institutional agreements, and
now, legislation. The duty of the Commission to transmit information on
administrative proceedings to the Parliament is common to all of these
instruments.304 Today, after over twenty years of institutional wrangling, the
Commission is required to forward to the Parliament the proposals for administrative
action submitted to comitology committees, the agendas of committee meetings, the
names and organizational affiliations of committee members, and the votes and
minutes from committee meetings. Furthermore, the Parliament today has the right
to vote on implementing measures adopted by comitology committees, although a
"no" vote has only moral force and does not bind the Commission.
The need for information on the work of the Commission and the Council led
the Parliament to trumpet the right to transparency for two reasons. As a matter of
normative discourse, after the northern right to transparency came to define the
European concept of good government, the Parliament’s past successes in obtaining
documents, as well as its subsequent crusades to obtain yet more information, had to
be extended to all European citizens. In other words, once transparency became a
http://www.jeanmonnet program.org/papers/99/990501/html (describing different types of comitology
committees).
303
See generally Corbett, Closer EU Integration, supra note 267, at 133, 256 (parliamentary
resolution of 1981 recommending that committees be purely advisory in nature); Kieran St. Clair Bradley,
The European Parliament and Comitology: On the Road to Nowhere?, 1997 Eur. L.J. 230 (1997); Ellen
Vos, Institutional Frameworks of Community Health and Safety Regulation: Committees, Agencies and
Private Bodies 120 (1999).
304
See Resolution closing the procedure for consultation of the European Parliament on the proposal
from the Commission of the European Communities to the Council for a Regulation laying down the
procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred to the Commission, 1986 O.J. (C 297) 94,
95 (point 1); Plumb-Delors Agreement of 1988, cited in Vos, supra note 303, at 126 (agreeing to forward
all proposals for implementing measures to the Parliament at the same time as they are submitted to
comitology committees); Code of conduct on the implementation of structural polices by the Commission,
1993 O.J. (C 255) 19, 19-20 [“Klepsch-Millan Agreement”] (agreeing to forward the Parliament all plans
for the use of regional development funds—generally elaborated by the Member States and then
transmitted to the Commission—all proposals for Community initiatives, and the results of any reviews of
the implementation of development projects on the ground); Modus vivendi of Dec. 20, 1994 between the
European Parliament, the Council and the Commission concerning the implementing measures for acts
adopted in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 189b of the EC Treaty, 1996 O.J. (C 102) 1
(undertaking to forward all proposals for implementing measures, to allow Parliament the opportunity to
vote on proposals, and in the event of a negative vote, to adopt the measure only after “taking due account
of the European Parliament’s point of view"); Resolution on the draft general budget of the European
Communities for the financial year 1997—Section III—Commission, 1996 O.J. (C 347) 125, 125, para.
72 (agreeing to forward the Parliament a wider array of documents—the agendas of committee meetings
and the results of votes taken in comitology committees—and to allow parliamentarians to attend
comitology meetings if there is no objection from the national regulators on the committee); Comitology
Decision, supra note 232, at arts. 7.3, 8 (codifying information and control powers established in earlier
instruments).
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European value, the Parliament could not ask for information for itself and itself
alone. The piggybacking of the right to transparency onto the Parliament’s
information initiatives is evident in the administrative area. The first law
guaranteeing parliamentary oversight of the administrative process (comitology
committees) both codified the gains that the Parliament had made in the previous
decade through inter-institutional agreements, and included a right of access for the
public-at-large.305 The provision was pushed by the Parliament, not the Commission
or the Council. The Parliament’s transparency amendments were watered down in
the end but, had it gotten its way, the law would have read:
Having regard to the rules and principles of transparency and access to
documents flowing from Articles 1 of the EU Treaty, 207 and 255 of the
EC Treaty and Declarations 35 and 41 attached to the Final Act of the
Amsterdam Treaty,
...
Except for reasons of confidentiality, all documents shall be made public
and accessible by electronic transmission.306

The new European value of transparency redefined the Parliament's institutional
interest in information.
The second reason for the Parliament’s advocacy of transparency was the moral
resource that the right brought to the strategic interest in information. The rhetoric of
one of the Parliament's earliest resolutions demonstrates the instrumental nature of
the right. There, the Parliament expressly coupled information as a fundamental right
for all European citizens, with information as a necessary complement to its powers
in the legislative and administrative processes:
1. [Parliament] [t]akes the view that right to information is one of the
fundamental freedoms of the people of Europe and that it should be
recognized as such by the European Community;
....
4. Requests that the minutes of Council meetings which concern the
discussion of and decision-making of a regulation or directive should be
published, including the statements which alter the purpose of the
directive or give another interpretation to the published document;
....
6. Wishes to see open access to information concerning the activities of
the management and the advisory committee [comitology committees
involved in European administration], with a view to obtaining precise
information on the scope of the decisions taken;
7. Proposes that a mediator be appointed within Parliament to monitor
compliance with the obligation incumbent on the Community bodies to
provide information.307
305

Comitology Decision, supra note 232.
Proposal for a Council Decision laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing
powers conferred on the Commission (COM(98)0380—C4-0501/98—98/0219(CNS)), 1999 O.J. (C 279)
404, 407, 410.
307
See Resolution on the compulsory publication of information by the European Community, 1988
O.J. (C 49) 175, 175-76; see also Resolution on the obligation for the Council to await Parliament’s
opinion, supra note 298, at 128 (point 16).
306
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The Parliament linked the institutional battles narrated above to the fundamental
freedom of the right to information.
The Parliament’s initiatives that followed the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 also
reveal the instrumental quality of the right. As mentioned above, the Parliament
tasked a committee (Committee on Institutional Affairs) with producing a report on
the legislation that would be needed to implement Article 255 on access to
documents.308 The opinion of a related committee (Committee on Legal Affairs and
Citizens’ Rights) on the report is telling. After discussing transparency guarantees
for European citizens, the Committee moved on to transparency measures for
parliamentarians:
A rapporteur [the parliamentarian tasked by the appropriate committee
with preparing a report on a proposed European law] should have
increased rights of access when drawing up his report. Access to all
documents used during the preparation of a Commission proposal might
be considered in this context.
The competent parliamentary committee should be granted rights of
access during the commitology procedure [European administrative
process described above].
Parliament as a whole might be granted rights of access in the case of
major interinstitutional issues and problems connected with institutional
law.309

The opinion of a second related committee (Committee on Civil Liberties and
Internal Affairs) was even more pointed in calling for a right to transparency for both
the public and the Parliament. In the foreign and security policy area (so-called
Second Pillar) and in the police and immigration areas (so-called Third Pillar and
parts of the First Pillar), the Parliament’s legislative prerogatives are extremely
limited.310 The Parliament has not, in contrast with areas in which it has cooperation
or co-decision powers, been able to cajole or threaten the Council and Commission
with deadlock in order to obtain information and influence. In its opinion, the
Committee used the right of access to documents to make the case for greater
parliamentary information and influence in police and immigration matters:
The current campaign for access to documents of the Justice and Home
Affairs Council [Council of Ministers] is crucial in fostering a culture of
transparency within the Union.
....
It goes without saying that the European Parliament should be informed
and therefore consulted before any legislative decision. Public access to
documents must also relate not only to the official institutions and bodies
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See Report on Openness, supra note 277.
Id. (Opinion for the Committee on Institutional Affairs, section C., at 21 of electronic version).
310
TEU art. 21 (common foreign security policy); art. 39 (police cooperation); art. 67 (immigration).
309

2005]

CREATING EUROPEAN RIGHTS

313

of the Union but also to all formal or informal working parties in which
the Union is directly or indirectly involved. 311

The conflation of the general right of access to documents with the Parliament’s
powers to require information and to be consulted is evident.312
3. The evolution of the right to transparency
Since European citizens obtained, in the Public Access to Documents Law,
concrete procedures for exercising their transparency rights, the only significant
development has been the Constitutional Treaty. The Treaty gives the transparency
measures established over the past decade the status of higher, constitutional law. In
the first part, the duties incumbent upon the European institutions are set down.313
The second part of the Constitutional Treaty, which incorporates the Charter of
Fundamental Rights, recognizes the individual right of access to documents.314
Lastly, Article III-399 sets out the structural, institutional conditions of transparency,
which are largely repetitive of the rights set out in the first part of the Constitutional
Treaty.315
The principal change wrought by the Constitutional Treaty is the symbolic,
constitutional status conferred upon the principles of openness, transparency, open
meetings, and access to documents. As a practical matter, the new articles do not add
much. They recognize the legislative practice of requiring all institutions,
committees, and agencies, in addition to the Commission, the Parliament, and the
Council, to respect access to document rights.316 They also constitutionalize the rules
of procedure of the Parliament and the Council under which debates on the adoption
of legislation are open to the public and under which parliamentary reports and the
votes and statements from high-level Council meetings are made public.317 Lastly,
the Constitutional Treaty requires the Parliament and the Council to publish
documents related to their deliberations on legislative matters. However, the scope
311
See Report on Openness, supra note 277 (Opinion of the Committee on Civil Liberties and
Internal Affairs, Introduction, at 26 of electronic version).
312
In the negotiations over the Public Access to Documents Law, the Parliament also pushed for
access to preparatory deliberations in the Commission and the Council. See Bjurulf & Elgström, supra
note 288, at 254. Both the Commission and the majority of members on the Council wished to protect the
secrecy of their deliberations. Id. at 253-54.
313
TCE art. I-50 ("Transparency of the proceedings of Union Institutions, bodies offices and
agencies").
314
TCE art. II-102 ("Right of access to documents").
315
Id. at art. III-399.
316
Id. at art. III-399.1. See, e.g., European Parliament and Council Regulation 1641/2003, 2003 O.J.
(L 245) 1 (amending Council Regulation (EEC) 1210/90 on the establishment of the European
Environment Agency and the European Environment Information and Observation Network; Rules of
Public Access to Documents); European Investment Bank, Rules of Public Access to Documents, 2002
O.J. (C 292) 10. For a partial list of access rules of different European bodies, see Steve Peers, From
Maastricht to Laeken: The Political Agenda of Openness and Transparency, in the European Union in
Increasing Transparency in the European Union? 7, 15 (Veerle Deckmyn ed., 2002).
317
TCE art. I-50.2. In the case of the European Parliament, both plenary meetings and committee
meetings are open to the public. In the case of the Council, only the final meeting of the Council,
rubberstamping agreements negotiated previously by low-level, national representatives, are made public.
There is nothing to suggest that the Constitutional Treaty means anything different by "the Council [shall
meet in public] when considering and voting on a draft legislative act." Id. at art. I-50.2
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of the requirement turns on the access-to-documents rules of the respective
institutions and hence access to such documents would not need to be significantly
broader than it stands at present.318
4. European value: European and northern transparency compared
In conclusion, how does the European right to transparency compare with the
administrative law of the northern Member States? The European right combines
different elements from the northern traditions of open government, but it has also
taken on dimensions not found in any of those traditions. Europeans have a right of
access to scientific studies, policy documents, and other preparatory material, if not
outweighed by the public interest in confidentiality before the legal act is adopted
and without exception after the measure is adopted. In this, the European right
approximates all the northern systems. However, material such as internal
memoranda, notes, outlines, and drafts is not categorically excluded from disclosure,
as under the Swedish and Danish laws, or excluded from disclosure until after the
matter has been decided, as under the Finnish law; material revealing personal
opinions is not, as a rule, exempted from disclosure as under the Dutch law. Rather,
access to such documents before a decision becomes final “shall be refused if
disclosure of the document would seriously undermine the institution’s decisionmaking process, unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure”; access
after a decision becomes final “shall be refused if disclosure of the document would
seriously undermine the institution’s decisionmaking process, unless there is an
overriding public interest in disclosure.”319 European institutions are under a duty to
maintain registers of all documents that can be easily consulted, approximating the
Swedish and Finnish systems. Yet where possible the institutions are also under a
duty to give individuals direct access to documents, electronically, rather than
through the lengthy, bureaucratic process of an access-to-documents request. This
goes beyond Swedish and Finnish law.
The most notable element of the European right is that, at least in theory, it
extends to government activities of a highly political nature. The reader will recall
that legislation in most northern systems makes it difficult, if not impossible, to
obtain documents relating to the contribution of government cabinets and ministers
to draft legislation. Likewise, with the exception of Sweden, parliaments are not
covered by access-to-documents legislation.320 The situation is different in the
European Union. Some of the drafts, minutes, votes, and declarations produced and
recorded in the meetings of the Council, in which representatives of national
governments negotiate the text of European laws, are subject to the right of access.321
Of course, application of the law's subject-specific exceptions might undermine the
318

Id. at art. III-399.2.
See Public Access to Documents Law, supra note 233, at art. 4.3.
320
See Mäenpää, supra note 213, at 1626 (stating that parliament not covered under Finnish law);
Swedish Freedom of the Press Act, art. 5 (stating that parliament covered under Swedish law); Danish
Constitution § 49 and Danish Parliament’s Rules of Procedure §§8, 38 (setting down rules on access to
plenary sessions of parliamentary and parliamentary committee meetings as well as publication of
parliamentary deliberations and documents).
321
See Public Access to Documents Law, supra note 233, at art. 4.3; Council Decision 2004/338/EC,
2004 O.J. (L 106), Annex II, art. 11 (adopting the Council’s Rules of Procedure).
319
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general rule, but, in theory, individuals should have access to documents and
minutes from the low-level "working groups" of national civil servants, the midlevel meetings of Member State diplomats (Committee of Permanent
Representatives or "COREPER"), and the high-level meetings of government
ministers. Citizens can also consult documents from comitology committees (part of
the European administrative process) which, in some cases, reproduce the
intergovernmental politics of the Council.322 The right of access to documents also
covers the European Parliament and applies to draft reports and agendas of
parliamentary committee meetings.323 Furthermore, the European right to
transparency includes the principle of open, public meetings of legislative bodies:
Council meetings giving final approval to European laws, parliamentary committees,
and plenary sessions of the European Parliament.324 The negotiations and political
deals that, even in the northern traditions of open government are generally
conducted behind closed doors, are coming under pressure, albeit still limited, from
the European right to transparency.
These added dimensions of transparency are related to the Parliament's strategic
interest in information and the unique European institutional landscape in which the
Parliament operates. As exemplified by its annual discharge reports, the Parliament
has called consistently for greater openness in the Council and the Commission to
further its own powers. Related to this competitive and, at times, hostile relationship
with the Commission, is the reach of European access-to-documents legislation: it
covers not only studies and reports containing the factual grounds for Commission
action but also internal memoranda, outlines, and notes that are generated in the
Commission’s decisionmaking process. Parliament's campaign for information not
only extended to the Commission but also to the highly political, intergovernmental
bargaining in the Council. Consequently, the European right, in contrast to the
northern systems where it originated, applies there too.
C. The Third Generation: The Right to Civil Society Participation
The last generation of rights before the Commission and the second set, after
transparency, to revamp Commission authority in the area of broadly applicable
policies began in 1999. The civil society phase is different from the two previous
ones in a number of important respects. First, the right did not originate in domestic
public law; rather it was drawn from the international arena where civil society had
become the dominant paradigm for legitimizing international organizations.
Nevertheless, the right has assumed a distinctly European significance. The
international provenance of the right meant that it was poorly defined compared to
the right to a hearing and transparency, which had been worked out in the
322

See Comitology Decision, supra note 232, at art. 7.
See European Parliament: Rules of Procedure, 1999 O.J. (L 202) 1, r.97; Jacobs, Institutional
Dynamics, supra note 249, at 11-14. Transparency in Parliament’s own affairs, through access to draft
committee reports and open committee meetings, came rather late. The adoption of rules to protect rights
of access was directly tied to the charge of hypocrisy, namely that Parliament could not demand that the
Council and the Commission be transparent and, at the same time, fail to guarantee the right in its own
affairs. See Interview with Francis Jacobs, supra note 249.
324
Council Decision 2004/338/EC, supra note 320, at art. 8; Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, supra
note 323, at r. 96.
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institutionally and historically rich political space of the nation-state. The amorphous
nature of the international value of civil society meant that European political
entrepreneurs, constrained by old, European maps of legitimate relations between
public bodies and private citizens, quickly infused the new right with the familiar,
European practice of corporatism.
Secondly, unlike the right to a hearing and transparency, this historical moment
of rights creation is still in progress. A number of important elements remain to be
decided: Will European citizens and their organizations be able to vindicate the right
in the European Courts? What type of policy measures will it cover? And will the
right apply, and in what shape, to European institutions besides the European
Commission? The following section employs the same organizing scheme as the
previous two sections but the reader should bear in mind that the right to civil
society participation is still unsettled. Certain facets of the right are treated as part of
the aftermath of the historical juncture not for purposes of complete descriptive
accuracy but to relate this episode of rights creation to the previous ones and to draw
lessons for a general theory of rights.
1. The right to be consulted on legislation and implementing regulations then and
now
a. National traditions of public participation in lawmaking and rulemaking
National procedures for the drafting of legislation and implementing regulations
follow the same basic pattern but they also display certain distinctive features.325
National procedures are similar in that, generally speaking, the government and the
administration enjoy considerable discretion in drafting legislation and rules and
they are not required legally to interact with members of the public. Before
submitting bills to the parliament for a vote or laying implementing regulations
before the legislature, sometimes for a vote and other times simply for purposes of
information, the executive is not required to make its draft public and consult with
interested citizens and organizations. National procedures are also similar in that, in
most Member States, there are carefully defined exceptions to executive discretion;
in areas such as the environment and land-use planning, officials are required to
publicize drafts and consult the public. National procedures are different in that,
notwithstanding the government's considerable discretion, some systems require
drafts to be reviewed by a specialized, independent body within the administration
(Council of State) and other systems rely heavily on advisory bodies composed of
interest organizations.
325
The term "implementing regulation" covers any legal measure promulgated by government
administration that is designed to affect a broad class of individuals and that is issued pursuant to a
delegation contained in a law passed by the legislative assembly (or, in the case of France's presidential
system, pursuant to the President's autonomous powers under the Constitution). Implementing regulations
are known as règlement in France, Rechtsverordnungen in Germany, decreto legislativo in Italy, and
"statutory instrument" in the UK. The American equivalent is a rule or regulation. The American reader
should bear in mind that the difference that exists in American public law between lawmaking and
rulemaking is much less pronounced elsewhere. That is because in parliamentary systems, unlike the
American separation of powers system, the government cabinet answers to Parliament when it drafts both
laws and rules (at least in constitutional theory, although the practice can be very different).
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To elaborate a bit on this element of domestic public law: Consider lawmaking.
All the Member States are parliamentary democracies, meaning that the executive is
elected by the members of the legislative assembly and therefore enjoys the
confidence of the legislative assembly.326 The government cabinet and the
administration are given extensive power to initiate legislation and to adopt
implementing regulations because they are considered to be the expression of the
popularly elected legislative assembly. In drafting legislation, most national
administrations are not under a duty to adhere to any special procedures.327 They are
not required under their constitutions or laws to publicize their drafts and consult the
public.328
Member States vary on two important exceptions to government discretion in
lawmaking: the duty to consult a specialized body of civil servants and corporatism.
In countries influenced by the French administrative law tradition (droit
administratif), the government is often required to submit draft legislation to a
specialized section of the administration. The Council of State, as the body is known
in France, Italy, Belgium, and Greece, checks the bill for technical drafting errors,
respect for constitutional principles, consistency with other legislation, and so on.
Second, in some instances, the government is required to submit bills to advisory
bodies composed of organizations representing the relevant interests, a practice
which is often referred to as corporatism because it bears some resemblance to the
powerful corporations of tradesmen and artisans that governed the city-states of early
modern Europe.329 This is typical of certain policy areas, for example welfare,
industrial policy, and consumer protection. Such advisory boards are far more
common in places such as Germany and Scandinavia, where interests are highly
organized and governments and intermediate organizations have a long history of
corporatist relations.330 In virtually all Member States, however, including those
whose administrations are not viewed as particularly open to outside interests,
advisory boards composed of peak associations exist in certain fields.331
Now consider implementing regulations. In most of the Member States, the
government discretion and exceptions to that discretion in the domain of lawmaking

326

See Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six
Countries 117-27 (1999).
327
In this, there is no difference between European systems of lawmaking and the legislative process
in the United States.
328
The British government sometimes engages in consultation, but as purely discretionary good
administrative practice and not because of a legal duty. One of the modernization initiatives of the Blair
government has been to require government departments to consult with the public when they draft
legislation or major statutory instruments. See Cabinet Office, Code of Practice on Written Consultation
(Nov. 2000), available at http://www.cabinet-office.gov.uk/ regulation/Consultation/Code.htm. As a
general rule, government departments must allow twelve weeks for comment, synthesize and summarize
those comments for public consumption, and then explain the policy choices ultimately made. However,
these are just Cabinet Office guidelines, namely they do not create binding legal duties and they vest a
significant amount of discretion with administrators concerning when and how to consult.
329
See Yves Mény, Government and Politics in Western Europe 143-46 (2d ed. 1993).
330
See Victor A. Pestoff, Globalization, Business Interest Associations and Swedish Exceptionalism
in the 21st Century?, Paper presented at University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill on Mar. 26, 2001, at 16 (Feb. 12, 2001), available at http://www.unc.edu/depts/europe/papers/010319pestoff.pdf.
331
Mény, supra note 329, at 145 (discussing French Conseil Economique et Social).
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also characterize implementing regulations.332 An additional set of exceptions,
however, apply to rulemaking. In most European systems, administrators must
publicize their intentions and consult with the public-at-large in certain types of
rulemaking. These forms of rulemaking include decisions believed to have concrete
effects on discrete, geographically defined groups of citizens. In addition, the
decisions subject to the extra requirements are generally made by local and regional
administrators, not central government. Land-use planning is one example.333
Government building projects and public investment decisions that have the
potential of hurting the environment are another example.334 Rules that are
considered insignificant, usually because they address matters of internal
administrative organization, deal with a limited class of cases, or have limited
temporal effects are subject to fewer procedural requirements than draft legislation
and implementing regulations.335 Very often they are promulgated by individual
ministers, not by prime ministers sitting in the cabinet of ministers, and they are not
subject to review by the Council of State or advisory bodies.
b. Public participation in Commission lawmaking and rulemaking
Until the late 1990s, the European Commission's procedure for drafting
legislation and implementing regulations was very similar to that of its national
counterparts. The Commission was not formally required to publish drafts or consult
the public. As a matter of law, the Commission's proposal could remain entirely
confidential until the moment it was sent to the other institutions for adoption,
principally the Council, and, starting in the late 1980s, the European Parliament. As
in the Member States, organized interests represented on corporatist advisory bodies
were the exception to the rule of executive discretion.
Two different forums for the participation of private associations existed. In
1957, the founding Member States established, alongside the other original
institutions, an advisory body called the Economic and Social Committee (ESC) that
332
See generally Edward C. Page, Governing by Numbers 124-73 (2001) (describing procedures for
drafting and promulgating statutory instruments in the UK); Adam Tomkins, Delegated Legislation in the
English Constitution, in Delegated Legislation and the Role of Committees in the EC, 101, 109-14 (Mads
Andenas & Alexander Türk eds., 2000); Etienne Picard, Delegation of Legislative Power in French Public
Law, in Delegated Legislation, supra at 67, 84-93 (reviewing rulemaking powers in France); Alexander
Türk, Delegated Legislation in German Constitutional Law, in Delegated Legislation, supra at 127, 16281 (describing parliamentary and private sector involvement in German rulemaking). The obvious
counterpoint is American notice and comment rulemaking procedure under the Administrative Procedure
Act. 5 U.S.C. § 553.
333
For Italy, see Aldo Sandulli, Il Procedimento, in 2 Diritto Amministrativo Generale 927 (Sabino
Cassese et al. eds., 2000). For France, see Jean-Marie Pontier, La démocratie de proximité: les citoyens,
les élus locaux et les décisions locales, 55 La Revue Administrative 160 (2002). For Germany and the
UK, see Theodora Th. Ziamou, Rulemaking, Participation and the Limits of Public Law in the US and
Europe 141-161 (2001).
334
Although this has existed since the early 1980s in certain European countries, environmental
impact statements have now become a feature of every national system through the Environmental Impact
Assessment Directive. See Council Directive 85/337/EEC, 1985 O.J. (L 175) 40 (on the assessment of the
effects of certain public and private projects on the environment).
335
See generally Ziamou, supra note 333, at 15-21 (describing distinction between these two types
of administrative rules in Germany, Greece, the UK, and the U.S.). The American equivalent would be the
rules exempted from notice and comment requirements under 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A).
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was modeled after their own corporatist traditions.336 The ESC was constituted of
producer interests—employers, workers, farmers, tradesmen, and professionals. The
organizations sent to Brussels to represent such interests were appointed by their
governments and were generally highly structured, peak associations with national
constituencies. Later, consumer organizations were added to the ESC. The Treaty of
Rome required that the Commission consult the ESC on legislative proposals: at the
same time that a proposal was sent to the Council for a decision and the Parliament
for an opinion, it was also sent to the ESC for an opinion. Notwithstanding the
legislative role carved out for the ESC, it quickly developed a reputation as the
weakest, least influential institution in Brussels.
The second forum for corporatist interest representation was the issue-specific
advisory committee, created by law in a particular policy area to assist the
Commission when drafting laws and rules.337 Advisory committees differed from the
ESC in a number of ways. The Commission, not the Member States, chose the
organizations that sat on the committees; these organizations were generally panEuropean, not national, federations; their advice was sought earlier in the
policymaking process, as the Commission was drafting proposals and not after
proposals had been completed; their advice was sought on both laws and
implementing regulations, not only laws; and, finally, enabling laws establishing
committees generally left consultation to the Commission's discretion.
The practice of public participation in Commission decisionmaking was quite
different from the closed nature of the procedure in the law on the books. The
Commission would often solicit input from firms and associations not represented on
advisory bodies to build political momentum for proposals. It did so largely on an
informal basis although it sometimes would also publish forward-looking policy
documents, known as Green and White Papers and available to the public-at-large.
In Green and White Papers, the Commission would outline a number of issues on
which it was contemplating drafting legislation and it would ask for the public's
response. But the law permitted the civil servants in the Commission to draft in
splendid isolation from the European citizenry. And the Official Journal is full of
directives and regulations that started in precisely that fashion.
Then, in December 2002, the Commission adopted a policy document, called a
Communication, in which it outlined the procedure that all divisions within the
Commission would follow for consulting individuals and their associations—billed
"civil society"—in drafting policy proposals.338 In consultations, the Commission
describes the issues open for discussion, invites the public to submit written
336
See TEC ex art. 194. In 1957, Article 194 read: “The Committee shall be composed of
representatives of the various categories of economic and social life, in particular, representatives of
producers, agriculturists, transport operators, workers, merchants, artisans, the liberal professions and of
the general interests.”
337
See, e.g., Commission Decision 73/306/EEC, 1973 O.J. (L 283) 18 (relating to the setting up of a
Consumers’ Consultative Committee); Commission Decision 81/195/EEC, 1981 O.J (L 88) 42 (setting up,
within the Advisory Committee on Seeds, a Special Section on the approximation of laws); Commission
Decision 2004/391/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 120) 50 (on the advisory groups dealing with matters covered by the
common agricultural policy).
338
European Commission, Communication from the Commission: Towards a reinforced culture of
consultation and dialogue — General principles and minimum standards for consultation of interested
parties by the Commission, COM (2002) 704 final (Dec. 2002) [hereinafter Communication on
Consultation].

320

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN LAW

[Vol. 11

comments, and publishes the civil society responses.339 This process is to take place
largely through the Commission's website. The Commission then summarizes the
comments and explains how its final proposal was or was not altered by civil
society’s comments:
The Commission will provide adequate feedback to responding parties
and to the public at large. To this end, explanatory memoranda
accompanying legislative proposals by the Commission or Commission
communications following a consultation process will include the results
of these consultations and an explanation as to how these were conducted
and how the results were taken into account in the proposal.340

Parallel to the consultation of the public-at-large, the Commission also solicits the
opinions of certain "target groups" which are believed to have a special interest in
the proposal because they will be directly impacted, they will be involved in the
implementation of the policy, or their organizational aims are related to the
proposal.341
In the Communication on Consultation, the Commission qualifies the procedure
in a number of essential respects. On the one hand, the Commission minimizes the
importance of the procedure by asserting that the final decision on the content of the
legislative proposal is a political one for it alone to make.342 Moreover, the
Commission states that the standards set out in the Communication are meant to
guide administrative practice but do not constitute legally binding duties enforceable
in court:
[A] situation must be avoided in which a Commission proposal could be
challenged in the Court on the grounds of alleged lack of consultation of
interested parties. Such an over-legalistic approach would be incompatible
with the need for timely delivery of policy, and with the expectations of
the citizens that the European Institutions should deliver on substance
rather than concentrating on procedures.343

Finally, the Commission confines the procedure to "major policy initiatives,"
namely, proposals for European laws, and excludes the "minor" changes to the
European legal framework contained in implementing regulations.344 On the other
hand, the Commission makes clear that the procedure set down in the
Communication on Consultation constitutes a floor; it might choose to consult on
more specific matters that fall within the ambit of administrative rulemaking.345
The commitments undertaken in the Communication on Consultation have
significantly affected the procedure for drafting policy initiatives and legislative
proposals. Since the Communication was published, there has been a steady flow of
consultations in a variety of fields and on a number of different types of policy
339

Id. at 19-22.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 19.
342
Id. at 12.
343
Id. at 10.
344
Id. at 10, 15.
345
Id. at 11.
340
341
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instruments. A few examples will illustrate the change in the Commission's working
methods. The Directorate-General responsible for customs has published and
solicited comments on a draft proposal for a new Customs Code.346 The Commission
requested comments on a Green Paper addressing the quality and general
accessibility of services in areas of the European market undergoing liberalization.347
Downstream in the policy process, the Commission conducted a public consultation
on the implementation of the European broadcasting law, to determine whether there
were problems with the existing framework.348 In 2003, the first year after the
Communication came into force, the Commission held a total of 21 public
consultations.349 It appears that what, in the past, was at best a sporadic exercise,
limited to mammoth policy initiatives, is today becoming routine throughout the
Commission.350
2. The historical juncture: The fall of the Santer Commission
What explains the Commission's decision to engage in systematic consultation
of the public in drafting legislative proposals? Why did it depart from its past
practice, as well as the standard mode of administration in the Member States? This
turn of events creates a real puzzle, more so than the right to be heard and
transparency, because civil society consultation was entirely self-imposed, not
compelled in part by the judiciary (as with the right to be heard) or by European
legislators (as with transparency). The experience with government bureaucracies
has been that their interest lies in unfettered discretion and that rights and procedures
are imposed from the outside. A closer examination of the historical background,
however, demonstrates that, starting in 1999, consultation was in the Commission's
interest.

346
See European Commission, Consultation on the New Customs Code, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/taxation_customs/customs/consultations/customs_code_en.htm.
347
European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: White Paper
on services of general interest, COM (2004) 374 final (May 2004).
348
Commission interpretative communication on certain aspects of the provisions on televised
advertising in the 'Television without frontiers' Directive, 2004 O.J. (C 102) 2.
349
European Commission, General Report on the Activities of the European Union 22, para. 17
(2004).
350
There has been organizational change in the Commission to manage the new right to civil society
consultation. The “Openness and professional ethics” unit in the Commission Secretariat-General (the
functional equivalent to the Executive Office of the President in U.S. administration) is responsible for
transparency, principally access to documents, and consultation. The five civil servants who work on civil
society consultations are responsible for encouraging Directorate-Generals to conduct consultations on the
items included in the Commission’s annual work program. See Interview with Lea Vatanen, European
Commission, Secretariat-General, Directorate B, Relations with Civil Society, Openness and Professional
Ethics (June 16, 2004). They also field questions from personnel around the Commission on how to
structure the procedure. In addition, the “Openness and professional ethics” unit manages a database
containing a list of Commission advisory bodies with civil society representation and a voluntary registry
of civil society organizations. This data base is called Consultation, the European Commission and Civil
Society (CONECCS) and is available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/civil_society/coneccs/index_en.htm.
There is also a central data base for all consultations being conducted by the Commission’s DirectorateGenerals. See http://europa.eu.int/yourvoice/consultations/index_en.htm.
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a. The fall of the Santer Commission
The Commission has been criticized for fiscal mismanagement and cronyism
ever since it underwent major expansion in the 1970s and 1980s. As long as the
Commission and the Council were the only strong organizations within the European
institutional complex, the charges of inefficiency and corruption never amounted to
much. That changed in the 1990s with the reforms made in the Maastricht and
Amsterdam Treaties and the rise of the European Parliament as a powerful actor. Not
only did the Parliament obtain co-equal legislative powers, but it was also given a
variety of legal means to hold the Commission accountable, similar to an ordinary,
national parliament.351 When, in 1998, it came to light that Edith Cresson, the French
Commissioner responsible for Research and Development, had given out an expert
contract to her dentist, the Parliament took the scandal as an occasion to demonstrate
its new accountability powers.352 In January 1999, it voted to set up a Committee of
Wisemen to investigate the Commission's financial and employment practices.353
The report issued two months later strongly criticized the Commission and
concluded with a fatal statement: "It is difficult to find a member of the Commission
with any sense of responsibility." The Commission, headed by President Jacques
Santer, was at risk of being the first Commission in history to be censured by the
Parliament. Rather than face such a motion, it resigned.354
When the new Commission headed by President Romano Prodi took office on
September 17, 1999, it faced a crisis. The Commission's reputation was at an all-time
low. On the agenda was enlargement to the East, after the Luxembourg Crisis and
the single market agenda of 1986, the single biggest transformation of the European
Union since its founding. The Prodi Commission was called upon to manage a
complicated task, full of political minefields, at the same time as it suffered from low
esteem from the Parliament and the European public. The response was to undertake
a massive, Commission-wide exercise on good governance. Numerous divisions and
special task forces within the Commission, as well as outside think tanks and
scholars, were called to reflect on how to render the Commission more legitimate.355
351
Among these new accountability tools was an improved appointments power. Before Maastricht,
the Commission was appointed exclusively through bargaining among the European Heads of State, but in
Maastricht, Parliament acquired the power to vote on the Commission as a whole (but not individual
members) and in Amsterdam, the power to vote on the Commission President. See Craig & Búrca, EU
Law, supra note 3.
352
See Karel Van Miert, Le marché et le pouvoir 241-59 (2000) (recounting this history from the
insider perspective of a Commissioner at the time).
353
Parliament acted pursuant to the power acquired in Maastricht to set up temporary Committees of
Inquiry. TEC art. 193.
354
See TEC art. 201.
355
See European Commission, Commission Discussion Paper, The Commission and NonGovernmental Organisations: Building a Stronger Partnership, COM (2000) 11 final (Jan. 2000);
European Commission, Reforming the Commission: A White Paper, COM (2000) 200 final (March 2000)
(especially Action 4 developing a set of recommendations for best practice in consultation); European
Commission, European Governance: Preparatory Work for the White Paper (2002); Governance in the
European Union (Olivier De Schutter et al. eds., 2001) (results of academic seminars organized by the
Commission in preparation for the White Paper). In total, there were twelve different internal working
groups, each of which was responsible for a distinct set of good government issues. Within Work Area
No. 2 on “Handling the process of producing and implementing Community rules” there was a Working
Group on “Consultation and participation of civil society.” European Commission, supra, at 63.
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The result was the Commission White Paper on European Governance, published in
2001.356 The principal innovation of the White Paper was the civil society concept.357
Through the "involvement" and "consultation" of civil society, the Commission's
policies would be technically better and more democratic. The Communication on
Consultation setting down the specifics of consultation procedure followed one year
later.
b. International value: The influence of the idea of legitimacy through civil society
Global politics of the last decade have been marked by the emergence of
widespread skepticism of international economic organizations. Multilateral
organizations such as the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, and the
International Monetary Fund have come under fire from a wide variety of social and
environmental justice non-governmental organizations (NGOs). To some extent,
international organizations are scapegoats for the effects of a market-driven process
of globalization. Nonetheless, they and their policies have been criticized for
contributing to the inequalities and loss of local control associated with
globalization. In the skeptics’ view, international economic organizations have not
kept their promise of development and prosperity. Rather, they have facilitated
global capital's exploitation of the Third World, labor, and the environment.
How were international economic organizations to be salvaged? According to
the critics, one significant improvement would be NGO participation in the
decisionmaking of international organizations. The call for participation was made
on the grounds of democracy, legitimacy, and effectiveness; only if international
decisionmakers were responsive to NGOs would their policies be fair, equitable, and
responsive to the needs of developing countries. This demand extended to a wide
array of international decisionmaking: treaty negotiations, inter-state dispute
resolution, foreign lending decisions, and the allocation and distribution of foreign
aid at the local level.
The call for greater NGO participation is tied to the reconceptualization of
NGOs as civil society. NGOs have long been part of the international system.358 In
the International Labor Organization, which dates back to 1919, representatives of
workers and employers sit and vote alongside government representatives on its
decisionmaking bodies.359 The founders of the United Nations created a permanent,
356

See European Commission, White Paper on European Governance, COM (2001) 428 final, July
25, 2001 [hereinafter White Paper on Governance].
357
The White Paper on Governance contained two other major themes: confining the Commission to
the technical, administrative realm while leaving political decisions to the Council and the Parliament, and
improving transparency. However, both the technocratic characterization of the Commission and
transparency were old modes of legitimizing European integration and the Commission. See generally
Christian Joerges, “Economic order” — “technical realization” — “the hour of the executive”: some legal
historical observations on the Commission White Paper on European governance, Jean Monnet Working
Paper No. 6/01, at 16 (Iain L. Fraser trans., 2001) (discussing neo-functionalist roots of technocracy
argument in the White Paper).
358
See generally Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International
Governance, 18 Mich. J. Int’l L. 183 (1997) (analyzing the history of NGO participation in international
law).
359
The ILO is composed of an annual General Conference, a Governing Body which meets three
times a year, and a Secretariat. Representatives of workers and employers sit on both the General
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institutional role for non-governmental actors by stipulating that government
representatives on the Economic and Social Council should consult NGOs.360 In the
mid-1990s, however, these old actors took on a new identity as civil society. The
official rhetoric of the UN system, the World Bank, and a variety of other
international organizations shifted from "NGO" to "civil society" and “civil society
organization.” 361
The change in language was not simply a matter of form. It was related to a vast
body of academic and policymaking literature in which civil society—generally
defined as social and environmental justice NGOs and not market actors or their
associations—was put forward as the key to legitimate global governance. An
analysis of the normative claim in favor of civil society is beyond the scope of this
Article. Suffice it to say that the organizations of global civil society are believed to
foster transnational solidarities, pluralism in the international system of governance,
republican commitments to collective self-government, and communitarian
values.362 Most dramatically, some claim that the organizations of civil society
represent the global people.363 This transformation in practice and rhetoric is nicely
captured in a statement by the Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development:
I am happy to see that nowadays there is practically no international
organization, not only in the United Nations system but also outside it,
that is not actively seeking ways of integrating the civil society. What was
new in December 1995 is becoming a common concern of international
organizations now.364

Conference and the Governing Body. See Steve Charnovitz, The International Labour Organization in its
Second Century, 4 Max Planck Y.B. U.N. L. 147, 171 (2000).
360
See U.N. Charter, art. 71 ("The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements
for the consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its
competence. Such arrangements may be made with international organizations and, where appropriate,
with national organizations after consultation with the Member of the United Nations concerned."). See
generally United Nations Non-Governmental Liaison Service (NGLS), The NGLS Handbook of UN
Agencies, Programmes, and Funds Working for Economic and Social Development 6-7 (2d ed. 1997)
(describing the mechanism for consulting NGOs).
361
See Peter Willetts, The Rules of the Game: The United Nations and Civil Society, in Whose
World is it Anyway? 247, 258 (John W. Foster & Anita Anand eds., 1999). A search of the United
Nations Bibliographic Information System (the bibliography of the UN’s official library) confirms the
impression widely held among academics and policymakers. A search for the key word “civil society” for
the years 1984 through 2003 reveals the growing popularity of the term. From one document in 1984, the
yearly hits gradually increase to 29 in 1997 and then explode, with 80 in 1998, 101 in 1999, and 261 in
2003.
362
See generally John Keane, Global Civil Society? 169, 202 (2003) (putting forward pluralism and
solidarity arguments for international civil society); Michael Edwards, Civil Society 42-43 (2004) (setting
forth republican and communitarian justifications for international civil society).
363
See, e.g., Richard Falk, The World Order between Inter-State Law and the Law of Humanity: The
Role of Civil Society Institutions, in Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order 163,
170-71 (Daniele Archibugi & David Held eds., 1995); Mary Kaldor, ‘Civilizing’ Globalization? The
Implication of the ‘Battle in Seattle’, 29 Millennium J. Int’l Stud. 105 (2000); Keane, supra note 362, at
169, 202; Willetts, supra note 361, at 260.
364
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Report of the Trade and Development
Board on its fifteenth executive session, TD/B/EX (15)/9, Annex II (Aug. 11, 1997), available at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/tb15d9.en.pdf.
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The Commission was influenced by this reconceptualization of organizations
outside the state in adopting the consultation procedure for lawmaking proposals.
The evidence for this claim can be found in the origins of civil society talk within the
Commission. The Commission is composed of over thirty Directorate-Generals but
only three—the Directorate-Generals responsible for international trade,
development (international aid), and employment and social affairs—began to
conceive of their relations with private associations as relations with "civil society"
in the late 1990s. Departments such as DG Agriculture, DG Internal Market, and DG
Competition did not develop a civil society discourse even though they deal
routinely with intermediate associations of farmers, workers, firms, and consumers.
In other words, Commission departments with regular contacts with other
international organizations were far more likely than Commission departments
responsible for internal matters to adopt the language of civil society.365 And it was
their discourse that was subsequently taken on by the Commission as a whole. In the
White Paper that first proposed consultation for the entire Commission, the
Commission singled out the experiences of the trade and development departments:
"This [involving civil society] already happens in fields such as trade and
development, and has recently been proposed for fisheries."
The experience of DG Trade (international trade) most clearly demonstrates the
influence of the civil society concept. In October 1998, negotiations on the
Multilateral Agreement on Investment collapsed because of opposition from antiglobalization organizations.366 The response of the Trade Commissioner, Sir Leon
Brittan, was to organize a series of public meetings, open to all "civil society
organizations," starting in November 1998.367 At these meetings, issues related to the
upcoming Seattle WTO Ministerial were discussed (transparency, development, the
environment, investments, intellectual property, goods, and trade). The European
delegation to Seattle included representatives of labor, business, the environment,
farmers, and the development community. After the Seattle protests of December
1999 and the collapse of WTO negotiations, DG Trade instituted a more formal
version of the meetings held the previous year. Consultation—known initially as the
365
DG Employment first engaged in a “social dialogue” with labor and management organizations
pursuant to the mandate contained in the Maastricht Treaty arts. 137-39. Then, starting with the Social
Policy Forum in May 1996, DG Employment initiated a “civil dialogue” with non-profit organizations
and voluntary associations. See Stijn Smismans, European Civil Society: Shaped by Discourses and
Institutional Interests, 9 Eur. L.J. 473, 475-78 (2003) [hereinafter Smismans, Civil Society] (analyzing the
rise of civil society participation in DG Employment and Social Affairs). By 1998, DG Employment came
to refer to its interlocutors as part of “civil society.” See European Foundation for the Improvement of
Living and Working Conditions and the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Employment,
Industrial Relations and Social Affairs, Summary Report of the European Social Policy Forum 49 (1998)
(on file with author). The early adoption of civil society rhetoric in DG Employment does not support the
case for international influence since DG Employment deals largely with internal, European affairs.
However, the experience of the other two Directorate-Generals narrated in the text demonstrates that one
important strand in the Commission’s proceduralization of policymaking did draw upon developments in
the international realm.
366
See Mikel Muguruza, Civil Society and Trade Diplomacy in the “Global Age” (Sept. 2002),
available at http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/civil_soc/Civil_society_%20and_Trade_Policy_in_the_EU.pdf
(recounting this history).
367
E-mail from Eva Kaluzynksa, DG Trade, Civil Society Dialogue, to Francesca Bignami,
Associate Professor, Duke University School of Law (June 17, 2004) (stating that private associations
were called "civil society organizations" from the beginning of the dialogue).
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“Trade Policy Dialogue with EU Civil Society” and now as the “Civil Society
Dialogue” —includes periodic public meetings on trade issues and regular Internet
chats with the Trade Commissioner.
The popularity of civil society talk in the Commission's foreign aid departments
also supports the claim of international influence. The Commission has a long
history of distributing development aid through NGOs.368 Since 1975, the
Commission has also consulted NGOs on broader policy questions through the
Liaison Committee of NGOs, now known as CONCORD (European NGO
Confederation for Relief and Development). The relationship between the
Commission and NGOs is weighted toward the implementation, not the making, of
development policy.369 By the mid-1990s, the Commission's foreign aid departments
had dubbed non-governmental organizations "civil society."370
c. Supranational interest: The interest of the Commission in reclaiming political
standing
Civil society consultation served the interest of the Prodi Commission in
reestablishing credibility because it brought the Commission closer to the ideal of
good global governance.371 The strategic use of the concept was manifest in the
policy documents setting out the procedures for civil society consultation. A brief
excursion into theories on the role of language in political conflict is necessary to
understand fully the deployment of the civil society concept in the White Paper and,
later, the Communication on Consultation. The mechanism by which words and
ideas are used by actors like the Commission in struggles to define political authority
368

There are two ways in which NGOs can take responsibility for implementing European
international development aid. Since the 1970s, NGOs have been paid to distribute specific forms of aid
such as food aid. Since 1976, the Commission has co-financed projects proposed by NGOs (at least 15%
of the financing must come from the NGOs' own resources). See E-mail from France Marion, EuropeAid
Co-operation Office, European Commission, to Francesca Bignami, Associate Professor, Duke University
School of Law (Aug. 4, 2004) (on file with author); see also Agnès Philippart, The Relations between
NGDOs and the European Commission 1 (Oct. 2002) (executive summary of unpublished thesis) (on file
with author) (identifying the Lome Convention of 1975 as the first instance of Commission-NGO
partnership).
369
This characteristic of civil society relations, however, might be changing with recent Commission
efforts to secure more NGO participation in the initial stages of development policy. See Interview with
Peter Bangma, Civil Society and NGO Liaison, DG Development, European Commission (June 17,
2004); European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European
Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, Participation of Non-State Actors in EC
Development Policy, COM (02) 598 final (Nov. 2002).
370
See E-mail from France Marion, supra note 368 (stating that she believes that "civil society" was
used for the first time in the Lome IV Convention signed on 15 December 1989). The difference between
the agreement on aid to ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries of 1995 and that of 2000
documents this shift: the former refers to “non-governmental organizations,” the latter to “non-state
actors,” defined as the private sector, economic and social partners, and civil society (i.e., what formerly
would have been called NGOs). See Agreement Amending the Fourth ACP-EC Convention of Lomé,
Nov. 4, 1995, art. 38 (signed in Mauritius); ACP-EU Partnership Agreement, Jun. 23, 2000, arts. 6, 32
(signed
in
Cotonou),
available
at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/
development/body/cotonou/agreement_en.htm.
371
In a similar vein, Stijn Smismans argues persuasively that the Commission used the discourse on
civil society to improve its own democratic credentials and thus to respond to the legitimacy crisis that it
faced. See Smismans, Civil Society, supra note 365, at 484. However, Smismans does not focus on the
international element of the concept.
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has been analyzed by political theorists Quentin Skinner, James Tully, and Charles
Taylor, drawing on J.L. Austin's concept of "speech act."372 A statement made in the
context of the struggle to define, exercise, extend, or modify political authority
should be understood as action.373 It is not epiphenomenon. In the speech act theory
of language, authors use words to affirm or change the existing structure of
authoritative decisionmaking. Because language is deployed strategically by the
participants in political debate, it cannot be assumed that words are being used in
accordance with prevailing linguistic conventions: a political actor might use an old
word unconventionally or, albeit rare, might even coin a new word rather than work
within the limits of the existing linguistic conventions.
A couple of examples will buttress the point. Feminists such as Betty Friedan
have applied the old language of "exploitation" to the new category of middle-class
suburban housewives, thereby mounting a formidable challenge to existing
structures of patriarchy.374 In the literature pertaining to social movements, this
practice is identified as "framing." Thus Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink argue
that the international movement against female genital mutilation was able to place
the issue on the agenda of national governments and international organizations only
after it applied the language of "castration" to female genital mutilation, a radical
innovation given the previous use of the word "circumcision" to describe the very
same practice.375
How, then, did the Commission deploy the language of "civil society" in the
debate over the constitution of European public authority and reclaim a central role
for itself in the institutional balance of powers? First, what were previously
understood as "special interest groups,"376 "voluntary associations,"377 the "social
partners,"378and "lobbies"379 were redefined as "civil society organizations."
According to the Commission, the non-state actors that counted as "civil society"
included:
the labour-market players (i.e. trade unions and employers
federations—the 'social partners'); organisations representing
social and economic players, which are not social partners in the
strict sense of the term (for instance, consumer organisations);
NGOS (non-governmental organisations) which bring people
together in a common cause, such as environmental organisations,
human rights organisations, charitable organisations, educational
and training organisations, etc.; CBO's (community-based
372
See James Tully, The Pen is a Mighty Sword: Quentin Skinner's Analysis of Politics, in Meaning
and Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics 7, 10 (James Tully ed., 1988).
373
This is related to Wittgenstein's theory of word as "deed."
374
See Quentin Skinner, Language and Political Change, in Political Innovation and Conceptual
Change 6, 14 (Terrence Ball et al. eds., 1989) [hereinafter Skinner, Language].
375
Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 14, at 908.
376
See, e.g., Commission Communication on an Open and Structured Dialogue Between the
Commission and Special Interest Groups, 1993 O.J. (C 63) 2.
377
See European Commission, Communication from the Commission on Promoting the Role of
Voluntary Organisations and Foundations in Europe, COM (97) 241 final (1997).
378
See TEC arts. 137-39.
379
See European Parliament, Rules of Procedure, supra note 323, at Annex IX, 97 (“Provisions
governing the application of Rule 9(2)—Lobbying in Parliament”).
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organisations), i.e. organisations set up within society at grassroots
level which pursue member-oriented objectives, e.g. youth
organisations, family associations and all organisations through
which citizens participate in local and municipal life; and religious
communities.
So 'civil society organisations' are the principal structures of
society outside of government and public administration, including
economic operators not generally considered to be 'third sector' or
NGOs. The term has the benefit of being inclusive and
demonstrates that the concept of these organisations is deeply
rooted in the democratic traditions of the Member States of the
Union.380
The old word "civil society" and the new positive connotations of "civil society"—
developed in the rhetoric of the international sphere—were used to categorize a set
of social actors and government practices that were very familiar in European
politics yet were looked upon with suspicion by citizens of a number of Member
States and by some of the civil society actors themselves.381 With this definition, the
Commission recharacterized a set of long-standing interest organizations and
government practices that were the subject of debate and contention in Europe.
German citizens might deny a role in European governance for the World Federation
of Advertisers because they consider it an illegitimate lobby; British citizens might
object to the participation of the European Trade Union Conference because they
believe it to represent an antiquated social force; French citizens might oppose the
involvement of Caritas, the Vatican's charitable organization, because they consider
that such involvement would mix religion with public life. No citizen, however,
would say that "civil society" should be excluded.
In a related rhetorical step, the Commission embraced the prevailing theory of
civil society as good for democracy and global governance because private
associations foster transnational solidarities, contest power holders in government,
encourage republican participation in government, and promote communitarian
values. First, the White Paper:
Civil society plays an important role in giving voice to the concerns of
citizens and delivering services that meet people's needs. . . . The
organisations which make up civil society mobilise people and support,
for instance, those suffering from exclusion or discrimination.382

Another passage in the White Paper reads:

380
Communication on Consultation, supra note 338, at 6. The White Paper contains essentially the
same definition. See White Paper on Governance, supra note 356, at 14 n.9.
381
For the history of the concept, see Norberto Bobbio, Democracy and Dictatorship: The Nature
and Limits of State Power (Peter Kennealy trans., 1989); John Ehrenberg, Civil Society: The Critical
History of an Idea (1999); John Keane, Despotism and Democracy, in Civil Society and the State: New
European Perspectives 35 (John Keane ed., 1988).
382
White Paper on Governance, supra note 356, at 14.
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Civil society increasingly sees Europe as offering a good platform to
change policy orientations and society. This offers a real potential to
broaden the debate on Europe's role. It is a chance to get citizens more
actively involved in achieving the Union's objectives and to offer them a
structured channel for feedback, criticism and protest.383

The Communication on Consultation repeats the point:
The specific role of civil society organisations in modern democracies is
closely linked to the fundamental right of citizens to form associations in
order to pursue a common purpose as highlighted in Article 12 of the
European Charter of Fundamental Rights. Belonging to an association is
another way for citizens to participate actively, in addition to involvement
in political parties or through elections.384

The last move made by the Commission was to ally itself with civil society by
setting down a set of rules for consulting civil society in the policymaking process.
In the White Paper, the Commission promised that it would take the steps necessary
for "[i]nvolving civil society."385 It committed to "[m]ore effective and transparent
consultation"386 and "a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue."387 And, in
the follow-up Communication on Consultation, the Commission put forward fullblown standards for the routine, structured participation of civil society in drafting
policy initiatives.388
What then, might one ask, was the Commission doing by saying it would
consult "civil society"? No less than that it should continue to rule because it was
closer to the good government ideal of today.389 The overtly political nature of the
White Paper makes interpretation unnecessary. The Commission was explicit:
Better consultation and involvement, a more open use of expert advice
and a fresh approach to medium-term planning will allow it to consider
much more critically the demands from the Institutions and from interest
groups for new political initiatives. It [the Commission] will be better
placed to act in the general European interest.390

And hence, to finish the thought, the Commission should retain its position at the
epicenter of European integration:

383

Id. at 14-15.
Communication on Consultation, supra note 338, at 5.
385
White Paper on Governance, supra note 356, at 14.
386
Id. at 15.
387
Id. at 16.
388
See supra text accompanying note 338-50.
389
To translate this into speech act theory, this is a sequence of illocutionary and perlocutionary acts.
When a person says "The door is open" to someone else she may be requesting that the other person close
the door (illocutionary act). If she actually gets the hearer to close the door, she has performed a
perlocutionary act. Speech Act Theory, in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 869 (Robert Audi ed.,
2d ed. 1999).
390
See White Paper on Governance, supra note 356, at 33-34.
384
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Both the proposals in the White Paper and the prospect of further
enlargement lead in one direction: a reinvigoration of the Community
method. This means ensuring that the Commission proposes and executes
policy; the Council and the European Parliament takes decisions; and
national and regional actors are involved in the EU policy process.391

One final point. That the civil society idea was adopted by the Commission
for the strategic reason of reclaiming political standing after the resignation of the
Santer Commission does not bear upon the normative analysis of civil society
participation. To be blunt, civil society is not superstructure.392 In seeking to defend
the Community method and reclaim authority, the Commission had to work within
certain parameters of democratic discourse. The Commission could not say "obey
me because I represent divine authority on earth." Nor could it say "obey me because
I represent a European nation bound together by a common blood and a common
language." Rather, it had to say, "obey me because I am democratic." Civil society,
as one variation of "I am democratic," is not an infinitely malleable concept.
Although the precise definition of the term is hotly disputed in the different arenas of
global governance, all are in agreement that civil society excludes corporations in
their profit-seeking guise. Furthermore, the revival of civil society in the 1990s was
accompanied by an understanding of the values served by voluntary associations and
their participation in public affairs: transnational solidarities, pluralism, republican
citizenship, and community. The Commission, in consulting civil society, was, and
continues to be, constrained by this set of judgments. Because "consultation of civil
society" cannot be stretched to accommodate, for instance, European regulatory
policy dictated by a single profit-seeking corporation, it is an idea with autonomous
force that must be evaluated on its own merits.
3. The evolution of the right to civil society participation
In fall of 1999, at the same time that the Commission began the good
governance exercise that culminated in the White Paper, the Prodi Commission was
influential in setting into motion another chain of events that produced one of the
major innovations of the recent Constitutional Treaty—an article on the right of civil
society to participate in European governance. One of the precursors to the
Constitutional Treaty was the Charter of Fundamental Rights, approved by the
391

Id. at 34.
See Skinner, Language, supra note 374, at 10-13. The use of language in contemporary political
theory underscores my insistence on attributing moral force to the idea of civil society, independent of the
strategic reasons that led to its adoption. According to Skinner, words can be broken down into their
sense, reference, and evaluative force. Sense is the abstract criteria for applying a word, reference is the
range of factual circumstances to which the word applies, and evaluative force is the range of attitudes,
positive or negative, expressed by the word. The sense and reference of words are routinely manipulated
by social actors so that they may benefit from their appraisative force. At the same time, because the
vocabulary available to social actors is limited and meaning can be stretched only so far, social actors are
also constrained by words. Skinner gives the example of Elizabethan merchants who describe their
commercial activities as "religious," in the attempt to give trade the same status as other forms of
economic activity, for instance landholding. Trade and the accumulation of wealth were a far cry from the
activities to which "religious" routinely referred. Nonetheless, Elizabethan merchants could not engage in
any type of trade, rather they had to be conscientious, punctual, and fair in their trading relations to adopt
the label of "religious."
392
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European Council at Nice in December 2000.393 The process that culminated in the
Charter of Fundamental Rights was begun under the German presidency of the
European Council in spring 1999. The Charter was not intended to introduce new
rights. Rather, it was conceived as a means of improving the legitimacy of Europe
by enhancing the visibility of rights already enjoyed by European citizens in their
relations with European government.394
In line with this purpose, the European Council designed an inclusive and open
process. When drafting began in fall of 1999, the participants include a number of
actors that had been excluded from the high politics of European treaty negotiations
in the past: representatives of the European Parliament and national parliaments were
given membership on the drafting body ("Convention"), alongside the Member
States and the Commission; representatives of the Court of Justice and Council of
Europe395 were given observer status.396 Furthermore, the European Council
instructed the Convention to seek the opinions of the Economic and Social
Committee, the Committee of the Regions, and the Ombudsman and to conduct its
affairs as openly as possible. Significantly, the European Council did not carve out a
role for voluntary associations.397 At that historical moment, "civil society" had not
yet acquired the salience that it now enjoys in European politics. The Convention,
however, allowed NGOs to take part in the deliberative process: NGO
representatives spoke at a number of public hearings and were allowed to submit
their proposals and critiques on a Convention website.398 The Commission,
consistent with the strategic decision in the White Paper to govern with civil society,
strongly supported including civil society organizations.
The earlier experience with the Charter of Fundamental Rights led to a formal
role for civil society in the Constitutional Convention. And it was because of the
suggestion of civil society representatives at that Convention that the Constitutional
Treaty now contains a far-reaching right to civil society consultation. In December
2001, the Laeken European Council decided to create the Convention responsible for
drawing up the Constitutional Treaty. The Convention was composed of 102
members and 102 alternates, chosen by national governments, national parliaments,
393
See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1. The rights set
down under the Charter only apply to European, not national, government bodies and are not officially
binding on European government bodies.
394
See Gráinne de Búrca, The Drafting of the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights, 26
Eur. L. Rev. 126, 128-32 (2001) [hereinafter Búrca, Drafting].
395
The Council of Europe is a separate international organization, headquartered in Strasbourg, that
is charged with enforcing the European Convention on Human Rights.
396
Indeed, it is clear that notwithstanding the name of the document, the drafting of the Charter was
not believed to be an episode of high politics. It was taken by the European Council to be mainly a
codification exercise and one that would culminate in a symbolic, rather than a legally binding, statement
of rights.
397
Búrca, Drafting, supra note 394, at 132 (analyzing the Tampere European Council conclusions of
October 1999). The European Council, however, encouraged the Convention to invite “other bodies,
social groups or experts” to give their views.
398
The European Charter of Fundamental Rights, available at http://perso.wanadoo.fr/
ciemi.org/p17en.html (n.d.) (discussing first public hearing in December 1999); Antonio Vittorino,
Member of the European Commission and representative of the European Commission to the Convention,
Speech Delivered in Lisbon, Portugal, at 5 (May 13, 2000), a v a i l a b l e
at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/unit/charte/en/speeches.html (discussing hearing of Apr. 26, 1999
attended by more than 70 NGOs).
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the European Parliament, and the Commission.399 Alongside the Convention was a
Forum for civil society organizations. The Forum consisted of a website, open to all
voluntary organizations, on which drafts of the Constitutional Treaty were published
and on which comments and proposed amendments from members of the public
could be posted.400 The function of the Forum was purely advisory. The Praesdium,
led by a Chairman (Giscard d'Estaing), two Vice-Chairmen (Giuliano d'Amato and
Jean Luc Dehaene) and composed of nine members drawn from the Convention, set
the agenda and drafted proposals for the consideration of the Convention and the
Forum.
The early months were devoted to soliciting views from members of the
Convention, what d'Estaing called the "listening stage."401 In this context, a meeting
of civil society organizations was held in Brussels on June 24-25, 2002.402 There,
Joseph Bresch, the President of the Economic and Social Committee, put forward the
suggestion that the Constitutional Treaty provide for the principle of participatory
democracy—including civil society participation.403 A skeleton outline of the
Constitutional Treaty was then circulated and posted on the Convention's website in
the fall of 2002.404 The drafters anticipated a provision on "participatory democracy"
which would guarantee that: "The Institutions are to ensure a high level of openness,
permitting citizens' organizations of all kinds to play a full part in the Union's
affairs."405 Anyone, including individuals, voluntary associations, and interest
organizations could submit comments on the draft, which were also posted on the
Convention's website. They did, and many called for a duty on the part of the
European institutions to consult civil society in policy planning and
decisionmaking.406 The more complete draft released on April 2, 2003 included an
article on participatory democracy very similar to the final version, in which civil
society organizations were given a right of participation in the decisionmaking of
European institutions.407 Thus, the provision in the Constitutional Treaty was tied to
399
See Organisation of the European Convention, at http://european-convention.eu.int/
organisation.asp?lang=EN. See generally Peter Norman, The Accidental Constitution: The Story of the
European Convention 19-48 (2003) [hereinafter Norman, Accidental Constitution] (describing the
structure of the Convention).
400
See Forum of the European Convention, at http://europa.eu.int/futurum/forum_
convention/index_en.htm.
401
See Norman, The Accidental Constitution, supra note 399, at 48.
402
Id. at 50.
403
Alain Lamassoure, Histoire Secrète de la Convention Européene 122 (2004).
404
Id. at 71.
405
Id. at 131.
406
See, e.g, Active Citizenship Network, “Horizontal” Subsidiarity, Democratic Governance and
Referendum, available at http://europa.eu.int/futurum/forum_convention/documents/contrib/other/ 0100_
r_en.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2005); BirdLife International European Community Office et al.,Concerning:
Participatory Democracies, Suggestions for Amendments to Article 34 and 36 (Apr. 9, 2003), available at
http://europa.eu.int/futurum/forum_convention/documents/contrib/other/0058_c9_en.pdf.
407
The final version of the Constitutional Treaty was signed by all members of the Convention on
July 10, 2003, presented to the Italian Presidency of the European Council on July 18, 2003, and agreed to
by the European Council, with a few modifications (which do not affect the article on civil society
consultation), on June 18, 2004. The Constitutional Treaty must now be ratified by all 25 Member States.
See Information Note from the Secretariat to the Convention, CONV 852/03 (July 18, 2003), available at
http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/03/cv00/cv00852en03.pdf; European Commission, Summary of the
Agreement on the Constitutional Treaty (June 28, 2004), available at http://europa.eu.int/futurum/
documents/other/oth250604_2_en.pdf.
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the structure of the Convention, namely the Forum for civil society organizations,
which in turn was based on the decision to include citizen groups in drafting the
Charter of Fundamental Rights. In other words, the decision to attribute
constitutional status to civil society participation was linked directly to the
Commission's bid in fall 1999 to improve its democratic credentials and re-establish
institutional stature by trumpeting civil society.
The provision dedicated to relations between European institutions and civil
society says:
Article I-47: The principle of participatory democracy
1. The Union Institutions shall, by appropriate means, give citizens and
representative associations the opportunity to make known and publicly
exchange their views on all areas of Union action.
2. The Union Institutions shall maintain an open, transparent and regular
dialogue with representative associations and civil society.
3. The Commission shall carry out broad consultations with parties
concerned in order to ensure that the Union's actions are coherent and
transparent.
....

Accompanying the first appearance of Article I-47, were comments explicitly
connecting participatory democracy with civil society: "The purpose of this Article
is to provide a framework and content for the dialogue which is largely already in
place between the institutions and civil society."408
Unlike the provisions of the Constitutional Treaty on the right to good
administration and the right to transparency, which largely codify existing law,
Article I-47 both elevates civil society consultation to the rank of higher law and
extends the right to a host of new areas. Insofar as the Commission is concerned,
Article I-47 converts what was previously an administrative practice set down in a
non-binding policy document into a constitutionally guaranteed procedure. With
respect to other European institutions, the provision creates an entirely novel set of
rights and duties. The duty to engage in “dialogue” and the duty to give citizens and
their associations an opportunity to make their views known were good government
principles originally developed by the Commission, for the Commission; the
Constitutional Treaty transforms these duties into a general principle of democracy
applicable to all European institutions.
The turning point for European rights that started in 1999 with the resignation of
the Santer Commission has still not come to a close. A number of basic questions
continue to surround the right to civil participation and will probably not be resolved
until the Constitutional Treaty is ratified (or not), the first legal challenges are
brought to European measures on the ground that the principle of participatory
democracy was violated, and the first legislative measures are taken to give effect to
the principle. Among the most significant questions that remain open are: Will the
right be legally binding and enforceable in the European Courts or will it be
interpreted as a programmatic article, that is, a right that European public officials
408
See Note from Praesidum to Convention, CONV 650/03, at 8 (Apr. 2, 2003), available at
http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/03/cv00/cv00650en03.pdf.
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are bound to respect and uphold in their activities but that is not judicially
enforceable?409 What types of Commission measures are subject to the duty to
consult–only European laws or also implementing regulations? If implementing
regulations, all of them or only the most significant ones? Finally, how will the right
of civil society participation be construed in the different institutional settings of
adjudication by the European Courts, intergovernmental bargaining in the Council of
Ministers and the European Council, and technical administration and informationgathering in the European agencies? The coming years promise to be eventful ones
for the right to civil society participation.
4. European value: Civil society in European and global governance compared
The Commission drew from the international realm when it set into motion the
civil society phase of European governance. None of the Member States had a
developed discourse on the importance of civil society for good government or a
procedure, applicable to all lawmaking, in which citizens and associations were
systematically invited to comment on early drafts of legislation. Yet the civil society
ideal in the international realm was nebulous. Unlike the right to a hearing and
transparency—public law principles that had been elaborated in the thick
institutional space of the nation-state—global governance rhetoric left the
Commission with significant latitude in designing the organizational changes that
would constitute governing with civil society. But this latitude was illusory. Like
the two previous episodes of rights transformation, national public law traditions
shaped European change: corporatist relations between public bodies and private
interest organizations.
The European right to civil society participation differs in two critical respects
from the international right. First, the understanding of civil society is different. In
the international realm, "civil society" generally refers to NGOs that seek social or
environmental justice, not associations of firms or workers whose agendas are
informed by their market activities.410 Moreover, internationally, the term covers an
extremely fluid set of private associations. And an association qualifies just by virtue
of being an organization that is one step removed from the institutions of
government. As long as a group has a name, an e-mail address, and a core of
activists, it counts as civil society. In the European Union, as in international
organizations, civil society means NGOs.411 But it also embraces producer groups
such as farmers, employer associations, sectoral industry groups, labor unions, and
409
See Sloman Neptun Schiffarts AG v. Seebetriebsrat Bodo Ziesemer, Cases C-72/91 & 73/91,
1993 E.C.R. I-887, at I-934 – I-936 (discussing distinction between programmatic and other types of
provisions of the treaties).
410
For instance, the World Bank uses civil society “to refer to the wide array of non-governmental
and not-for-profit organizations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of
their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic
considerations.” See World Bank Group, Defining Civil Society, at http://web.worldbank.org/
WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/CSO/0,,contentMDK%3A20101499~menuPK%3A244752~pagePK%3
A220503~piPK%3A220476~theSitePK%3A228717,00.html (last visited on Mar. 9, 2005). Associations
based on market-related activities are expressly excluded from the definition.
411
See generally Stijn Smismans, Law, Legitimacy, and European Governance: Functional
Participation in Social Regulation 42-52 (2004) (comparing American and European understandings of
civil society).
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professional associations. Furthermore, civil society in Commission documents and
the Constitutional Treaty signifies a fixed reality of organizations that represent
functional interests, religious traditions (churches), and political values. It refers to a
self-contained universe of labor unions, employer organizations, consumer
federations, umbrella environmental organizations, anti-discrimination groups,
political liberties associations, and churches. Finally, to count as a civil society
organization in Europe, an association is expected to have a membership base, a
physical address with offices, and a bit of history.
Europe's different understanding of civil society is directly tied to the
Commission's strategic use of the international discourse in the old institutional
setting of European corporatist interest representation.412 The Commission borrowed
its definition of civil society from the corporatist European institution par excellence,
the Economic and Social Committee. That definition, unsurprisingly, reflected the
Economic and Social Committee’s own model of interest representation.413
Similarly, the new, central database of Commission organizations with civil society
representation is a compilation of previously existing advisory bodies, many of
which can trace their roots to the 1960s.414 I do not wish to suggest that civil society
is only a label and that nothing has changed in the relationship between European
institutions and the public. Certainly, the civil society concept brought with it a
commitment to consult a wider array of non-state organizations, organizations with a
broader set of concerns than the old peak producer associations. Yet, still, these new
associational actors must fit a distinctly European mold. Before the Commission will
take their claims seriously, private associations must demonstrate a long-standing
role in national politics or they must show that they reach out to a significant number
of Europeans through their membership activities.
The second major difference between the European right to civil society
participation and the international right is the breadth of organizational change that
has occurred to accommodate civil society. The consultation procedure adopted by
the Commission is more comprehensive than the institutional practices of any other
major international economic organization. Among these, the World Bank has gone
the furthest. But even the World Bank’s procedures do not match those of the
Commission: they do not stretch across the board to all policy areas, they do not
entail the same, weighty sequence of publication, public comments, and official
explanation, and they are not legally binding.415 The participation that can be
expected once (and if) the Constitutional Treaty is ratified and Article I-47 takes
effect, will surpass wildly anything that exists in the international realm. As with the
412

See supra text accompanying note 336-37, 427.
See White Paper on Governance, supra note 356, at 14 n.9 (quoting from Opinion of the
Economic and Social Committee on "[t]he role and contribution of civil society organisations in the
building of Europe," 1999 O.J. (C329) 39). The Nice Treaty of 2000 subsequently confirmed this
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Committee shall consist of representatives of the various economic and social components of organised
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Bank civil society policies) (last visited on Mar. 9, 2005).
413

336

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN LAW

[Vol. 11

previous episodes of rights creation, the Commission did not simply borrow
constitutional models; rather it constructed a rights scheme that was more extensive
than in the place of origin.
IV. THE THEORIES AND THE EVIDENCE
This historical experience highlights two important elements of an explanation
of European rights: national legal traditions and contingent, historical circumstances
that put obstacles in the way of the strategic interests of European institutions. In all
three cases, normative understandings of good government developed within the
confines of the nation-state were extremely influential in shaping the new rights and
procedures that emerged to structure public authority in the post-national setting.
The right to a hearing and the right to transparency were clearly driven by
individuals with allegiances to their national constitutional symbols and practices.
The right to civil society participation was more complex: the Commission adopted a
normative discourse of good government that had been developed outside Europe,
yet precisely because institutions and social understandings in the international realm
were so ill-defined, old European values quickly took over. National legal traditions
spurred and constrained rights innovation. Spurred because they served as the basis
for the initial design and subsequent transformation of procedural rights before the
Commission. Constrained because rights that were foreign to the European
normative toolkit were less likely to succeed even though they might have been
strategically advantageous to certain citizens and public officials.
These three cases also demonstrate the importance of changing political
circumstances in shaping the rights-based strategies adopted by European
institutions to advance their preference for supranationalism and greater powers.
Accession of a new Member State, one Member State's failure to ratify a treaty, and
confrontation between two supranational bodies—the European Parliament and the
Santer Commission—resulted in far-reaching rights innovation. Each time, rights
operated as a context-specific strategy to advance the underlying institutional
preference for supranational authority: the interest of the Court of Justice and the
Commission in enforcing their decisions; of Heads of State in securing ratification of
their hard-fought political deals contained in the Maastricht Treaty; of the Parliament
in improving its legislative powers; and of the Commission in remaining the engine
of European integration.
In Part II, I presented three theories of European rights and constitutional
change and I derived specific hypotheses for procedural rights before the
Commission. Legal constitutionalism, realism, and neo-functionalism generate
predictions on a number of dimensions of rights: the bundle of rights that individuals
enjoy, the timing of rights creation, and the European institution responsible for
advocating rights. How do these theories fare when matched against the pattern of
institutional change that has occurred over time? And how can my analysis suggest
revisions of these theories, each of which, as I argue below, fails to account for
critical aspects of European rights?
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A. Legal Constitutionalism
Legal constitutionalists begin from the premise that constitutional designers are
motivated by universal principles of democracy and justice and that the
constitutional rules adopted by conventions and courts further those principles.
Hanns Peter Nehl's work best exemplifies this approach in the context of the
European Commission. Given the normative underpinnings of this form of
scholarship, the forward-looking element of the theory combines the positive "will"
with the normative "should"; therefore, it is difficult to discern the concrete mix of
rights Nehl believes a constitution designer will (and should) protect at a given
historical moment. His analysis, however, does produce expectations as to which
institutions will press for rights in the administrative process and when they will do
so. First, given that their professional and institutional mission is inextricably woven
with higher principles of justice, judges should be the most receptive to claims that
European administration is unfair and illegitimate. Bureaucrats, by contrast, can be
expected to focus on getting the work of administration done. In other words,
procedural rights should be driven by the case law of the European Courts. Second,
such rights should emerge as soon as the Commission begins exercising different
types of power and private parties go to courts to complain that it was exercised
unfairly.
In the case of the right to a hearing in individualized Commission proceedings,
Nehl's expectations as to the institutional proponent of the right are mostly borne out
by the historical record. The Court of Justice set down the right to a hearing in
competition proceedings and then extended the right to other areas of Commission
administration in which private parties could show that they were similarly
burdened. Yet the late arrival of the right—eight years after the first competition
case was decided—and the Commission's entrepreneurship in undertaking
organizational change are difficult to explain.
The events that pose significant difficulties for legal constitutionalism are the
rise of the right to transparency and civil society participation. Many years before
they became standard elements of European rights discourse, individual litigants had
made functionally similar claims before the Court of Justice. But their claims were
rejected. For instance, Nehl narrates a case from 1984 in which a trader vindicated,
unsuccessfully, the right of access to documents.416 In Tradax Graanhandel BV v.
Commission, a Dutch importer of maize challenged a duty ("levy") assessed as part
of the European price support scheme for agricultural commodities. Rather than
challenge the implementing regulation setting down the duty, the Dutch importer
requested the information that had been used to make the calculations that resulted in
the duty. The Commission turned down the Dutch importer's request and, when
Tradax went to the Court of Justice, both the Advocate General and the Court
dismissed the claim.
Tradax argued for the documents based on a general principle of good
administration—a principle evidenced by access-to-documents legislation existing in
a number of Member States. Tradax also claimed that the right to a hearing, which
afforded parties the right to documents in competition proceedings, should also
416

Tradax Graanhandel BV v. Commission, Case 64/82, 1984 E.C.R. 1359.
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apply to a business affected by an implementing regulation.417 Neither the Advocate
General nor the Court was persuaded. The reasoning of the Advocate General
illustrates the limits of judges and fairness doctrines in reforming administration:
Nor does it seem to me that there is any general or absolute principle of
Community law, as is suggested, which requires information to be
disclosed by the institutions of the Community to persons affected by
Community acts in the absence of express provision and in the absence of
litigation. The provisions of the laws of Member States which have been
cited requiring disclosure of information in the possession of
governments, in the interests of more open government, may support an
argument that there should be specific or general measures laying down
some rules. It does not seem to me to establish a general principle of
"unwritten law" which aids the applicants in this case. Moreover, the fact
that in competition and staff cases the Court has recognized that, before a
decision is taken affecting an individual he has a right to be heard and to
know the case against him, does not seem to me to lead to the conclusion
that after a levy is fixed for all traders (since it is not contended that there
is a right to the information before the levy is fixed) the information must
be given to individual traders.418

A Dutch litigant, subscribing to values and ideals formed through experience in
the Dutch system of open government, was unable to persuade the Court to adopt an
access-to-documents rule.419 It was only after Maastricht, the declarations of
European Heads of State in fall of 1992, and the enactment of the first Commission
access to document rules in 1993 and 1994, that the Court began enforcing a right of
access to documents to the benefit of traders in situations almost identical to that of
Tradax.420
The same unsuccessful testing of legal theories before the Court of Justice has
occurred in the sphere of civil society participation. The primary doctrinal candidate
for obtaining, through the Court of Justice, the functional equivalent of the right to
participation is the duty to give reasons under Article 190, now 253, of the EC
Treaty.421 A requirement that the Commission respond to the objections of interested
parties in the statement of reasons supporting a law or regulation would approximate
the explanatory memorandum that the Commission now issues in civil society
consultations. Yet the Court has always rejected the claim that the Commission is

417
Tradax also claimed the right to information based on the doctrines of legal certainty and
legitimate expectations, on the theory that an individual should be able to check that the law was rightfully
applied by examining the information and reasoning used by the administration in promulgating an
implementing regulation. Id. at 1369-70.
418
Id. at 1386 (opinion of Advocate General Gordon Slynn).
419
Another case in which the litigants attempted, unsuccessfully, to make creative use of the right to
a hearing to obtain documents that now may be requested under the right to transparency is Bureau
Européen des Unions de Consommateurs, 1991 E.C.R. at I-5740, I-5741.
420
See Rothmans, 1999 E.C.R. at II-2463; Case T-111/00, British American Tobacco International,
2001 E.C.R. at II-2997.
421
In the case of implementing regulations, the deciding institution is the Commission. In the case
of laws, the deciding institutions are the Parliament and Council acting on a Commission proposal.
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obliged to engage in an exchange of views with the European public before
proposing laws and adopting regulations.422
As far as the anticipated timing of rights is concerned, legal constitutionalist
theory also disappoints. The Commission has always possessed the power to adopt
rules and propose laws and it has exercised this power since the 1960s. Yet,
notwithstanding the objections from individual litigants chronicled above, until
recently the Commission exercised such powers free of any duty to disclose
documents or to engage in an exchange of views with civil society. Only in 1993 and
then in 2002 did such rights and obligations come into being. In sum, it appears that
even though judges are moved by complaints of oppressive government action, they
will only go as far as required by their pre-existing, national understandings of rights
and their need to obtain the cooperation of national courts for enforcement purposes.
Turning to the social mechanism underlying the legal constitutionalist account,
the historical record supports the contention that individuals advance values—as
opposed to self-interested preferences—when they design constitutional rules.423 The
most telling piece of evidence in support of this claim is the over-representation of
citizens from northern countries in designing European transparency rules. Were
transparency simply a mode of maximizing preferences for political power
(parliamentarians) or material well-being (litigants), then we would expect all
Europeans, regardless of their countries of origin, to use and advance the European
right to transparency.424 But that has not been the European experience. Swedes,
Finns, Danes, and the Dutch significantly outnumber the French, Italians, Spaniards,
and other nationalities in the transparency area.
Yet this very same evidence points to a significant weakness in the legal
constitutionalist account: what is thought to be morally right is not universal but
varies based on historical experiences with law and government within the nationstate. Furthermore, in the emerging European polity, the mode through which certain
422
See e.g. Firma G. Schwarze v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle f_r Getreid und Futtermittel, Case 16/65,
1965 E.C.R. 1081 (challenge to agriculture implementing regulation based on duty to give reasons); P.
Moskof AE v. Ethnikos Organismos Kapnou, Case C-244/95, 1997 E.C.R. I-6441 (challenge to
agriculture implementing regulation based on duty to give reasons); Commission v. Jégo Quéré SA, Case
C-263/02 P, 2002 O.J. (C 233) 14 (challenge to fishing implementation regulation based on Commission’s
duty to take into consideration different interests under TEC art. 30, previous involvement of the parties,
and right to be heard). Nehl is correct to observe that, in the context of Commission decisions on whether
to pursue a complaint against a Member State for a breach of the Treaty prohibition on state aids, the
Court requires the Commission to respond to specific concerns raised in the original complaint. This it
does based on the duty to give reasons, together with the duty “in the interests of sound administration of
the fundamental rules of the Treaty relating to State aid, to conduct a diligent and impartial examination of
the complaint.” See Nehl, supra note 31, at 160-63 (discussing Commission v. Chambre Syndicale
Nationale des Enterprises de Transport de Fonds et Valeurs (Sytraval) & Brink’s France SARL, Case C367/95 P, 1998 E.C.R. I-1719 (Sytraval II)). However, this use of the duty to give reasons to require the
Commission to engage in a consultation-like procedure is closely tied to the existence of a complaint
procedure established under European law, permitting competitor firms to alert the Commission of illegal
state subsidies. See Council Regulation 659/1999, 1999 O.J. (L 83) 1, 7 (laying down detailed rules for
the application of art. 93 of the EC Treaty).
423
See generally Daniel Steel, Social Mechanisms and Causal Inference, 34 Phil. Soc. Sci. 55, 57-59
(defining social mechanism).
424
See generally Liesbet Hooghe, Several Roads Lead to International Norms: But Few Via
International Socialization: A Case Study of the European Commission, 59 Int'l Org. 8 (2005) (describing
theories of action based on norms and theories of action based on utility maximization and discussing
modes of empirically distinguishing between the two).
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national constitutional values are adopted as European ones departs from the
persuasion mechanism central to the legal constitutionalist model. In each
generation, rights served as instruments for co-opting recalcitrant constituencies;
they were not the product of debate involving all European citizens in which
agreement was reached as to which rights were best.425
This revision of legal accounts of constitutional design has important
implications for the normative ambitions at the heart of such theories. When
assessing whether European rights meet standards of fairness and justice, it is
important to understand first the extent to which such standards are commonly
shared. The experience with rights before the Commission shows a propensity
towards national bias which can color the process of constructing and criticizing
constitutional rules. Moreover, the strategic adoption of rights cautions against
taking their emergence as evidence that the new European polity is adapting to the
demands of democracy and fairness. Whether this is the case should be a matter of
critical, inclusive deliberation and persuasion. The mere existence of a new right or
constitutional rule does not reveal whether such normative criteria have been
fulfilled.
B. Realism
In a realist approach, state interests and the balance of power among states
should shape the rules through which European institutions govern. One plausible
account in the procedural domain is that states seek to protect the well-being of their
own citizens from arbitrary government action by transposing their national patterns
of individual rights and public duties to the European Commission.
Intergovernmental bargaining should produce a set of rights faithful to those existing
in the most powerful Member States.
From the beginnings of European integration to the present day, France and
Germany have occupied the position of the two most powerful Member States,
notwithstanding the many waves of accession.426 A realist, therefore, would expect
European citizens to enjoy the rights that French and German citizens are guaranteed
under their domestic constitutions and laws. Moreover, in the power politics
approach, rights should be promoted by Member States and they should be set down
in treaties and laws negotiated by Member States. Lastly, the timing of rights should
track historically the conferral of powers upon the Commission, since states should
only want to protect their citizens from arbitrary government action once they
perceive that the Commission had the power to impose it.
The power politics explanation is persuasive in the early days of the
Commission. The first area in which the Commission exercised direct enforcement
powers was competition law. The opportunity to be heard was set down in a Council
regulation and the details of the hearing—the right to be notified of the
Commission's evidence and arguments and to object in writing and in person—was
425

See generally Rawi Abdelai, Mark Blyth, and Craig Parsons, Constructivist Political Economy
(Jan. 14, 2005) (paper on file with author) (identifying persuasion, manipulation, and socialization as three
mechanisms through which norms are constructed).
426
See Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to
Maastricht 137, 374 (1998).
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set down in a Commission regulation. The Commission was also required to give a
statement of the reasons supporting the final competition decision under Article 190
of the Treaty of Rome. This conformed to French competition procedure (notice, a
right to reply in writing, and a reasoned opinion of the Technical Commission on
Cartels and Dominant Positions) and German competition procedure (the same plus
the right to an oral hearing). The institutional advocates of rights also match
expectations: the basic framework was set down by the states that negotiated the
Treaty of Rome and the Council Regulation. And the anticipated timing is
historically accurate: as soon as the Commission was given direct enforcement
powers (Council Regulation of 1962) it was also required to respect basic rights
(Council Regulation of 1962 and Commission Regulation of 1963).
However, by the time the Court of Justice recognized a general right to a
hearing in 1974, the realist model loses explanatory power. The right was drawn not
from France, Germany, or even a majority legal tradition, but from the UK.
Especially in the early years after accession, as the UK was adjusting to the different
conditions of Community membership, she had little power compared to France and
Germany. Furthermore, the right was established by supranational institutions—the
Court of Justice and, to a lesser extent, the Commission—and emerged at a time
when no change in the Commission’s powers had occurred.
The same initial consistency with, followed by departure from, the power
politics approach is true of transparency and civil society participation. Before 1993,
individuals did not have a right to documents, as in the majority, closed government
tradition, which included France and Germany. After 1993, the predictions falter, for
the right came from Member States that were powerless as a matter of their
economies and populations (Denmark and the Netherlands), was established by
supranational institutions (the European Council after the Maastricht Treaty had
been signed and the European Parliament), and was introduced well after the
Commission had come to exercise significant rulemaking and lawmaking powers
independent of the Member States.427
Likewise, before 2002, public participation in rulemaking and lawmaking
followed the majority corporatist model of consulting advisory bodies on which
select interest organizations were represented. The Economic and Social Committee
was established in the Treaty of Rome and advisory committees were set down in a
number of European laws that dated to the 1960s and 1970s. Thus, both forms of
interest representation were promoted by the Member States, and promoted at the
time that the Commission was first given rulemaking and lawmaking powers. After
2002, while the understanding of which actors constituted the public retained the
original corporatist bent, the procedure for consulting interests, as well as the types
of private associations that were consulted, became significantly more inclusive.
Furthermore, the institutional proponent of the new right to civil society participation
427

By 1986, with the introduction of qualified majority voting for harmonization measures in the
Single European Act, the Commission had the power to act contrary to the wishes of Member States and,
by extension, their citizens. Before 1986, Member States might have believed that they could control
Commission rulemaking and lawmaking through unanimity voting on comitology committees and the
Council. In the isolated areas where such checks did not exist—in the nooks and crannies of the
management of agricultural prices and customs duties—Member States might have believed that
decisions were simply too technical to be able to arbitrarily harm the economic well-being of their
citizens.
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was the supranational Commission. Finally, the appearance of the right did not occur
at a time when the Member States transferred new powers to the Commission.
This historical pattern is revealing. A power politics approach can account for
the procedural baseline that existed before each of the historical challenges that
prompted organizational change and new rights. Thus what was a plausible, but not
necessary, set of assumptions—states seek to protect the well-being of their citizens
before international institutions by transferring their domestic rights to the
international realm—finds support in the historical record. Moreover, a fairly crude
balance of power analysis can account for outcomes when national laws and
procedures conflict. Even though open government Netherlands was an original
member of the European Community (and adopted access to documents legislation
in 1978) and even though Denmark acceded in 1973 (Denmark’s original legislation
dates to 1970), the two states were too small and insignificant to transfer their public
law of transparency to European institutions. However, once sovereignty was
transferred and momentum for European integration got underway, supranational
institutions became the primary agents of rights innovation. Here I use the term
"supranational institution" loosely: not only institutions that are conventionally
defined as such, namely the Commission, the Court of Justice, and the European
Parliament, but also the Member States on the European Council after a bargain had
been reached in the Maastricht Treaty. The evidence does not shed light on why
supranational institutions took the lead: did they anticipate a preference among
Member States for the highest-common-denominator system of rights (regardless, a
preference that does not fit with the realist account), did national governments
perceive rights before the Commission as a technical area for legal experts, were
Member State preferences transformed by the actions of European institutions, or did
Member States lose control to European institutions? But, for whatever reason, the
Member States did not attempt to reassert control over rights before the
Commission.428
C. Neo-Functionalism
Neo-functionalist theories of Europe, like realist ones, assume self-interested
preferences and strategic, utility-maximizing behavior but they identify
supranational institutions rather than inter-state bargains as the critical force behind
European integration. Martin Shapiro has come the closest to articulating a neofunctionalist view of constitutional innovation in the Commission. Shapiro employs
a rational choice approach in which litigants, with the money to hire lawyers and an
interest in avoiding administrative action, challenge Commission decisions on novel
legal theories and judges, driven by competence-expanding, activist tendencies, rule
in their favor. His account also includes anti-technocracy, pro-democracy values and
the internal logic of legal doctrine. These value-driven premises, however,
complement the rational choice ones: all point in the direction of an ever-expanding
bag of procedural rights.

428
It should be recalled that the Council attempted to dilute the transparency guarantees in the
Access to Documents Law, but only for rights before the Council, not the Commission.
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According to Shapiro, procedural rights before the Commission should
gradually come to approximate those under American administrative law. The
institutional advocate of rights should be the Court of Justice, since judges are
interested in expanding their powers, as well as in remaining faithful to the doctrinal
demands of the duty to give reasons and the political demands of protecting litigants
(and democracy) against overweening bureaucrats. Lastly, the timing of rights
should track, with a slight lag, the exercise of different types of government powers
by the Commission: the Commission issues decisions and rules; litigants oppose
them with new legal theories; and the Court of Justice considers and initially rejects
the theories, but is moved eventually by self-interest, pro-democracy norms, and
doctrinal logic to accept the litigants' arguments.
Even though Shapiro's model of constitutional change is very different from
Nehl's, his predictions on institutions and timing are virtually identical, and neither
finds support in the historical record of transparency or civil society participation.429
The history of litigation before the European Courts contains many instances in
which plaintiffs advanced theories that would give them access to documents or an
exchange of views with the Commission and the Courts refused, repeatedly, to
entertain their claims. In establishing the right to transparency and the right to civil
society participation, the Court of Justice was a marginal actor.
In addition to predictions on institutions and timing, Shapiro anticipates that the
Commission will be required to respect procedures analogous to American ones, by
which he means principally notice and comment rulemaking. The judicial
interpretation given to the U.S. Administrative Procedure Act in the late 1960s and
1970s requires federal agencies to publish rulemaking proposals, including the
policy considerations and scientific information underlying proposals, accept
comments from the public, and give detailed explanations of their policy choices in
their final rules.430 Shapiro argues that the duty to give reasons will eventually be
interpreted in such a way as to give individuals a very similar set of rights. But that
has not happened. Even in the core area of individual competition, anti-dumping, and
customs decisions, the Commission's statement of reasons is far from the exhaustive
rebuttal of all the parties’ objections required under American law.431
The difference between the European and American practices lies in the origins
of the duty to give reasons.432 That principle was imposed on European institutions
in the Treaty of Rome of 1957 to give effect to the rule of law ideal, common to the
founding Member States, that all government acts must be based on law.433 A
429

See supra text accompanying note 41-45 (Shapiro), 31 (Nehl).
This set of requirements does not include transparency. Even in the judicialized American system
of government, a congressional act (the Freedom of Information Act) was necessary before individuals
had a general right to learn how their administration governed.
431
See supra text accompanying note 42.
432
Shapiro acknowledges that the European statement of reasons is not as extensive as the American
statement of basis and purpose. He attributes this to the European Courts's desire to avoid the American
experience of overly proceduralized agency decisionmaking or, in other words, transatlantic learning by
negative example. See Shapiro, Institutionalization, supra note 41, at 101-02. However, many, if not most,
judges on the European Courts are unfamiliar with American administrative law; even though some might
be wary of following the American route, it is unlikely that the American experience is the only or
principal explanation for the European outcome.
433
The duty to give reasons appears to have had special legal significance in Germany. The
“obligation to give full reasons” is considered part of the constitutional principle of lawfulness of
430
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European institution promulgating an act had to give the reasons for it: the legal
provision on which it was based and the grounds for believing that the government
act would further the purposes of that provision.434 The duty to give reasons was not
conceived as a device for guaranteeing pluralist participation in administrative
proceedings, as the analogous provisions of American law have been interpreted by
American courts.435 In the droit administratif systems of the original Member States,
if the parties believed that government administration had not taken into account an
important consideration and hence had acted contrary to the dictates of the enabling
law, they could go to court.436 When the common law right to a hearing became
European law, it had no impact on the duty to give reasons. The common law right
did not provide for a quasi-judicial opinion at the end of administrative proceedings;
indeed, it had nothing to say about the form of final administrative decisions.437
Thus, the statement of reasons that the Commission today gives in competition and
international trade cases does not answer each and every point made by the parties to
administrative proceedings.438 Knowing the grounds for a Commission decision is
one thing, obtaining a reply on every objection of fact, policy, and law is another
thing. The European Courts require only that the statement of reasons be complete
enough to enable the parties to determine that the administration acted according to
law or that they must go to court to vindicate their right to a government of laws and
not of men.439
administration as well as the constitutional principle of effective judicial protection against the executive.
Only if a party knows the reasons for a decision can she discern whether her rights have been infringed by
the executive. See Ress, supra note 89, at 4.4.
434
See Commission v. Council, Case 45/86, 1987 E.C.R. 1517 (obligation to state legal basis);
Roquette Frères v. Council, Case 138/79, 1980 E.C.R. 3333 (obligation to refer to any proposals or
opinions required under EC Treaty); Italy v. Commission, Case 1/69, 1969 E.C.R. 277 (obligation to give
“clear and unambiguous” statement of reasons).
435
Articles 5 and 7 (ex Article 4) of the EC Treaty confirm the rule of law interpretation of the duty
to give reasons. Article 5 states: “The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon
it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein.” Article 7 states: “Each institution [European
Parliament, Council, Commission, Court of Justice, Court of Auditors] shall act within the limits of the
powers conferred upon it by this Treaty.” The duty to give reasons under Article 253 should be read in
conjunction with the duty to remain within the limits of the powers conferred by the Treaty under Articles
5 and 7. I am indebted to Xavier Lewis for this insight.
436
See supra text accompanying note 51-52.
437
See Wade & Forsyth, supra note 54, at 516.
438
See, e.g. Siemens SA v. Commission, Case C-278/95 P, 1997 E.C.R. I-2507, at I-2535;
Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau GmbH v. Commission, Case T-198/01, at paras. 59-60 (C.F.I May 12,
2004) (not yet reported); Siemens SA v. Commission, Case T-459/93, 1995 E.C.R. II-1675, at II-1690, II1610 (“[the obligation to state reasons] is intended to give an opportunity to all the parties of defending
their rights, to the Community judicature of exercising its powers of review and to the Member States and
to all interested parties of ascertaining the circumstances in which the Commission has applied the Treaty.
. . . However, . . . , in stating the reasons for the decisions it has to take in order to ensure that the rules of
competition are applied, the Commission is not obliged to adopt a position on all the arguments relied on
by the parties concerned and it is sufficient if it sets out the facts and the legal considerations having
decisive importance in the context of the decision . . . .”).
439
The difference between the American statement of basis and purpose and the European duty to
give reasons is complemented by a difference in the procedure for judicial review of administrative
decisions. If the parties decide to challenge a Commission decision and they decide to make the same
(sometimes unanswered) objections in court, the Commission is allowed to reply with new arguments,
albeit not factual evidence because that would breach the right to be heard. See Thyssen Stahl AG v.
Commission, Case T-141/94, 1999 E.C.R. II-347, at II-556, II-557. By contrast before an American court,
as a general rule, government agencies can rely only on the explanations given in the administrative
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Moving beyond individual decisions to the duty to give reasons for general acts,
the European path has also taken an unexpected turn, at least compared to the
American one. With the right to civil society participation, the proceduralized
sequence of public notice, opportunity to comment, and government response has
been introduced for acts of a general nature but, for the time-being, only for
European laws, not implementing regulations. The Commission, in reasserting
authority after the resignation of the Santer Commission, needed civil society to
justify its role in making the fundamental, political choices contained in European
legislation. It had no strategic interest in involving civil society in what was
perceived as the technical domain of rulemaking. This is precisely the opposite from
the American experience. In the United States, regulations must adhere to notice and
comment procedures but congressional statutes, as a matter of constitutional and
statutory law, are free from requirements of public debate before they are passed.440
Although politically inconceivable, legislation could in theory be enacted by the
President and Congress without any opportunity for public comment.
The divergence between this analysis and the actual trajectory of procedural
rights suggests a number of revisions to the neo-functionalist framework.441 When
scholars examine the impact of the Court of Justice and the Commission on
European policymaking, they overlook sometimes the unusual structure of
supranational public power. This structure operates as the context in which
supranational bodies further their competence-aggrandizing preferences and
therefore shapes the policies and constitutional rules that emerge from the pursuit of
such preferences. When compared with national government, European
supranational governance incorporates an uncommon vertical dimension and an
uncommon horizontal dimension. Vertically, because the enforcement of executive
and judicial decisions depends upon the cooperation of national courts, individual
rights guaranteed before the Commission must meet with their approval. National
understandings of legitimate government authority can provoke rights
innovation—as with the common law's principle of natural justice—or limit such
innovation—as with the absence of procedural rights akin to American notice and
comment in European rulemaking. Therefore, to focus only on the horizontal
relationship between the Court of Justice and the Commission is to miss an
process. (Especially in the rulemaking context, however, a court will overlook an agency’s failure to
respond to a party’s objection in an administrative proceeding if the court determines that the agency’s
failure had no effect on the final rule and hence was not prejudicial. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d
298, 360 (1981).)
440
See William N. Eskridge et al., Cases and Materials on Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of
Public Policy 267-498 (2002).
441
The persistence of these differences in European and American administrative procedure,
notwithstanding the importance of multinationals and their American law firms in litigating cases before
the European Courts, indicates that claims about the Americanization of law in Europe and elsewhere
require further research. See Marc Galanter, Predators and Parasites: Lawyer-Bashing and Civil Rights, 28
Ga. L. Rev. 633, 679 (1994); R. Daniel Kelemen & Eric C. Sibbitt, The Globalization of American Law,
58 Int’l Org. 103 (2004); Wolfgang Wiegand, Americanization of Law: Reception or Convergence?, in
Legal Culture and the Legal Profession 137 (Lawrence M. Friedman & Harry N. Scheiber eds., 1996).
Indeed, the mechanism underlying the creation of European procedural rights—objections to European
law based on national traditions of legitimate government and accommodation of such objections in the
interest of preserving European government powers—suggests that non-European legal traditions will
have significantly less influence over European law.

346

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN LAW

[Vol. 11

important element of supranational judicial and executive power. We cannot explain
European procedural rights as caused exclusively by the assertion of judicial power
over Commission bureaucrats. Like European adjudication, European lawmaking is
shaped by an uncommon vertical element. Many decisions are taken by consensus,
not majority vote. For instance, treaties must be ratified by all countries, not a
majority of all European citizens or a majority of Member States. Hence the power
of the Danish electorate after they rejected the Maastricht Treaty and the salience of
the northern right to transparency.
It is also important to take into account the unconventional horizontal
configuration of European public power at the center. Neo-functionalist
examinations of rights tend to focus on the Court of Justice or the Court of Justice
and the Commission. However, as we have seen, a variety of supranational
institutions motivated by competence-maximizing preferences have been influential
in shaping rights. This is especially true for the more recent history of rights, with
the empowerment of a growing number of institutions at the European level,
including the European Parliament, the Ombudsman, and European agencies. The
transformation of the European political landscape that began in the early 1990s
requires that scholars cast their explanatory net more broadly to incorporate the full
range of supranational organizations.
A related source of complexity is the interaction of supranational institutions
and their competence-aggrandizing preferences. In the early days of the European
Community, the Commission and the Court of Justice were allied in pushing for the
constitutionalization of the Treaty of Rome—the transformation of obligations
incumbent on states into rights inhering in citizens. As the discussion of the right to a
hearing has revealed, they were also allied in expanding the rights that individuals
could invoke in supranational, Commission proceedings, in the interest of
guaranteeing enforcement of Commission competition decisions. But the
relationship between the Commission and the European Parliament is different.
Many commentators anticipated that the two also would join to promote the prointegration cause, against a foot-dragging Council of Ministers and nationalist
Member States.442 Contrary to expectations, the history of transparency and civil
society participation demonstrates that Parliament and the Commission can compete
as well as collude. In seeking more information through the right to transparency and
in forcing the resignation of the Santer Commission, the Parliament sought to
expand its powers over all branches of European government, including the
Commission. And in adopting the right to civil society participation, the
Commission reacted to the Parliament's bid for greater powers with an offensive
move of its own. European integration is at a point where the constitutional
relationship between the federalist center and the Member States has been
settled—more-or-less—and the relations among government bodies at the center are
under construction. In this historical phase, the competence-aggrandizing impulses
of supranational bodies induce them to compete for a role in the governing process,
just as in the early history of integration those same motives led them to collude in
favor of a federalist center.
442

See George Tsebelis, The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter, 88 Am.
Pol. Sci. Rev. 128, 133 (1994).
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The predictions of the theories, compared to the historical experience, are
summarized below. The discrepancy between the anticipated and actual evolution of
rights before the Commission demonstrates the need to develop an analytical
framework that can incorporate both comparative law and events that fall short of
major episodes of treaty-making.

Table 2---Predictions of the theories matched against the historical record
Legal
constitutionalism

Realism

Neofunctionalism

Historical record

Right to a
hearing:
rights,
agents, timing

--; European
Courts; gradually
after 1962.

Procedural
rights of French
and German
traditions;
Member States;
1962.

Rights under
American law;
European Courts;
gradually after
1962.

Originally rights of
French and
German
traditions (1962
and 1963)
followed by
English right to a
hearing (1974);
Member States,
European Courts,
Commission.

Transparency:
rights, agents,
timing

--; European
Courts; gradually
after 1957.

Limited or no
access to
documents as in
French and
German closed
government
traditions;
Member States;
1986 or before.

--

Originally no
access to
documents
followed by
northern right to
transparency
(1993); Heads of
State and
European
Parliament.

Civil society
participation:
rights, agents,
timing

--; European
Courts; gradually
after 1957.

Corporatist
interest
representation
in certain policy
areas as in
France and
Germany;
Member States;
1986 or before

Procedure similar
to American
notice and
comment for
implementing
regulations;
European Courts;
gradually after
1957.

Originally
corporatist interest
representation on
ESC (1957) and
advisory
committees (1960s
and 1970s), now
routine and formal
procedure for early
consultation of
public on all
legislative
proposals (2002);
Commission.
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D. Insights of Historical Institutionalism
The explanation of European rights advanced in this Article owes an intellectual
debt to a research approach in comparative politics known as "historical
institutionalism."443 According to historical-institutionalists, we can understand the
roots of cross-national differences in political and economic outcomes by
understanding institutions. Institutions are defined broadly as the organizations of
political and social life and their written rules, together with the less formal,
unwritten norms associated with those organizations.444 Legislatures, courts,
parliaments, constitutions, laws, regulations, judicial decisions, administrative
circulars, and standard bureaucratic operating procedures all fall squarely within the
definition of institution. Researchers working in this tradition often find that once
institutions come into being, they show remarkable staying power and affect political
outcomes in predictable ways (“path dependence”). In the sociological variant of
historical institutionalism, this is because rules and conventions shape the values,
beliefs, preferences, and identities of the individuals who work within those rules. In
the rational choice variant, the same persistence of institutions is explained as a
result of their role in solving collective action dilemmas and the difficulty, due to the
very nature of collective action dilemmas in political life, of discarding one suboptimal set of rules and organizations for another, better set.445 When they explain
the origins of institutions, such scholars go back to the point in time when
institutions were created or altered. They regard functionalist explanations of
institutions with skepticism. The logic of path dependence and unintended
consequences makes it unlikely that historical actors created organizations and rules
to serve the same needs as fulfilled today.
In the European context, contemporary neo-functionalist scholars have used
historical institutionalism to make the case for ascribing autonomous explanatory
force to supranational institutions.446 Once such organizations and rules were
established in the Treaty of Rome, they re-oriented the strategic behavior and
identities of European citizens. They acquired a life of their own. In this historicalinstitutionalist account, the Treaty of Rome set into motion a logic of path
dependence that can help explain the current shape of European governance.
In this Article, I have argued that two other historical sources of institutional
innovation apart from the bargain struck in the Treaty of Rome should be taken into
account. The first stretches back to before the Treaty, to the experience with public
law within the nation-state. The European Union emerged out of six, then nine, then
443
See generally Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis (2004);
Kathleen Thelen, How Institutions Evolve: Insights from Comparative Historical Analysis, i n
Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences 208 (James Mahoney & Dietrich Rueschemeyer
eds., 2003); Paul Pierson & Theda Skocpol, Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science,
in Political Science: State of the Discipline 693 (Ira Katznelson & Helen V. Milner eds. 2002); Kathleen
Thelen, Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics, 1999 Ann. Rev. Pol. Sci. 369; Peter Hall &
Rosemary C.R. Taylor, Political Science and the Three Institutionalisms, 44 Pol. Stud. 936 (1996).
444
Hall & Taylor, supra note 442, at 938.
445
See Paul Pierson, Path Dependence and the Study of Politics, 94 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 251 (2000).
446
See Alec Stone Sweet, Neil Fligstein & Wayne Sandholtz, The Institutionalization of European
Space, in Sweet, Institutionalization, supra note 34, at 1; Paul Pierson, The Path to European Integration:
A Historical-Institutionalist Analysis, in Sandholtz, European Integration, supra note 39, at 27, 48.
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twelve, and finally fifteen consolidated nation-states.447 Each has a highly formalized
and deeply entrenched set of organizations and rules that developed independently of
one another because of the territorially bounded nature of economic and social life in
the era of nation-building. National constitutional rules, such as the procedures that
must be followed by government administration and the rights of citizens to object to
government decisions, serve as powerful templates in designing European
institutions. When officials and citizens interact in international institutions, they do
not set out to design, what, by common consensus, is the fairest and most efficient of
organizations, rather they promote the different national models of democracy into
which they have already been socialized. Purposeful, strategic human action is
constrained by the mental maps of democracy developed in national polities.
The other, overlapping source of institutional innovation is to be found in events
that occurred after the original six Member States signed the Treaty of Rome, events
largely outside the control of the supranational institutions that were subsequently
transformed. UK accession prompted the Commission and the Court of Justice to
adopt a slew of common law principles in the interest of maintaining their
enforcement powers. The Danish rejection of the Maastricht Treaty made European
Heads of State take seriously the northern understanding of legitimate government.
And the European Parliament's challenge to the Santer Commission led to an effort
to improve Commission legitimacy through organizational change and provoked a
search for new rights, drawn this time from the international realm.
A fine-tuned, neofunctionalist account of Europe's supranational institutions and
their strategic context, together with a richer set of historical sources of
constitutional innovation, improves our understanding of European rights. It also
allows us to anticipate when national legal communities and voters, subscribing to
their national rights traditions, will be able to force changes to the European status
quo. And when supranational bodies will prompt other supranational bodies to
engage in constitutional transformation.
For instance, the logic of the right to a hearing leads us to anticipate that
accession of a state with an idiosyncratic set of individual rights should provoke the
Court of Justice and the Commission to engage in constitutional innovation.
Exploration of this hypothesis lies beyond the scope of this Article. However, a
cursory examination of developments in European administrative law after Spain
acceded in 1986 suggests that this line of inquiry is promising indeed. The legal
community in post-Franco Spain has been committed to entrenching an extensive set
of individual rights, many of which go beyond those enjoyed by citizens in longstanding democracies. Under Spanish law, before the customs authorities may
recover any difference between customs duties paid at the time of importation and
those owed to the European Union, they must notify the importer of the shortfall and
give the importer fourteen days to respond.448 Only once that period has expired can
the Spanish authorities issue a final administrative order for payment of the
447
Given the recent date of the accession of Central and Eastern European states as well as the more
malleable, less-established nature of their government systems, I do not count them among the
“consolidated nation-states” underlying the current European legal order.
448
This is known as "post-clearance recovery" and may occur within a period of three years after the
initial customs declaration and the release of the goods into the common market with payment of customs
duties.
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difference.449 (Customs duties go directly to the European purse, not Member State
treasuries, and represent about 10 percent of the European Union’s annual
budget.450) This has the effect of delaying the enforcement of European customs
law—by the time that separates calculation of the duty from the final order—with
the practical consequence that Spanish importers begin owing interest on the
amounts due fourteen days later than importers in the rest of the European Union.
And since customs duties represent a significant source of European revenues, the
Commission takes a very dim view of the delay caused by Spanish procedural
guarantees.
The Commission's response to the Spanish law has been inconsistent. In 2003,
the Commission sued Spain in the Court of Justice, on the grounds that the delay
constitutes a breach of the time-limit for assessment of the duty specified in
European customs law.451 But the Commission has also incorporated the Spanish
right in its draft of a new European Customs Code:
The debtor(s) shall, within a period following this advice [notice from the
national customs authority of the duty to be paid] to be determined in
accordance with the committee procedure [procedure for adopting
implementing regulations], have the opportunity to make his views known
before the duties are recovered. Upon expiry of this period, the debtor(s)
shall be notified, in the appropriate form, of the decision determining the
amount of duty to be recovered.452

If this provision passes, the minority Spanish right will become the standard for
customs proceedings throughout the European Union. The decision to modify
European law rather than rely on changing Spanish law through the enforcement
action might very well be driven by the concern that the case is destined to fail in the
Court of Justice. The possibility that Spanish courts might hold European customs
orders invalid because in violation of their importers’ fundamental rights is not
something that the Court would take lightly. Whether Spain will come into line with
Europe, or Europe with Spain, remains to be seen; but past experience indicates that
the latter outcome is more likely.
V. CONCLUSION
The European executive branch today is strikingly different from the one led by
Jean Monnet fifty years ago. Before the Commission may issue adverse, individual
decisions, it must notify the parties of all aspects of the planned decision, allow the
parties to examine the information in its files, accept written submissions, hold an
449
See Reglamento General de Inspección de los Tributos, Real Decrecto 939/1986 of Apr. 25,
1986, BOE, May 14, 1986, no. 117, at 17200, art. 49.
450
See European Commission, General Report on the Activities of the European Union 390, table 26
(2003) (9.8 billion out of the 94.6 billion Euro budget was projected to come from customs duties in
2004).
451
Case C-546/03: Action brought on 23 December 2003 by the Commission of the European
Communities against the Kingdom of Spain, 2004 O.J. (C 59) 12.
452
See European Commission, Modernized Customs Code, TAXUD/458/2004—REV 4, art. 59(3)
(Nov. 11, 2004), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/taxation_customs/resources/documents/458
rev_en.pdf.

2005]

CREATING EUROPEAN RIGHTS

351

oral hearing, and give a statement of the grounds for the final decision complete
enough so that the parties, and eventually the European Courts, can discern whether
the Commission has adhered to the requirements of European law. This set of rights
is most extensive in competition and anti-dumping proceedings, slightly less so in
customs remissions proceedings, and even less so in the other, rare instances in
which the Commission bypasses national administrations and makes adverse
individualized determinations. Europe's lawmakers were inspired by the droit
administratif tradition and the common law right to a hearing. When the right to a
hearing migrated to Brussels, it acquired a number of novel features. It guaranteed
more thorough-going disclosure of the government's case than in the administration
of origin, the UK Monopolies and Mergers Commission. Commission proceedings
were also largely free of political discretion after the parties had been heard, contrary
to British administration of competition policy.
As for transparency, the Commission is required to maintain a public, electronic
register of all the documents generated in the administrative and legislative
process—technical studies, committee agendas, and reports that serve to prepare
official acts—together with the official acts. The Commission is under a duty to
make those documents immediately accessible through the register or, second-best,
to provide the documents upon a request from a European citizen or resident. The
right of citizens to know how government makes decisions day-to-day, before and
after public debates in a parliamentary assembly, expanded in its adoptive home.
None of the northern systems, where the right originated, combined the transparency
guarantee of an electronic public register with that of access to documents
preliminary and political in nature.
Finally, when the Commission drafts proposals for European laws, it must
respect the right of civil society participation. It is obliged to make an early draft of
the proposal available to European civil society, accept comments, and explain in the
final version why it did or did not modify the proposal in light of the comments. The
definition of which associations count as the civil society that must be taken
seriously borrows from the European corporatist tradition of interest representation,
although it is more inclusive than the corporatist model. The systematic and crosscutting procedure for involving civil society in Commission governance goes beyond
any of the reforms yet undertaken by international organizations, the place where the
idea of civil society participation originated.
Notwithstanding that procedural rights emerged in different historical periods
and that they were informed by different cultural traditions and supranational
interests, they display one striking common characteristic: they afford citizens a
greater set of entitlements against European government than in their place of origin.
What accounts for this surprising outcome? One contributing factor is the weak
nature of the Commission as a government organization. The Commission relies on
cooperation from national administrations and national courts in enforcing European
law. It does not have a police force that it can call into action, European courts in
which it can appear to seek the execution of orders, or jails into which it can put
recalcitrant citizens. It does not have independent enforcement powers. Politically
too the Commission is weak. It is not led by a popularly elected official, as are
executive branches at the national level. It is led by a College of Commissioners,
headed by a President, that is appointed by common consensus among the Member
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States, with some input from the European Parliament. In no way can the
Commission be said to enjoy an electoral mandate when it undertakes its mission. In
responding to challenges from national judges, lawyers, and statesmen, as in the case
of a right to a hearing, the Commission cannot use legal enforcement powers. In
responding to challenges from national voters and elected officials, as in the case of
the right to transparency and civil society participation, the Commission cannot use
the political mandate of a popular vote. The Commission cannot say, as national
executive authorities generally do when faced with demands for rights, that it
governs in the name of the people and, therefore, the will of the majority and the
greater good must, under the circumstances, prevail over individual rights.
The history of procedural rights before the Commission is heartening because it
shows that as authority migrates beyond the confines of the nation-state, citizens,
lawyers and judges with allegiances to their strong national—and to some extent
international—rights cultures are vigilant in protecting rights in new political spaces.
And when such actors succeed in uploading constitutional guarantees from the
national to the European arena, those guarantees can expand in the European place
of destination.
Nonetheless, history reveals a startling irony. The European project, at the heart
of which is the Commission, was begun in response to a calamitous failure of the
nation-state: war. European leaders have given up national control over a variety of
policy areas in the belief that their countries do better by pooling sovereignty rather
than going it alone. Yet even though, in the original treaties, the Commission
obtained significant powers to further the cause of European integration, today, as
the European Union makes the transition from international organization to political
community, the Commission is circumscribed by an expanding set of procedural
rights. The institutional weakness that has contributed to this outcome is the result of
the design of the same Member States that originally conferred powers upon the
Commission. No European Head of State wants competition from a directly elected
President of the European Commission. Nor would any national voter want to be
arrested, tried, and sentenced by a public official who spoke a different language,
had been schooled in a different legal system, and had allegiances to a different set
of cultural and political institutions. The procedural guarantees have also been driven
by an unexpected institutional competitor of the Commission: a directly elected
European Parliament with extensive, treaty-based powers. As the margins of the
right to a hearing and the right to transparency are worked out in existing and novel
policy areas, the different dimensions of the still-uncertain right to civil society
participation are decided, and new rights are added to the European constitutional
order, this dynamic should be kept in mind. The Commission is not an ordinary
executive branch; for that reason it might well be more dangerous. But for that
reason too, it is less able to resist European citizens’ demands for rights.

